We easily know in others, the advantage of courage, of bodily strength, of experience, of disposition and of beautie, but we never yeelde the advantage of judgement to any body: And the reasons, which part from the simple naturall discourse in others, we thinke, that had we but looked that way, we had surely found them.
[tr. Florio (1603)]

We readily enough confess an advantage of courage, strength, experience, geod-nature, and beauty in others; but an advantage in judgment we yield to none, and the reasons that simply proceed from the natural sense of others, we think, if we had but turned our thoughts that way, we should ourselves have found them out.
[tr. Cotton (1686)]

We easily enough confess in others an advantage of courage, strength, experience, activity, and beauty, but an advantage in judgment we yield to none; and the reasons that proceed simply from the natural conclusions of others, we think, if we had but turned our thoughts that way, we should ourselves have found out as well as they.
[tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877)]

We easily recognise in others superiority of courage, of bodily strength, of experience, of activity, of beauty, of rank; but superiority of judgement we concede to no one; and the reasonings that proceed from simple natural intelligence in another, it seems to us that, had we but looked in that direction, we should have found them.
[tr. Ives (1925)]

We readily recognize in others a superiority in courage, physical strength, experience, agility, or beauty. But a superior judgement we concede to nobody. And we think that we could ourselves have discovered the reasons which occur naturally to others, if only we had looked in the same direction.
[tr. Cohen (1958)]

In others we readily acknowledge superior courage, physical strength, experience, agility and beauty: but superior judgement we concede to none. And such arguments in another as derive from pure inborn wit we think that we would have discovered too if only we had looked at things from the same angle.
[tr. Screech (1987)]

The quality of the pleasure makes sometimes amends for the shortness of the enjoyment. Fortune is weary to carry one and the same man always upon her shoulders.
[Flesher ed. (1685)]

Fortune pays you sometimes for the intensity of her favours by the shortness of their duration. She soon tires of carrying any one long on her shoulders.
[tr. Jacobs (1892)]

Luck always compensates her intensity by her brevity. Fortune wearies of carrying anyone long upon her shoulders.
[tr. Fischer (1937)]

Sometimes Lady Luck compensates us, trading intensity for duration. She grows tired when she has to carry someone on her back for a long time.
[tr. Maurer (1992)]

I am persuaded that this punishement is unlawful. Furthermore I thinke ther is no body that knoweth not, how unreasonable, yea, how pernitious a thinge it is to the weale publike, that a thefe and a homicide or murderer, should suffer equall and like punishment. For the thefe seynge that man, that is condempned for thefte in no less jeoperdie, nor judged to no lesse punishment, then him that is convicte of manslaughter; throughe this cogitation onelye he is strongly and forciblye provoked, and in a maner constreined to kill him whome els he woulde have but robbed. For the murder beynge ones done, he is in lesse feare, and in more hoope that the deede shall not be bewrayed or knowen, seynge the partye is nowe deade and rydde oute of the waye, which onelye mighte have uttered and disclosed it. But if he chaunce to be taken and discrived, yet he is in no more daunger and jeoperdie, then if he had committed but single fellonye. Therfore whiles we go about with suche crueltie to make theves aferd, we provoke them to kil good men.
[tr. Robynson (1551)]

I think the putting of Thieves to death is not lawful; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd, and of ill Consequence to the Common-Wealth, that a Thief and a Murderer should be equally punished; for if a Robber sees that his Danger is the same, if he is convicted of Theft, as if he were guilty of Murder, this will naturally set him on to kill the Person whom otherwise he would only have robbed; since, if the Punishment is the same, there is more security, and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make it is put out of the way; so that terrifying Thieves too much provokes them to cruelty.
[tr. Burnet (1684)]

I think putting thieves to death is not lawful ; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd, and of ill consequence to the commonwealth, that a thief and a murderer should be equally punished: for if a robber sees that his danger is the same, if he is convicted of theft, as if he were guilty of murder, this will naturally incite him to kill the person whom otherwife he would only have robbed, since if the punishment is the same, there is more security and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make it is put out of the way; so that terrifying thieves too much, provokes them to cruelty.
[tr. Warner (1758)]

I think putting thieves to death, not lawful. And it is obviously absurd, and prejudicial to the commonwealth, that theft and murder should be punished alike. For, if a robber find that his danger is the same, if he be convicted of theft as if he had been guilty of murder, he will be incited to kill the person whom otherwise he would only have robbed; since, the punishment being the same, there is less danger of discovery, when he who can best make it is killed. Thus, terrifying thieves too much, provoketh them to cruelty.
[tr. Cayley (1808)]

I think putting thieves to death is not lawful; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd and of ill consequence to the commonwealth that a thief and a murderer should be equally punished; for if a robber sees that his danger is the same if he is convicted of theft as if he were guilty of murder, this will naturally incite him to kill the person whom otherwise he would only have robbed; since, if the punishment is the same, there is more security, and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make it is put out of the way; so that terrifying thieves too much provokes them to cruelty.
[tr. Burnet/Morley (1901)]

I am persuaded that this punishment is unlawful. Furthermore, I think there is no body that knoweth not how unreasonable, yea, how pernicious a thing it is to the weal public that a thief and a homicide or murderer should suffer equal and like punishment. For the thief, seeing that man that is condemned for theft in no less jeopardy, nor judged to no less punishment, than him that is convict of manslaughter; through this cogitation only he is strongly and forcibly provoked, and in a manner constrained, to kill him, whom else he would have but robbed. For the murder once done, he is in less care and in more hope, that the deed shall not be betrayed or known, seeing the party is now dead and rid out of the way, which only might have uttered and disclosed it. But if he chance to be taken and discrived, yet he is in no more danger and jeopardy than if he had committed but single felony. Therefore whiles we go about with such cruelty to make thieves afeared, we provoke them to kill good men.
[tr. Robynson/Lupton/Armes (1911)]

I think this punishment unlawful. Now how absurd and even dangerous to the commonwealth it is that a thief and a murderer should receive the same punishment, surely everyone knows. For since the robber sees that he is in as great danger if merely condemned for theft as if he were convicted of murder as well, this consideration alone impels him to murder a man, whom otherwise he would only have robbed; for besides the fact that he is in no more danger if caught, there is greater safety in putting the man out of the way, and a greater hope of covering up the offence, if there is no one left to tell the tale. And so while we try to frighten thieves with excessive cruelty, we urge them on to the destruction of honest men.
[tr. Richards (1923)]

I think this punishment unlawful. Besides, surely everyone knows how absurd and even dangerous to the commonwealth it is that a thief and a murderer should receive the same punishment. Since the robber sees that he is in as great danger if merely condemned for theft as if he were convicted of murder as well, this single consideration impels him to murder the man whom otherwise he would only have robbed. In addition to the fact that he is in no greater danger if caught, there is greater safety in putting the man out of the way and greater hope of covering up the crime if he leaves no one left to tell the tale. Thus, while we endeavor to terrify thieves with excessive cruelty, we urge them on to the destruction of honest citizens.
[tr. Richards/Surtz (1964)]

I think it is wrong to put thieves to death. But everybody knows how absurd and even harmful to the public welfare it is to punish theft and murder alike. If theft carries the same penalty as murder, the thief will be encouraged to kill the victim whom otherwise he would only have robbed. When the punishment is the same, murder is safer, since one conceals both crimes by killing the witness. Thus while we try to terrify thieves with extreme cruelty, we really invite them to kill innocent men.
[tr. Adams (1992 ed.)]

I think putting thieves to death is not lawful; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd and of ill consequence to the commonwealth that a thief and a murderer should be equally punished; for if a robber sees that his danger is the same if he is convicted of theft as if he were guilty of murder, this will naturally incite him to kill the person whom otherwise he would only have robbed; since, if the punishment is the same, there is more security, and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make it is put out of the way; so that terrifying thieves too much provokes them to cruelty.
[tr. Open Utopia (Duncombe) (2012)]

None shall think lightly of me, as if weak,
Of courage void, or with a soul too tame,
But form'd by Heaven in a far different mould.
The terror of my foes, and to my friends
Benignant : for most glorious are the lives
Of those who act with such determin'd zeal.
[tr. Wodhull (1782)]

Let me not be deem'd
A poor, low-thoughted, tame, and timid thing:
No; to my foes relentless is my soul,
But to my friends all gentleness; and such
Are held through life in honour's highest rank.
[tr. Potter (1814)]

Let none believe me weak and lethargic
Nor tame in spirit, but far other souled;
Dour to my foes, but to my friends most helpful:
For the lives of such do wear the nobler grace.
[tr. Webster (1868)]

Let no one deem me a poor weak woman who sits with folded hands, but of another mould, dangerous to foes and well-disposed to friends; for they win the fairest fame who live their life like me.
[tr. Coleridge (1891)]

Let no one think me mean-spirited and weak, nor of a gentle temper, but of a contrary disposition to my foes relentless, and to my friends kind: for the lives of such sort are most glorious.
[tr. Buckley (1892)]

Let none account me impotent, nor weak,
Nor meek of spirit! — Nay, in other sort,
Grim to my foes, and kindly to my friends,
For of such is the life most glorious.
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

Names have I
Among your folk? One light? One weak of hand?
An eastern dreamer? — Nay, but with the brand
Of strange suns burnt, my hate, by God above,
A perilous thing, and passing sweet my love!
For these it is that make life glorious.
[tr. Murray (1906)]

Let no man think of me as mean or weak
Or a quiet soul, -- nay very far from it! --
As dangerous a foe as loyal friend.
For such are they that live most honourable.
[tr. Lucas, ed. Higham (1938)]

Let no one think me a weak one, feeble-spirited,
A stay-at-home, but rather just the opposite,
One who can hurt my enemies and help my friends;
For the lives of such persons are most remembered.
[tr. Warner (1944)]

Let no one think of me as “poor” or “weak”
Or “retiring”, but quite the contrary, a millstone
Around my enemies’ necks, a boon to my friends.
The lives of people like that are most renowned.
[tr. Podlecki (1989)]

Let no one think me weak, contemptible, untroublesome. No, quite the opposite, hurtful to foes, to friends kindly. Such persons live a life of greatest glory.
[tr. Kovacs (Loeb) (1994)]

Let no one think me a weak and feeble woman, or one to let things pass, but rather one of the other sort, a generous friend but an enemy to be feared. It is people like that who achieve true fame in life.
[tr. Davie (1996)]

Let no one think that I am some weak and sickly woman, or one of those quiet spirits!
Quite the opposite! I am most friendly to my friends and most fearsome to my enemies. It’s only people like me who live a life of glory.
[tr. Theodoridis (2004)]

Let no one think that I am mean or weak
nor peaceful, but of the other sort,
a weight upon my enemies but to my friends most kind.
It is to such people the heroic way of life belongs.
[tr. Luschnig (2007)]

Let no one think that I’m a trivial woman,
a feeble one who sits there passively.
No, I’m a different sort — dangerous
to enemies, but well disposed to friends.
Lives like mine achieve the greatest glory.
[tr. Johnston (2008), l. 957ff]

Let no one think me weak, worthless, or docile. Let me be thought the opposite of these: harsh with my ehemies, gentle with my friends. Such people live lives of great renown.
[tr. Kovacs / Kitzinger (2016)]

Let no one think me weak, contemptible,
untroublesome; no, quite the opposite,
hurtful to foes, kindly to friends;
such persons live a life of greatest glory.
[tr. Kovacs; ed. Yeroulanos (2016)]

Let no one think me insignificant or weak,
or gentle -- I am quite the opposite;
a heavy burden on my enemies
and a great help to my friends;
people like this live the most glorious life.
[tr. Ewans (2022)]

Let no one consider me trifling and weak, as one who lives in serenity [hēsukhiā], but of another mold: dangerous to enemies [ekhthroi], and well-disposed to philoi. They win the fairest kleos who live their life like me.
[tr. Coleridge / Ceragioli / Nagy / Hour25]

Let no one think of me as weak, contemptible, untroublesome. No, quite the opposite: hurtful to foes, to friends kindly. Such people live a life of greatest glory.
[tr. Kovacs / Zhang / Rogak]