Again, he that feareth pains and crosses in this world, feareth some of those things which some time or other must needs happen in the world. And that we have already showed to be impious. And he that pursueth after pleasures, will not spare, to compass his desires, to do that which is unjust, and that is manifestly impious. Now those things which unto nature are equally indifferent (for she had not created both, both pain and pleasure, if both had not been unto her equally indifferent): they that will live according to nature, must in those things (as being of the same mind and disposition that she is) be as equally indifferent.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

To go on: He that's afraid of Pain, or Affliction; will be afraid of something that will always be in the World; but to be thus uneasie at the Appointments of Providence, is a failure in Reverence, and Respect. On the other hand; He that's violent in the pursuit of Pleasure, won't stick to turn Villain for the Purchase: And is not this plainly , an Ungracious, and an Ungodly Humour? To set the Matter Right, where the Allowance of God is equally clear; as it is with Regard to Prosperity, and Adversity: For had he not approved both these Conditions, He would never have made them: I say where the Good Liking of Heaven is equally clear, Ours ought to be so too: Because we ought to follow the Guidance of Nature, and the Sense of the Deity.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

Besides, he who dreads pain, must sometimes dread that which must be a part of the order and beauty of the universe: this, now, is impious: and, then, he who pursues pleasures will not abstain from injury; and that is manifestly impious. But, in those things to which the common nature is indifferent, (for she had not made both, were she not indifferent to either); he who would follow nature, ought, in this too, to agree with her in his sentiments, and be indifferently dispos'd to either.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

Nay, he that is uneasy under affliction, is uneasy at what must necessarily exist in the world. This uneasiness, then, is a degree of impiety: and he who is too eager in his pursuit of pleasures, will not abstain from injustice to procure them. This is manifestly impious.
In short, as nature herself seems to view with indifference prosperity and adversity, (as she certainly does, or she would not produce them) so he who would follow nature as his guide, ought to do the same.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is equally affected -- for it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected towards both -- towards these they who wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Now, he that is afraid of pain will be afraid of something that will always be in the world; but this is a failure in reverence and respect. On the other hand, he that is violent in the pursuit of pleasure, will not hesitate to turn villain for the purchase. And is not this plainly an ungodly act? to set the matter right, where the allowance of God is equally clear, as it is with regard to prosperity and adversity (for had He not approved both of these conditions, He would never have made them both), I say, where the good liking of heaven is equally clear, ours ought to be so too, because we ought to follow the guidance of nature and the sense of the Deity.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

Moreover, he who fears pain will some time fear that which will form part of the world-order; and therein he sins. And he who seeks after pleasures will not abstain from unjust doing; which is palpably an act of sin. Where Nature makes no difference -- and were she not indifferent, she would not bring both to pass -- those who would fain walk with Nature should conform their wills to like indifference.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

Again, he who dreads pain must sometimes dread a thing which will make part of the world order, and this is impious. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is clear impiety. In those things to which the common nature is indifferent (for she had not made both, were she not indifferent to either), he who would follow Nature ought, in this also, to be of like mind with her, and shew the like indifference.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

Moreover he that dreads pain will some day be in dread of something that must be in the world. And there we have impiety at once. And he that hunts after pleasures will not hold his hand from injustice. And this is palpable impiety.
But those, who are of one mind with Nature and would walk in her ways, must hold a neutral attitude towards those things towards which the Universal Nature is neutral—for she would not be the Maker of both were she not neutral towards both.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

He who fears pains will sometimes fear what is to come to pass in the Universe, and this is at once sinful, while he who pursues pleasures will not abstain from doing injustice, and this is plainly sinful. But those who wish to follow Nature, being like-minded with her, must be indifferent towards the things to which she is indifferent, for she would not create both were she not indifferent towards both.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

And furthermore, one who is afraid of pain is sure to be afraid at times of things which come to pass in the universe, and that is already an impiety; and one that pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and that is manifest impiety. But towards those things with regard to which universal nature is neutral (for she would not have created both opposites unless she was neutral with regard to both), it is necessary that those who wish to follow nature and be of one mind with her should also adopt a neutral attitude.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.)]

And moreover, to fear pain is to fear something that’s bound to happen, the world being what it is -- and that again is blasphemy. While if you pursue pleasure, you can hardly avoid wrongdoing -- which is manifestly blasphemous.
Some things nature is indifferent to; if it privileged one over the other it would hardly have created both. And if we want to follow nature, to be of one mind with it, we need to share its indifference.
[tr. Hays (2003)]

Further, anyone who fears pain will also at times be afraid of some future event in the world, and that is immediate sin. And a man who pursues pleasure will not hold back from injustice -- an obvious sin. Those who wish to follow Nature and share her mind must themselves be indifferent to those pairs of opposites to which universal Nature is indifferent -- she would not create these opposites if she were not indifferent either way.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

And furthermore, one who is afraid of pain is sure to be afraid at times of things which come about in the universe, and that is already an impiety; and one who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and that is a manifest impiety. But towards those things with regard to which universal nature is neutral (for she would not have created both opposites unless she was neutral with regard to both), it is necessary that those who wish to follow nature and be of one mind with her should also adopt a neutral attitude.
[tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

He also that pursues after pleasures, as that which is truly good and flies from pains, as that which is truly evil: is impious. For such a one must of necessity oftentimes accuse that common nature, as distributing many things both unto the evil, and unto the good, not according to the deserts of either: as unto the bad oftentimes pleasures, and the causes of pleasures; so unto the good, pains, and the occasions of pains.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

Farther: He that reckons Prosperity and Pleasure among Things really Good; Pain and Hardship amongst Things really Evil , can be no Pious Person: For such a Man will be sure to complain of the Administrations of Providence, Charge it with Mismatching Fortune, and Merit, and misapplying Rewards and Punishments: He'll often see Ill People furnish'd with Materials for Pleasure, and Regaled with the Relish of it : And good Men harrass'd and deprest, and meeting with nothing but Misfortune.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

He, too, who pursues pleasure as good, and shuns pain as evil, is guilty of impiety: for such a one must needs frequently blame the common nature, as making some unworthy distributions to the bad and the good; because the bad oftimes enjoy pleasures, and possess the means of them; and the good often meet with pain, and what causes pain.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

Moreover, he who pursues pleasure, as if it were really good, or flies from pain, as if it were evil, he also is guilty of impiety. For he that is thus disposed, must necessarily complain often of the dispensations of Providence, as distributing its favours to the wicked and to the virtuous, without regard to their respective deserts; the wicked frequently abounding in pleasures, and in the means of procuring them, and the virtuous, on the contrary, being harassed with pain, and other afflictive circumstances.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Further, he that reckons prosperity and pleasure among things really good, pain and hardship amongst things really evil, can be no pious person; for such a man will be sure to complain of the administrations of Providence, and charge it with mismatching fortune and merit. He will often see evil people furnished with materials for pleasure and regaled with the relish of it, and good men harassed and depressed, and meeting with nothing but misfortune.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

Again, to seek pleasures as good, or to shun pains as evil, is to sin. For it inevitably leads to complaining against Nature for unfair awards to the virtuous and to the vile, seeing that the vile are oftentimes in pleasure and come by things pleasurable, while the virtuous are overtaken by pain and things painful.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

He, too, who pursues pleasure as good, and shuns pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. Such a one must needs frequently blame the common nature for unseemly awards of fortune to bad and to good men. For the bad often enjoy pleasures and possess the means to attain them, and the good often meet with pain and with what causes pain.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

Again he acts impiously who seeks after pleasure as a good thing and eschews pain as an evil. For such a man must inevitably find frequent fault with the Universal Nature as unfair in its apportionments to the worthless and the worthy, since the worthless are often lapped in pleasures and possess the things that make for pleasure, while the worthy meet with pain and the things that make for pain.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Moreover, he who runs after pleasures as goods and away from pains as evils commits sin; for being such a man he must necessarily often blame Universal Nature for distributing to bad and good contrary to their desert, because the bad are often employed in pleasures and acquire what may produce these, while the good are involved in pain and in what may produce this.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

Again, it is a sin to pursue pleasure as a good and to avoid pain as an evil. It is bound to result in complaints that Nature is unfair in her rewarding of vice and virtue; since it is the bad who are so often in enjoyment of pleasures and the means to obtain them, while pains and events that occasion pains descend upon the heads of the good.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

Again, one who pursues pleasure as good and tries to avoid pain as an evil is acting irreverently; for it is inevitable that such a person must often find fault with universal nature for assigning something to good people or bad which is contrary to their deserts, because it is so often the case that the bad devote themselves to pleasure and secure the things that give rise to it whilstr the good encounter pain and what gives rise to that.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.)]

Moreover, the pursuit of pleasure as a good and the avoidance of pain as an evil constitutes sin. Someone like that must inevitably and frequently blame universal Nature for unfair distribution as between bad men and good, since bad men are often deep in pleasures and the possessions which make for pleasure, while the good often meet with pain and the circumstances which cause pain.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

Again, one who pursues pleasures as being good and tries to avoid pains as being bad is acting irreverently; for it is inevitable that such a person must often find fault with universal nature for assigning something to good people or bad that is contrary to their deserts, because it is so often the case that the bad devote themselves to pleasure and secure the things that give rise to it while the good encounter pain and what gives rise to that.
[tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

He that is unjust, is also impious. For the nature of the universe, having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should do one another good; more or less according to the several persons and occasions but in nowise hurt one another: it is manifest that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the most ancient and venerable of all the deities. For the nature of the universe, is the nature the common parent of all, and therefore piously to be observed of all things that are, and that which now is, to whatsoever first was, and gave it its being, hath relation of blood and kindred.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

To play the Knave is to Rebel against Religion, all sort of Injustice is no less then High Treason against Heaven: For since the Nature, or Soul of the Universe has made Rational Creatures for mutual Service, and Support Made them that they should Assist, and Oblige each other, according to the Regards of Circumstance, and Merit; but never do any body any Harm: The Case standing thus, he that crosses upon this Design, is Prophane in his Contradiction , and Outrages the most Antient Deity. For the Nature of the Universe is the Cause of it , and that which gives it Being. Thus all things are one Family, suited , and as it were of Kin to each other.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

He who does an injury is guilty of impiety. For, since the nature of the whole has formed the rational animals for one another; each for being useful to the other according to his merit, and never hurtful; he who transgresses this her will, is thus guilty of impiety against the most ancient and venerable of the Gods. For the nature of the whole is the nature of all things which exist; and things which exist, are a-kin to their causes.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

He that acts unjustly, acts impiously. For God, or the Universal Nature, having produced all rational creatures to be mutually serviceable to each other, according to their respective merits, and by no means to injure each other; he who violates this first principle of nature, prophanely insults the most antient of all Deities. For this Universal Nature is the cause of all things that exist which are connected with each other by mutual friendship and alliance.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another, to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Injustice is no less than high treason against heaven. For since the nature of the universe has made rational creatures for mutual service and support, but never to do anybody any harm, since the case stands thus: he that crosses upon this design is profane, and outrages the most ancient Deity.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

To be unjust is to sin. By Nature rational beings have been constituted for one another's sake, each to help each according to its worth, and in wise to hurt: and he who transgresses the will of Nature, sins -- to wit, against the primal deity.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

He who does injustice commits impiety. For since universal Nature has formed the rational animals for one another; each to be useful to the other according to his merit, and never hurtful; he who transgresses this her will is clearly guilty of impiety against the most ancient and venerable of the Gods.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

Injustice is impiety. For in that the Nature of the Universe has fashioned rational creatures for the sake of one another with a view to mutual benefit based upon worth, but by no means for harm, the transgressor of her will acts with obvious impiety against the most venerable of Deities.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Whosoever does injustice commits sin; for Universal Nature having made reasonable creatures for the sake of one another, to benefit each other according to desert but in no wise to do injury, manifestly he who transgresses her will sins against the most venerable of the gods, because Universal Nature is a nature of what is, and what is is related to all that exists.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

Injustice is a sin. Nature has constituted rational beings for their own mutual benefit, each to help his fellows according to their worth, and in no wise to do them hurt; and to contravene her will is plainly to sin against this eldest of all the deities.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

Whoever commits injustice acts irreverently; for since universal nature has created rational creatures for the sake of one another, to benefit their fellows according to their deserts and in no wise to do them harm, it is plain that one who offends against her will is guilty of irreverence towards the most venerable of gods.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.); tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

Injustice is sin. When universal Nature has constituted rational creatures for the sake of each other -- to benefit one another as deserved, but never to harm -- anyone contravening her will is clearly guilty of sin against the oldest of the gods: because universal Nature is the nature of ultimate reality, to which all present existence is related.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

That heav'ns are voide, & that no gods there are,
Rich Paulus saith, and all his proofe is this:
That while such blasphemies pronounce he dare,
He liveth here in ease, and earthly blisse.
[tr. Harington (1618), ep. 110 (Book 2, ep. 14), "Against an Atheist"]

Selius affirms, in heav'n no gods there are:
And while he thrives, and they their thunder spare,
His daring tenet to the world seems fair.
[tr. Killigrew (1695)]

Selius asserts, there is no providence:
Anmd what he thus asserts, he proves from hence;
Tht such a villain as himself still lives;
And, what is more, is courted too, and thrives.
[tr. Hay (1755)]

A Selius swears there is no god,
And thus attests an oath so odd.
Heaven has no habitant, quoth he;
Else how could heaven so smile on me?
[tr. Elphinston (1782), Book 7, ep. 12]

That there's no God, John gravely swears,
And quotes, in proof, his own affairs;
For how should such an atheist thrive,
If there was any God alive?
[Anon., Westminster Review, 1853-04]

Selius affirms that there are no Gods, and that Heaven is empty; and he produces a proof of his assertion; viz. that while he denies all Providence, he beholds himself affluent.
[tr. Amos (1858)]

Selius affirms that there are no gods, and that heaven is empty; and thinks he has sufficient proof of his opinion in seeing himself become rich while he maintains it.
[tr. Bohn's Classical (1859)]

"There are no gods: heaven is empty," Segius asserts; and he proves it, for in the midst of these denials he sees himself made rich!
[tr. Ker (1919)]

When Segius declaims he knows
That Heaven is void and gods are not,
It is because his record shows
That knaves may have a prosperous lot.
[tr. Pott & Wright (1921), "The Test of Facts"]

"There are no gods," says Segius, "and the blue
Is void." He lives and thrives and proves it true.
[tr. Francis & Tatum (1924), ep. 169]

"There are no gods, and heaven's all a lie!
No gods," said Segius, "give a damn or care
What happens to us." And he must be right:
Today the rat's a multi-millionaire.
[tr. Marcellino (1968)]

Sergius swears by the hollow sky that there are no gods,
and the truth is plain, since he,
denouncing them, is wealthy as can be.
[tr. Bovie (1970)]

"The skies are empty
and the gods are dead,"
says Segius, the proof of which
is that he sees himself made rich.
[tr. Porter (1972)]

"God doesn't exist, there's no one in the skies,"
Says Segius. If it's justice he denies,
He's right: would he be wealthy otherwise?
[tr. Michie (1972)]

Segius declares that there are no gods, that the sky is empty; and proves it, for in the course of these denials he sees himself become a rich man.
[tr. Shackleton Bailey (1993)]

This darkling world he claims, with rue
Has run itself into a ditch.
And he can prove his thesis true:
In such a cosmos -- he is rich.
[tr. Wills (2007)]

Segius says there are no gods, no heaven.
The proof he offers? He's a rich man.
[tr. Kennelly (2008), "Proof"]

Segius asserts that there are no gods, that heaven is empty. And he’s the proof, because, even as he denies these things, he sees that he’s become prosperous.
[tr. @aleatorclassicus (2012)]

Segius claims there are no gods, the skies
are bare. He proves it, too: while he denies
the gods exist, he sees his fortune rise.
[tr. McLean (2014)]

Not knowing he that fights with Heav’n hath never long to live,
And for this deed, he never shall have child about his knee
To call him father, coming home.
[tr. Chapman (1611), ll. 387-89]

No man who fights with gods will live long or hear his children prattling about his knees when he returns from battle.
[tr. Butler (1898)]

Know thou, whoe'er with heavenly power contends,
Short is his date, and soon his glory ends;
From fields of death when late he shall retire,
No infant on his knees shall call him sire.
[tr. Pope (1715-20)]

Infatuate! he forgets
That whoso turns against the Gods his arm
Lives never long; he never, safe escaped
From furious fight, the lisp’d caresses hears
Of his own infants prattling at his knees.
[tr. Cowper (1791), ll. 474-78]

Infatuate! nor does the son of Tydeus know this in his mind, that he is by no means long-lived who fights with the immortals, nor ever at his knees will sons lisp a father’s name, as he returns from war and dreadful battle.
[tr. Buckley (1860)]

Unknowing he how short his term of life
Who fights against the Gods! for him no child
Upon his knee shall lisp a father's name,
Safe from the war and battle-field return'd.
[tr. Derby (1864), ll. 463-466]

Verily he endureth not for long who fighteth with the immortals, nor do his children prattle about his knees when he is come back from war and the dread conflict.
[tr. Murray (1924)]

That man who fights the immortals lives for no long time, his children do not gather to his knees to welcome their father when he returns home after the fighting and the bitter warfare.
[tr. Lattimore (1951)]

Doesn't the son of Tydeus know, down deep,
the man who fights the gods does not live long?
Nor do his children ride his knees with cries of 'Father' --
home at last from the wars and heat of battle.
[tr. Fagles (1990), ll. 465-468]

• the first clause was struck, changing the beginning to "Whereas Almighty God ...."
• the phrase "and manifested his supreme will that free it shall remain by making it altogether insusceptible of restraint" was struck.
• the phrase "but to extend it by its influence on reason alone" was struck.