I now am well aware
What crimes I venture on: but rage, the cause
Of woes most grievous to the human race,
Over my better reason hath prevail'd.
[tr. Wodhull (1782)]

I know, I feel the ills, my soul now dares;
But rage, which lords it ov'er my breast, gives birth
To all the dreadful ills that chasten man.
[tr. Potter (1814)]

Oh I do know what sorrows I shall make,
But anger keeps the mastery of my thoughts,
Which is the chiefest cause of human woes.
[tr. Webster (1868)]

At last I understand the awful deed I am to do; but passion, that cause of direst woes to mortal man, hath triumphed o'er my sober thoughts.
[tr. Coleridge (1891)]

I know indeed the ills that I am about to dare, but my rage is master of my counsels, which is indeed the cause of the greatest calamities to men.
[tr. Buckley (1892)]

I know, indeed, the evil of that I purpose; but my inclination gets the better of my judgment.
[Bartlett's (1892)]

Now, now, I learn what horrors I intend:
But passion overmastereth sober thought:
And this is cause of direst ills to men.
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

Yea, I know to what bad things
I go, but louder than all thought doth cry
Anger, which maketh man's worst misery.
[tr. Murray (1906)]

I understand
The horror of what I am going to do; but anger,
The spring of all life's horror, masters my resolve.
[tr. Vellacott (1963)]

I understand how evilly I am about to act,
But my spirit is stronger than my will to resist,
Spirit, the greatest cause of evil for men.
[tr. Podlecki (1989)]

And I know well what pain I am about to undergo, but my wrath overbears my calculation, wrath that brings mortal men their gravest hurt.
[tr. Kovacs (Loeb) (1994)]

I am well aware how terrible a crime I am about to commit, but my passion is master of my reason, passion that causes the greatest suffering in the world.
[tr. Davie (1996)]

I know only too well how horrible the crime I am about to commit is. Logic makes it clear for me but anger, the only cause of man’s most terrible suffering, anger, conquers my logic.
[tr. Theodoridis (2004)]

I understand what evil I am about to do
but my wrath is stronger even than my thoughts,
which is the cause of the greatest wrongs of humankind.
[tr. Luschnig (2007)]

I understand too well the dreadful act
I’m going to commit, but my judgment
cannot check my anger, and that incites
the greatest evils human beings do.
[tr. Johnston (2008)]

I know well what evil I intend to do,
but anger overbears my calculation,
anger, cause of the worst misery to man.
[ed. Yeroulanos (2016)]

I know how great a crime I'm going to commit,
but anger has control over my plans
anger, which is the greatest cause of human pain.
[tr. Ewans (2022)]

At last I understand the evils [kaka] that I will perform; but my thūmos, responsible [aitios] for the greatest troubles [kaka] for mortals, is stronger than my sober thoughts.
[tr. Coleridge / Ceragioli / Nagy / Hour25]

And I know well what pain I am about to undergo, but my wrath overpowers my calculation, wrath that brings mortal men their gravest hurt.
[tr. Kovacs / Zhang / Rogak]

We easily forget our Faults, when no body knows them but our selves.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶197]

We easily forget crimes that are known only to ourselves.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶74]

We easily forget crimes which are known only within ourselves.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶62]

We easily forget our faults when they are only known to ourselves.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶205]

We easily forget those faults which are known only to ourselves.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶196]

Failings known to us alone are easily forgotten.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶201]

Our faults are easily forgotten when they are known only to ourselves.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶196]

We easily forget our faults when no one but ourselves knows them.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶196]

Our misdeeds are easily forgotten when they are known only to ourselves.
[tr. Tancock (1959), ¶196]

We easily forget our faults when they are known to ourselves alone.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶196]

Most people fancy themselves innocent of those crimes of which they cannot be convicted.

Innocentem quisque se decit, respiciens testem, non conscientiam.

Suerlye my lorde, I thinke it not ryght nor justice, that the losse of money should cause the losse of mans life. For myne opinion is, that all the goodes in the worlde are not hable to countervayle mans life. But if they would thus say; that the breakynge of justice, and the transgression of the lawes is recompensed with this punishment, and not the losse of the money, then why maye not this extreme and rigorous justice wel be called plaine injurie? For so cruell govemaunce, so streite rules, and unmercyful lawes be not allowable, that if a small offense be committed, by and by the sword should be drawen: nor so stoical ordinaunces are to be borne withall, as to counte al offenses of suche equalitie, that the killing of a man, or the takyng of his money from him were both a matter, and the one no more heinous offense then the other: betwene the whyche two, yf we have anye respecte to equitie, no similitude or equalitie consisteth.
[tr. Robynson (1551)]

It seems to me a very unjust thing to take away a Man's Life for a little Mony; for notyhing in the World can be of equal value with a Man's Life: and if it is said, that it is not for the Mony that one suffers, but for his breaking the Law; I must say extream Justice is an extream Injury: for we ought not to approve of these terrible Laws that make the smallest Offences capital; nor of that Opinion of the Stoicks that makes all Crimes equal, as if there were no difference to be made between the killing of a Man, and the taking his Purse; between wich if we examine things impartially, there is no likeness nor proportion.
[tr. Burnet (1684)]

It seemeth very unjust to me to take away life for a little money, for nothing can be of equal value with life. And if it be said, that the suffering is not for the money, but for the breach of the law, I answer, extreme justice is an extreme injury. For we ought not to approve of those terrible laws, which make the smallest offences capital, nor of that opinion of the stoics which maketh all crimes equal: as if no difference were to be made between killing a man and taking his purse, between which, in reality, there is the greatest disproportion.
[tr. Cayley (1808)]

Surely my lord, I think it not right nor justice, that the loss of money should cause the loss of man’s life. For mine opinion is, that all the goods in the world are not able to countervail man’s life. But if they would thus say: that the breaking of justice, and the transgression of the laws is recompensed with this punishment, and not the loss of the money, then why may not this extreme justice well be called extreme injury? For neither so cruel governance, so strait rules, and unmerciful laws be allowable, that if a small offence be committed, by-and-by the sword should be drawn: nor so stoical ordinances are to be borne withal, as to count all offences of such equality that the killing of a man, or the taking of his money from him were both a matter, and the one no more heinous offence than the other: between the which two, if we have any respect to equity, no similitude or equality consisteth.
[tr. Robinson (1909 ed.)]

Certainly, right reverend father and my kind lord, I think it quite unjust that a man should lose his life for the loss of money. For in my opinion not all the goods that fortune can bestow on us can be set in the scale against a man's life. But if they say that this penalty is attached to the offence against justice and the breaking of the laws, and not to the theft of money, one may well style this extreme justice as extreme wrong. For we ought not to approve of such stern rules of law as should justify the drawing of the sword, when they are disobeyed in trifles, nor on the other hand such Stoical ordinances as count all offences equal, so that there is no difference whether one kills a man or robs him of a coin, when if equity has any meaning, there is no similarity or connexion between the two cases. God has said, "Thou shalt not kill," and shall we so lightly kill a man for taking a little money?
[tr. Richards (1923)]

Your Grace, it seems to me quite unjust to take a man's life because he's taken some money. To my mind, no amount of property is equivalent to a human life. If it's argued that the punishment is not for taking the money, but for breaking the law and violating justice, isn't this conception of absolute justice absolutely unjust? One really can’t approve of a régime so dictatorial that the slightest disobedience is punishable by death, nor of a legal code based on the Stoic paradox that all offences are equal — so that there’s no distinction in law between theft and murder, though in equity the two things are so completely different.
[tr. Turner (1965 ed.)]

Certainly, most reverend and kind Father, I think it altogether unjust that a man should suffer the loss of his life for the loss of someone’s money. In my opinion, not all the goods that fortune can bestow on us can be set in the scale against a man’s life. If they say that this penalty is attached to the offense against justice and the breaking of the laws, hardly to the money stolen, one may well characterize this extreme justice as extreme wrong. For we ought not to approve such stern Manlian rules of law as would justify the immediate drawing of the sword when they are disobeyed in trifles nor such Stoical ordinances as count all offenses equal so that there is no difference between killing a man and robbing him of a coin when, if equity has any meaning, there is no similarity or connection between the two cases.
[tr. Richards/Surtz (1964)]

It seems to me, most kind and reverend father, that it's altogether unjust to take away a man's life for the loss of someone's money. Nothing in the world that fortune can bestow is equal in value to a man's life. If they say the thief suffers not for the money, but for violation of justice and transgression of laws, then this extreme justice should really be called extreme injury. We ought not to approve of these fierce Manlian laws that invoke the sword for the smallest violations. Neither should we accept the Stoic view that considers all crimes equal, as if there were no difference between killing a man and taking a coin from him. If equity means anything, there is no proportion or relation at all between these two crimes.
[tr. Adams (1992 ed.)]

I am persuaded that this punishement is unlawful. Furthermore I thinke ther is no body that knoweth not, how unreasonable, yea, how pernitious a thinge it is to the weale publike, that a thefe and a homicide or murderer, should suffer equall and like punishment. For the thefe seynge that man, that is condempned for thefte in no less jeoperdie, nor judged to no lesse punishment, then him that is convicte of manslaughter; throughe this cogitation onelye he is strongly and forciblye provoked, and in a maner constreined to kill him whome els he woulde have but robbed. For the murder beynge ones done, he is in lesse feare, and in more hoope that the deede shall not be bewrayed or knowen, seynge the partye is nowe deade and rydde oute of the waye, which onelye mighte have uttered and disclosed it. But if he chaunce to be taken and discrived, yet he is in no more daunger and jeoperdie, then if he had committed but single fellonye. Therfore whiles we go about with suche crueltie to make theves aferd, we provoke them to kil good men.
[tr. Robynson (1551)]

I think the putting of Thieves to death is not lawful; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd, and of ill Consequence to the Common-Wealth, that a Thief and a Murderer should be equally punished; for if a Robber sees that his Danger is the same, if he is convicted of Theft, as if he were guilty of Murder, this will naturally set him on to kill the Person whom otherwise he would only have robbed; since, if the Punishment is the same, there is more security, and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make it is put out of the way; so that terrifying Thieves too much provokes them to cruelty.
[tr. Burnet (1684)]

I think putting thieves to death is not lawful ; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd, and of ill consequence to the commonwealth, that a thief and a murderer should be equally punished: for if a robber sees that his danger is the same, if he is convicted of theft, as if he were guilty of murder, this will naturally incite him to kill the person whom otherwife he would only have robbed, since if the punishment is the same, there is more security and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make it is put out of the way; so that terrifying thieves too much, provokes them to cruelty.
[tr. Warner (1758)]

I think putting thieves to death, not lawful. And it is obviously absurd, and prejudicial to the commonwealth, that theft and murder should be punished alike. For, if a robber find that his danger is the same, if he be convicted of theft as if he had been guilty of murder, he will be incited to kill the person whom otherwise he would only have robbed; since, the punishment being the same, there is less danger of discovery, when he who can best make it is killed. Thus, terrifying thieves too much, provoketh them to cruelty.
[tr. Cayley (1808)]

I think putting thieves to death is not lawful; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd and of ill consequence to the commonwealth that a thief and a murderer should be equally punished; for if a robber sees that his danger is the same if he is convicted of theft as if he were guilty of murder, this will naturally incite him to kill the person whom otherwise he would only have robbed; since, if the punishment is the same, there is more security, and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make it is put out of the way; so that terrifying thieves too much provokes them to cruelty.
[tr. Burnet/Morley (1901)]

I am persuaded that this punishment is unlawful. Furthermore, I think there is no body that knoweth not how unreasonable, yea, how pernicious a thing it is to the weal public that a thief and a homicide or murderer should suffer equal and like punishment. For the thief, seeing that man that is condemned for theft in no less jeopardy, nor judged to no less punishment, than him that is convict of manslaughter; through this cogitation only he is strongly and forcibly provoked, and in a manner constrained, to kill him, whom else he would have but robbed. For the murder once done, he is in less care and in more hope, that the deed shall not be betrayed or known, seeing the party is now dead and rid out of the way, which only might have uttered and disclosed it. But if he chance to be taken and discrived, yet he is in no more danger and jeopardy than if he had committed but single felony. Therefore whiles we go about with such cruelty to make thieves afeared, we provoke them to kill good men.
[tr. Robynson/Lupton/Armes (1911)]

I think this punishment unlawful. Now how absurd and even dangerous to the commonwealth it is that a thief and a murderer should receive the same punishment, surely everyone knows. For since the robber sees that he is in as great danger if merely condemned for theft as if he were convicted of murder as well, this consideration alone impels him to murder a man, whom otherwise he would only have robbed; for besides the fact that he is in no more danger if caught, there is greater safety in putting the man out of the way, and a greater hope of covering up the offence, if there is no one left to tell the tale. And so while we try to frighten thieves with excessive cruelty, we urge them on to the destruction of honest men.
[tr. Richards (1923)]

I think this punishment unlawful. Besides, surely everyone knows how absurd and even dangerous to the commonwealth it is that a thief and a murderer should receive the same punishment. Since the robber sees that he is in as great danger if merely condemned for theft as if he were convicted of murder as well, this single consideration impels him to murder the man whom otherwise he would only have robbed. In addition to the fact that he is in no greater danger if caught, there is greater safety in putting the man out of the way and greater hope of covering up the crime if he leaves no one left to tell the tale. Thus, while we endeavor to terrify thieves with excessive cruelty, we urge them on to the destruction of honest citizens.
[tr. Richards/Surtz (1964)]

I think it is wrong to put thieves to death. But everybody knows how absurd and even harmful to the public welfare it is to punish theft and murder alike. If theft carries the same penalty as murder, the thief will be encouraged to kill the victim whom otherwise he would only have robbed. When the punishment is the same, murder is safer, since one conceals both crimes by killing the witness. Thus while we try to terrify thieves with extreme cruelty, we really invite them to kill innocent men.
[tr. Adams (1992 ed.)]

I think putting thieves to death is not lawful; and it is plain and obvious that it is absurd and of ill consequence to the commonwealth that a thief and a murderer should be equally punished; for if a robber sees that his danger is the same if he is convicted of theft as if he were guilty of murder, this will naturally incite him to kill the person whom otherwise he would only have robbed; since, if the punishment is the same, there is more security, and less danger of discovery, when he that can best make it is put out of the way; so that terrifying thieves too much provokes them to cruelty.
[tr. Open Utopia (Duncombe) (2012)]

La promptitude avec laquelle nous croyons le mal, sans l’avoir assez examiné, est un effet de la paresse et de l’orgueil.
 
[The readiness with which we believe evil, without having examined it sufficiently, is an effect of laziness and pride.]

A readiness to believe Ill, before we have duly Examined it, is the Effect of Laziness and Pride. Men are pleased to find Others to Blame and loth to give Themselves the Trouble of Enquiring, how far, and whether they are so, or not.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶268]

A readiness to believe ill without examination is the effect of pride and laziness. We are willing to find people guilty, and unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accusation.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶245; ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶250]

A willingness to believe ill, without examination, is the effect of pride and idleness. We are ready to suppose guilt, but unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accusation.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶214]

Readiness; to believe evil without sufficient examination is the result of pride and indolence. We wish to find people guilty, and we do not wish to give ourselves the trouble of examining into the crimes.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶278]

A quickness in believing evil without having sufficiently examined it, is the effect of pride and laziness. We wish to find the guilty, and we do not wish to trouble ourselves in examining the crime.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶267]

A ready belief of evil without examining the facts is a form of pride, or of indolence. We are anxious to ferret out criminals without taking the pains of examining their crimes.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶275]

Readiness to believe evil without adequate inquiry is the result of pride and indolence. We like detecting criminals, but we dislike the labor of investigating crimes.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶267]

The promptitude with which we will believe evil of others, without an adequate examination of the facts, is an effect of pride working with laziness. We wish to find the guilty men, and cannot be be bothered to study the crime.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶267]

Readiness to believe the worst without adequate examination comes from pride and laziness; we want to find culprits but cannot be bothered to investigate the crimes.
[tr. Tancock (1959), ¶267]

A readiness to believe evil without sufficient examination, it is an effect both of pride and of idleness. On the one hand, we desire to find other people guilty; and on the other, we do not wish to take the pains necessary to examine their crimes.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶267]

He that sinneth, sinneth unto himself. He that is unjust, hurts himself, in that he makes himself worse than he was before.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

He that commits a Fault Abroad , is a Trespasser at Home; And he that injures his Neighbour, hurts himself , for to make himself an ill Man is a shrew'd Michief.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

He who does wrong, does a wrong to himself. He who is injurious, does evil to himself, by making himself evil.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

He that commits a crime, is guilty of an offence against his own interest, and he that acts unjustly, injures himself: for to make himself a bad man, is an essential injury.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.
[tr. Long (1862)]

He that commits a fault abroad is a trespasser at home; and he that injures his neighbour, hurts himself, for to make himself an evil man is a great mischief.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

He who sins, sins against himself; he who does wrong, wrongs himself, making himself evil.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

He that does wrong, does wrong to himself. The unjust man is unjust to himself, for he makes himself bad.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Whosoever does wrong, wrongs himself; whosoever does injustice, does it to himself, making himself evil.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

The sinner sins against himself; the wrongdoer wrongs himself, becoming the worse by his own action.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

Whoever does wrong, wrongs himself; whosever acts unjustly, acts unjustly toward himself, because he makes himself bad.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed., 2011 ed.)]

To do harm is to do yourself harm. To do an injustice is to do yourself an injustice -- it degrades you.
[tr. Hays (2003)]

The sinner sins against himself: the wrongdoer wrongs himself, by making himself morally bad.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

He who acts wrongly harms himself. If a person commits an injustice, he acts badly toward himself, thus making himself bad.
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

Crime, like virtue, hath degrees; one single day can not make a bad man just; nor can the good, in such short season, pass suddenly to utter baseness.
[tr. Heron (1858), 3.1]

Some crimes always precede great crimes; whoever has overstepped the legitimate limits, may at last violate the most sacred rights; thus, as well as virtue, crime has its degrees, and we have never seen timid innocence pass suddenly into extreme licentiousness.
[tr. Mongan (1885)]

Some lesser crimes always precede great sin.
He who hath once the bounds of right transgressed
May violate the most sacred laws at last;
But even as virtue, vice hath its degrees,
And modest innocence one never sees
Pass suddenly to wanton ways and lewd.
[tr. Lockert (1936)]

A man who can transgress the lawful boundaries
may violate the most sacred rights in the end.
Like virtue, crime has its gradations;
Never has timid innocence
suddenly become extreme depravity.
[Unk.]

Crime like virtue has its degrees; and timid innocence was never known to blossom suddenly into extreme license.
[Bartlett's]

Perhaps the murder of your guests seems light,
We Greeks esteem it base. If I acquit thee
How shall I scape reproach? Indeed, I cannot:
since thou hast dar'd to perpetrate the crime,
Endure the consequences.
[tr. Wodhull (1809)]

Perhaps with you it is a slight thing to kill your guests; but with us Grecians this thing is abhorred. How then, in giving my decision that thou hast not injured, can I escape blame? I can not; but as thou hast dared to do things dishonorable, endure now things unpleasant.
[tr. Edwards (1826)]

Haply with you guest-murder is as nought,
But to us which be Greeks foul shame is this.
How can I uncondemned adjudge thee guiltless?
I cannot. Forasmuch as thou hast dared
To do foul deeds, even drain thy bitter cup.
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

Perhaps among you it is a light thing to murder guests, but with us in Hellas it is a disgrace. How can I escape reproach if I judge you not guilty? I could not. No, since you endured your horrid crime, endure as well its painful consequence.
[tr. Coleridge (1938)]

Perhaps you think it is a trifling matter
to kill a guest.
We Greeks call it murder.
How, therefore, could I acquit you now
without losing face among men?
I could not do it.
You committed a brutal crime; therefore accept
the consequences of your act.
[tr. Arrowsmith (1958)]

Perhaps for lesser breeds it's no great thing to kill a guest, but to us Greeks it is. If I say you did no wrong I can't escape the censure and the blame that I'll incur. Since you were tough enough to do such deeds be tough enough to suffer the results.
[tr. Harrison (2005)]

Maybe you think
killing a guest -- in this case a child who’d been
put in your care -- is a small matter in the larger
scheme of things. But we Greeks think of it
as heinous murder. How could I rule you innocent
and maintain a shred of credibility? I can’t.
You committed a brutal crime; be prepared,
therefore, for a justly brutal punishment.
[tr. Karden/Street (2011)]

What other services, my lords, can robbers render, save that they can claim to have given life to those whose lives they spare?
[tr. King (1877)]

How; are brigands "benefactors," except in being able to assert that they have granted life to those from whom they have not taken it?
[tr. Ker (Loeb) (1926)]

Us not this, O conscript fathers, such a kindness as is done by banditti, who are contented with being able to boast that they have granted their lives to all those men whose lives they have not taken?
[tr. Yonge (1903)]

How else can brigands confer a favour, conscript fathers, except by asserting that they have granted life to those from whom they have not taken it away?
[tr. Berry (2006)]

What is the kindness of outlaws, members of the Senate, other than their ability to remind us that they gave life to people from whom they did not steal it?
[tr. McElduff (2011)]

One man steals a purse, and is punished. Another steals a State, and becomes a Prince.
[tr. Giles (1889)]

Here is one who steals a hook (for his girdle); -- he is put to death for it: here is another who steals a state; -- he becomes its prince.
[tr. Legge (1891)]

A poor man must swing
For stealing a belt buckle
But if a rich man steals a whole state
He is acclaimed
As statesman of the year.
[tr. Merton (1965)]

This one steals a buckle and he is executed, that one steals a country and he becomes its ruler.
[tr. Palmer (1996)]

He who steals a belt buckle pays with his life; he who steals a state gets to be a feudal lord.
[tr. Watson (2013)]

One steals a hook -- he is put to death. Another steals a state -- he becomes a prince.
[tr. Yang/Höchsmann (2007)]

He who steals a belt buckle is executed, but he who steals a state is made a feudal lord.
[tr. Ziporyn (2009)]

Steal money you're a thief; steal a country you're a king.
["Japanese proverb"]

Stealing a dog is said to be immoral. Still, they steal a country and call it righteousness.
[Source]

To steal a purse is rightly held a crime.
To steal a country is an act sublime.
[Percy Russell (1919)]

One who steals a pearl is persecuted as a thief. One who steals a nation is revered as a king.
[Source]

When you steal a pin, you are executed; but if you steal a country, you become a king.
[Chinese historian Sima Qian (c. 145 – c. 86 BC)]

One who steals a little is a thief. One who steals a little bit more is a robber. And one who steals a nation is a king.
[Source]

To steal a fruit means theft, while to steal a country does not.
["Old Chinese saying"]

Those that steal a loaf of bread are hanged as thieves - those that steal a country are made emperor.
[Source]

Steal an apple and you're a thief. Steal a country and you're a statesman.
[Disney's Aladdin (2019)]

You may plainly perceive the traitor through his mask; he is well known everywhere in his true colours; his rolling eyes and his honeyed tones impose only on those who do not know him. People are aware that this low-bred fellow, who deserves to be pilloried, has, by the dirtiest jobs, made his way in the world; and that the splendid position he has acquired makes merit repine and virtue blush.
[tr. Van Laun (1878)]

The treacherous rascal is plainly seen through his mask, he is everywhere known for what he is; his rolling eyes and soft tones impose only upon strangers. People know that this wretched fellow, who ought to be hanged, has pushed his way in the world by dirty jobs, and that the splendid condition he finds himself in through them makes merit grumble and virtue blush.
[tr. Mathew (1890)]

Behind his mask the knave is seen, wherever he is known, for what he is; the rolling of his eye, his bated voice, impose on none but those who do not live here. All others know that the sneaking fellow, fit only to be shunned, has by the foulest actions foisted himself upon society, where his career, by their connivance clothed in splendor, makes merit groan and virtue blush.
[tr. Wormeley (1894)]

You can clearly see the traitor through his mask. He is known everywhere for what he is: his rolling eyes and his honeyed tones only impose on those people who do not know him. They know that this low-bred cur, who deserves to be exposed, has, by the dirtiest means, pushed himself on in the world; and the splendid position he has acquired by these means makes merit repine and virtue blush.
[tr. Waller (1903)]

The traitor's face shows plainly through his mask,
And everywhere he's known for what he is;
His up-turned eyes, his honeyed canting voice,
Impose on none but strangers. All men know
That this confounded, low-bred, sneaking scamp
Has made his way by doing dirty jobs,
And that the splendid fortune these have brought him
Turns merit bitter and makes virtue blush.
[tr. Page (1913)]

Behind his mask the scoundrel's visible.
Here everybody knows his character;
And his protesting eyes, his honeyed tongue,
Impose on no one but a casual stranger.
And that contemptible boor notoriously
Has made his way in the world by dirty means,
So that his present splendid situation
Makes merit grumble and makes virtue blush.
[tr. Bishop (1957)]

Right through his mask men see the traitor's face,
And everywhere give him his proper place;
His wheedling eyes, his soft and cozening tone,
Fool only those to whom he is not known.
That this knave rose, where he deserved to fall,
By shameful methods, is well known to all,
And that his state, which thanks to these is lush,
Makes merit murmur and makes virtue blush.
[tr. Frame (1967)]

This soul is full of darkness, and sin is committed, but the guilty person is not the man who commits the sin, but he who produces the darkness.
[tr. Wraxall (1862)]

This soul is full of shadow; sin is therein committed. The guilty one is not the person who has committed the sin, but the person who has created the shadow.
[tr. Hapgood (1887)]

The soul in darkness sins, but the real sinner is he who caused the darkness.
[tr. Denny (1976)]

If the soul is left in darkness, sins will be committed. The guilty one is not he who commits the sin, but the one who causes the darkness.
[tr. Wilbour/Fahnestock/MacAfee (1987)]

In any benighted soul -- that's where sin will be committed. It's not he who commits the sin that's to blame, but he who causes the darkness to prevail.
[tr. Donougher (2013)]

O you habit of sinning, what delight you afford to the wicked and the audacious, when chastisement is afar off, and when impunity attends you!
[tr. Yonge (1903)]

Alas, the habit of evil-doing! what pleasure it affords to the depraved and the shameless, when punishment is in abeyance, and has been replaced by license.
[Source (1906)]

Everything beautiful and noble is the result of reason and calculation. Crime, for which the human creature has acquired a taste in its mother’s womb, is natural in origin. Virtue, on the contrary, is artificial, unnatural since, at all times and among all nations, gods and prophets were necessary to teach virtue to animalistic humanity, which humanity alone was unable to discover. Evil occurs without effort, naturally, through fatality; good is always the product of artifice.
[tr. Kline (2020)]

If men could blush at their own actions, how many sins, publick and private, would they save by it?
[Bullord ed. (1696)]

If Men knew how to blush at their own Actions, how many Crimes, publick and private, would they save by it!
[Curll ed. (1713)]

If Men could blush for themselves, how many Sins, public and private, would they save by it!
[Browne ed. (1752)]

If a man knew how to blush at his own actions, what crimes, not only secret but public and overt, would he not spare himself!
[tr. Stewart (1970)]

If any one shall infringe any of these laws, let him bear the penalty.
[tr. Barham (1842)]

If any one shall infringe any of these laws, let him be liable to a penalty.
[tr. Barham/Yonge (1878)]

The punishment for violation of any of these laws shall fit the offense.
[tr. Keyes (1928)]

Whatever of these someone has violated, let the penalty be equivalent to the crime.
[tr. Zetzel (1999)]

Whatever of these matters someone departs from, let there be a penalty equal to the wrongdoing.
[tr. Fott (2013)]

Whatever someone has violated, let the punishment match the offense.
[Bartelett's]

Had I a hundred mouths, as many tongues,
A voice of iron, to these had brazen lungs;
Their crimes and tortures ne're could be displaid.
[tr. Ogilby (1649)]

Had I a hundred mouths, a hundred tongues,
And throats of brass, inspired with iron lungs,
I could not half those horrid crimes repeat,
Nor half the punishments those crimes have met.
[tr. Dryden (1697)]

Had I a hundred tongues, and a hundred mouths, and a voice of iron, I could not comprehend all the species of their crimes, nor enumerate the names of all their punishments.
[tr. Davidson/Buckley (1854)]

No -- had I e'en a hundred tongues
A hundred mouths, and iron lungs,
Those types of guilt I could not show,
Nor tell the forms of penal woe.
[tr. Conington (1866)]

Not if I had a hundred tongues, a voice
Of iron, could I tell thee all the forms
Of guilt, or number all their penalties.
[tr. Cranch (1872), l. 780ff]

Not had I an hundred tongues, an hundred mouths, and a voice of iron, could I sum up all the shapes of crime or name over all their punishments.
[tr. Mackail (1885)]

Nor, had I now an hundred mouths, an hundred tongues at need,
An iron voice, might I tell o'er all guise of evil deed,
Or run adown the names of woe those evil deeds are worth.
[tr. Morris (1900)]

Ne'er had a hundred mouths, if such were mine,
Nor hundred tongues their endless sins declared,
Nor iron voice their torments could define,
Or tell what doom to each the avenging gods assign.
[tr. Taylor (1907), st. 83, l. 744ff]

&I could not tell,
Not with a hundred mouths, a hundred tongues,
Or iron voice, their divers shapes of sin,
Nor call by name the myriad pangs they bear.
[tr. Williams (1910)]

Nay, had I a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths, and voice of iron, I could not sum up all the forms of crime, or rehearse all the tale of torments.
[tr. Fairclough (1916)]

If I had a hundred tongues,
A hundred iron throats, I could not tell
The fullness of their crime and punishment.
[tr. Humphries (1951)]

No, not if I had a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths
And a voice of iron, could I describe all the shapes of wickedness,
Catalogue all the retributions inflicted here.
[tr. Day-Lewis (1952)]

A hundred tongues,
a hundred mouths, an iron voice were not
enough for me to gather all the forms
of crime or tell the names of all the torments.
[tr. Mandelbaum (1971), l. 829ff]

If I had
A hundred tongues, a hundred mouths, a voice
Of iron, I could not tell of all the shapes
Their crimes had taken, or their punishments.
[tr. Fitzgerald (1981)]

If I had a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths and a voice of iron, I could not encompass all their different crimes or speak the names of all their different punishments.
[tr. West (1990)]

Not if I had a hundred tongues, a hundred mouths,
a voice of iron, could I tell all the forms of wickedness
or spell out the names of every torment.
[tr. Kline (2002)]

Not if I had a hundred mouths, a hundred tongues,
And a voice of iron, could I recount
All the crimes or tell all their punishments.
[tr. Lombardo (2005)]

A hundred tongues and mouths, an iron voice, wouldn't let me cover the varieties of evil, nor all the names for punishments.
[tr. Bartsch (2021)]

No act of injustice is more pernicious than theirs, who while they are attempting the greatest deceit, labor to appear good men.
[tr. McCartney (1798)]

But in the whole system of villainy, none is more capital than that of the men, who, when they most deceive, so manage as that they may seem to be virtuous men.
[tr. Edmonds (1865)]

But of all forms of injustice, none is more heinous than that of the men who, while they practise fraud to the utmost of their ability, do it in such a way that they appear to be good men.
[tr. Peabody (1883)]

The most criminal injustice is that of the hypocrite who hides an act of treachery under the cloak of virtue.
[tr. Gardiner (1899)]

No iniquity is more deadly than that of those who, when they are most at fault, so behave as to seem men of integrity.
[ed. Harbottle (1906)]

But of all forms of injustice, none is more flagrant than that of the hypocrite who, at the very moment when he is most false, makes it his business to appear virtuous.
[tr. Miller (1913)]

Taking all forms of injustice into account, none is more deadly than that practiced by people who act as if they are good men when they are being most treacherous.
[tr. Edinger (1974)]

Let this law therefore be established in friendship, viz., that we should neither ask things that are improper, nor grant them when asked; for it is a disgraceful apology, and by no means to be admitted, as well in the case of other offenses, as when any one avows he has acted against the state for the sake of a friend.
[tr. Edmonds (1871)]

As to friendship, then, let this law be enacted, that we neither ask of a friend what is wrong, nor do what is wrong at a friend’s request. The plea that it was for a friend’s sake is a base apology, -- one that should never be admitted with regard to other forms of guilt, and certainly not as to crimes against the State.
[tr. Peabody (1887)]

Therefore let this law be established in friendship: neither ask dishonourable things, nor do them, if asked. And dishonourable it certainly is, and not to be allowed, for anyone to plead in defence of sins in general and especially of those against the State, that he committed them for the sake of a friend.
[tr. Falconer (1923)]

Therefore, let this law be established for friendship: that we should neither ask for foul things nor fulfill requests for them. For this is a foul excuse and ought not be accepted for any crime, but especially not if someone is shown to have placed themselves against the Republic for the sake of a friend.
[Source]

Howbeit, to me it is no less abhorrent,
When, caught in criminality, the culprit
Seeks with fine words to beautify his deed.
[tr. Donaldson (1848)]

More hateful still the miscreant who seeks
When caught, to make a virtue of a crime.
[tr. Storr (1859)]

But not less hateful
Seems it to me, when one that hath been caught
In wickedness would give it a brave show.
[tr. Campbell (1873)]

But, truly, I detest it, too, when one who has been caught in treachery then seeks to make the crime a glory.
[tr. Jebb (1891)]

I cannot bear to see the guilty stand
Convicted of their crimes, and yet pretend
To gloss them o'er with specious names of virtue.
[tr. Werner (1892)]

But verily this, too, is hateful, -- when one who hath been caught in wickedness then seeks to make the crime a glory.
[tr. Jebb (1917)]

But now much worse than this
Is brazen boasting of barefaced anarchy.
[tr. Fitts/Fitzgerald (1939), l. 390ff]

The criminal who being caught still tries.
To make a fair excuse , is damned indeed.
[tr. Watling (1947), l. 414ff]

I hate it too when someone caught in crime
then wants to make it seem a lovely thing.
[tr. Wyckoff (1954)]

But this is worst of all: to be convicted
And then to glorify the name as virtue.
[tr. Kitto (1962)]

But how I hate it when she's caught in the act, And the criminal still glories in her crime. [tr. Woodruff (2001)]

I hate it when someone, caught in ugliness, afterwards wants to make it look pretty. [tr. Tyrell/Bennett (2002)]

And there’s nothing I hate more than when someone is caught committing a crime and tries to hide it by embellishing it with sweet words.
[tr. Theodoridis (2004)]

How I despise
a person caught committing evil acts
who then desires to glorify the crime.
[tr. Johnston (2005), l. 562ff]

I, for my part, hate anyone caught in the act who tries to beautify his crimes thereupon.
[tr. Thomas (2005)]

I hate it when someone is caught in the midst of their evil deeds and tries to gloss over them.
[tr. @sentantiq (2020)]

For 'tis the common interest of mankind.
Of every individual, every state.
That he who hath transgress'd should suffer ill.
And Fortune crown the efforts of the virtuous.
[tr. Wodhull (1809)]

For this is a general principle among all, both individuals in private and states,
That the wicked man should feel vengeance, but the good man enjoy prosperity.
[tr. Edwards (1826)]

For the general good
Of individuals and of states requires
That vengeance overtake th’ unrighteous deed,
And virtue triumph in her just reward.
[ed. Ramage (1864)]

For all men's weal is this, --
Each several man's, and for the state, -- that ill
Betide the bad, prosperity the good.
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

For this is the interest alike of citizen and state, that the wrong-doer be punished and the good man prosper.
[tr. Coleridge (1938)]

The common interests
of states and individuals alike demand
that good and evil receive their just rewards.
[tr. Arrowsmith (1958)]

Every man -- every slave -- shares one wish. May we each get what we deserve.
[tr. McGuinness (2004)]

I think the wish is common among men, as individuals and citizens, that bad men should suffer and good men thrive.
[tr. Harrison (2005)]

It is everyone’s conviction, individually and collectively as a city, that the evil man suffers and the good man rejoices.
[tr. Theodoridis (2007)]

It’s in the interests of both
states and individuals that evil suffers evil
and good fares well.
[tr. Karden/Street (2011)]

For the criminality and injustice of the act stands essentially in the deliberate principle on which it is done.
[tr. Buckley (1850)]

For vice and wrong-doing depend on the moral purpose.
[tr. Jebb (1873)]

It is deliberate purpose that constitutes wickedness and criminal guilt.
[tr. Roberts (1924)]

For vice and wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose.
[tr. Freese (1926)]

For the immorality and wrongness of an act depend on intentional choice.
[tr. Waterfield (2018)]

No man is so exquisitely honest or upright in living, but brings all his actions and thoughts within compasse and danger of the lawes; and that tenne times in his life might not lawfully be hanged.
[tr. Florio (1603)]

There is no so good Man, that so squares all his Thoughts and Actions to the Laws, that he is not Faulty enough to deserve Hanging ten Times in his Life.
[tr. Cotton (1686)]

There is no so good man, who so squares all his thoughts and actions to the laws, that he is not faulty enough to deserve hanging ten times in his life.
[tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877)]

There does not exist a man of such worth that, were he to lay open to the scrutiny of the laws all his actions and thoughts, he would not deserve hanging ten times in his life.
[tr. Ives (1925)]

No man is so moral but that, if he submitted his deeds and thoughts to cross-examination by the laws, he would be found worthy of hanging on ten occasions in his lifetime.
[tr. Screech (1987)]

Men blush not so much for their Crimes, as for their Weaknesses and Vanity.
[Curll ed. (1713)]

Men don't so much blush for their Crimes, as for their Weaknesses and Vanity.
[Browne ed. (1752)]

Men are less ashamed of their crimes than of their weaknesses and their vanity.
[tr. Van Laun (1885)]

Men are less ashamed of their crimes than of their failings and of what touches their vanity.
[tr. Stewart (1970)]