In my judgement, he
Who tramples on the laws, but can express
His thoughts with plausibility, deserves
Severest punishment: for that injustice
On which he glories, with his artful tongue.
That he a fair appearance can bestow,
He dares to practise.
[tr. Wodhull (1782)]

Th' injurious man, whose tongue
Flows with pernicious rhetoric, I hold
To merit the severest punishment.
For confident his speech can varnish o'er
The blackest deeds, his craft dares venture on them.
[tr. Potter (1814)]

For him who does wrong and is wise to gloze it
I hold worth worser doom. For making sure
He'll show wrong gracious with his tongue, he's bold
To every crime.
[tr. Webster (1868)]

To my mind, whoso hath skill to fence with words in an unjust cause, incurs the heaviest penalty; for such an one, confident that he can cast a decent veil of words o'er his injustice, dares to practise it.
[tr. Coleridge (1891)]

In my judgment, whatever man being unjust, is deeply skilled in argument, merits the severest punishment. For vaunting that with his tongue he can well gloze over injustice, he dares to work deceit.
[tr. Buckley (1892)]

For in my sight the villain subtle-tongued
Getteth himself for gain exceeding loss,
Who, confident his tongue can gloze the wrong,
Becomes a bold knave.
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

To me it seemeth, when
A crafty tongue is given to evil men
'Tis like to wreck, not help them. Their own brain
Tempts them with lies to dare and dare again,
Till .... [tr. Murray (1906)]

I think that the plausible speaker
Who is a villain deserves the greatest punishment.
Confident in his tongue’s power to adorn evil,
He stops at nothing.
[tr. Warner (1944)]

To me, a wicked man who is also eloquent
Seems the most guilty of them all. He’ll cut your throat
As bold as brass, because he knows he can dress up murder
In handsome words.
[tr. Vellacott (1963)]

For me, the man who is a villain, but clever
In speech, would have to pay the highest fine;
Confident of cloaking his villainy in fine words,
He dares anything.
[tr. Podlecki (1989)]

To my mind, the plausible speaker who is a scoundrel incurs the greatest punishment. For since he is confident that he can cleverly cloak injustice with his words, his boldness stops at no knavery.
[tr. Kovacs (Loeb) (1994)]

For in my eyes the criminal with a gift for speaking deserves the worst of punishments. So confident is he in his tongue’s ability to dress his foul thoughts in fair words, there is nothing he dares not do.
[tr. Davie (1996)]

What I believe, for example is the more eloquent the misfit, the greater the punishment he deserves because, thinking that his eloquence and his pretty words will get him out of any injustice, he has the audacity to commit even greater evils.
[tr. Theodoridis (2004)]

In my opinion,
the unjust man who speaks so plausibly
brings on himself the harshest punishment.
Since he’s sure his tongue can hide injustice,
he dares anything.
[tr. Johnston (2008), l. 689ff]

To my mind, whoever is naturally sophos in speaking but has no dikē deserves the heaviest punishment. Such a man boasts that he can cast a decent veil of words over his unjust deeds, and boldly proceeds to wickedness.
[tr. Coleridge / Ceragioli / Nagy / Hour25]

To my mind, the plausible speaker who is a scoundrel incurs the greatest punishment. For since he is confident that he can cleverly cloak injustice with his words, his boldness stops at no dishonesty.
[tr. Kovacs / Zhang / Rogak]

But I that understand the nature of that which is good, that it only is to be desired, and of that which is bad, that it only is truly odious and shameful: who know moreover, that this transgressor, whosoever he be, is my kinsman, not by the same blood and seed, but by participation of the same reason, and of the same divine particle; How can I either be hurt by any of those, since it is not in their power to make me incur anything that is truly reproachful? or angry, and ill affected towards him, who by nature is so near unto me?
[tr. Casaubon (1634), 1.15]

And since it's fallen to my share to understand the Natural Beauty of a good Action, and the Deformity of an ill One; since I am satisfied the Person disobliging is of Kin to me, and tho we are not just of the same Flesh and Blood, yet our Minds are nearly related, being both extracted from the Deity; since I am likewise convinc'd that no Man can do me a real injury, because no Man can force me to misbehave my self; For these Reasons, I can't find in my Heart to Hate, or to be Angry with one of my own Nature and Family.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

But I have fully comprehended the nature of good, as only what is beautiful and honourable; and of evil, that it is always deformed and shameful; and the nature of those persons too who mistake their aim; that they are my kinsmen, by partaking, not of the same blood or seed, but of the same intelligent divine part; and that I cannot be hurt by any of them, since none of them can involve me in any thing dishonourable or deformed. I cannot be angry at my kinsmen, or hate them.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

But I, who have a more just idea of things, that nothing is good, but what is honourable, and nothing evil, but what is base; and am also sensible that the persons who offend me are in some sense allied to me, (I do not mean of the same flesh and blood, but that our souls are derived from, and particles of, the same divine nature) I can neither suffer any real injury from them, because they cannot compel me to do a base action; nor can I be angry with or hate thoe whom I consider as of the same nature and the same family with myself.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me; not [only] of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Since it has fallen to my share to understand the natural beauty of a good action, and the deformity of an ill one -- since I am satisfied the person disobliging is of kin to me, and though we are not just of the same flesh and blood, yet our minds are nearly related, being both extracted from the Deity I am likewise convinced that no man can do me a real injury, because no man can force me to misbehave myself, nor can I find it in my heart to hate or to be angry with one of my own nature and family.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

But seeing that I have beheld the nature and nobility of good, and the nature and meanness of evil, and the nature of the sinner, who is my brother, participating not indeed in the same flesh and blood, but in the same mind and partnership with the divine, I cannot be injured by any of them; for no man can involve me in what demeans. Neither can I be angry with my brother, or quarrel with them.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

But I have considered the nature of the good, and found it beautiful: I have beheld the nature of the bad, and found it ugly. I also understand the nature of the evil-doer, and know that he is my brother, not because he shares with me the same blood or the same seed, but because he is a partaker of the same mind and of the same portion of immortality. I therefore cannot be hurt by any of these, since none of them can involve me in any baseness. I cannot be angry with my brother, or sever myself from him.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

But I, in that I have comprehended the nature of the Good that it is beautiful, and the nature of Evil that it is ugly, and the nature of the wrong-doer himself that it is akin to me, not as partaker of the same blood and seed but of intelligence and a morsel of the Divine, can neither be injured by any of them -- for no one can involve me in what is debasing -- nor can I be wroth with my kinsman and hate him.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

But I, because I have seen that the nature of good is the right, and of ill the wrong, and that the nature of the man himself who does wrong is akin to my own (not of the same blood and seed, but partaking with me in mind, that is in a portion of divinity), I can neither be harmed by any of them, for no man will involve me in wrong, nor can I be angry with my kinsman or hate him.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

But for my part I have long perceived the nature of good and its nobility, the nature of evil and its meanness, and also the nature of the culprit himself, who is my brother (not in the physical sense, but as a fellow-creature similarly endowed with reason and a share of the divine); therefore none of those things can injure me, for nobody can implicate me in what is degrading. Neither can I be angry with my brother or fall foul of him.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

But I, who have beheld the nature of the good, and seen that it is the right; and of the bad, and seen that it is the wrong; and for the wrongdoer himself, and seeing that his nature is akin to my own -- not because he is of the same blood and seed, but because he shares with me in mind and a portion of the divine -- I, then, can neither be harmed by any of these men, nor can I become angry with one who is akin to me, nor can I hate him.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.)]

But I have seen that the nature of good is what is right, and the nature of evil what is wrong; and I have reflected that the nature of the offender himself is akin to my own -- not a kinship of blood or seed, but a sharing in the same mind, the same fragment of divinity. Therefore I cannot be harmed by any of them, as none will infect me with their wrong. Nor can I be angry with my kinsman or hate him.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

But insofar as I have comprehended the true nature of what is good, namely that it is fine and noble, and the true nature of what is bad, that it is shameful, and the true nature of the person who has gone astray: that he is just like me, not only in the physical sense but also with respect to Intelligence and having a portion of the divine -- insofar as I have comprehended all this, I can neither be harmed by any of them, for no one else can involve me in what is shameful and debasing, nor can I be angry with my fellow man or hate him.
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

But I, who have observed the nature of the good, and seen that it is the right; and of the bad, and seen that it is the wrong; and of the wrongdoer himself, and seen that his nature is akin to my own -- not because he is of the same blood and seed, but because he shares as I do in mind and thus in a portion of the divine -- I, then, can neither be harmed by these people, nor become angry with one who is akin to me, nor can I hate him.
[tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

But I have recognized the nature of the good and seen that it is the right, and the nature of the bad and seen that it is the wrong, and nature of th wrongdoer himself, and seen that he is related to me, not because he has the same blood or seed, but because he shares in the same mind and portion of divinity. So I cannot be harmed by any of them, as no one will involve me in what is wrong. Nor can I be angry with my relative or hate him.
[tr. Gill (2013)]

But I, who know what is truly beautiful and truly ugly, and who know the wickedness of their hearts, also know that all these people are akin to me, that they are part of the same divine pattern. I cannot be injured by any of them, for no one can force me to see the world the way they do. Neither can I hate them, for both they and I need each other.
[tr. McNeill (2019)]

O you habit of sinning, what delight you afford to the wicked and the audacious, when chastisement is afar off, and when impunity attends you!
[tr. Yonge (1903)]

Alas, the habit of evil-doing! what pleasure it affords to the depraved and the shameless, when punishment is in abeyance, and has been replaced by license.
[Source (1906)]

Howbeit, to me it is no less abhorrent,
When, caught in criminality, the culprit
Seeks with fine words to beautify his deed.
[tr. Donaldson (1848)]

More hateful still the miscreant who seeks
When caught, to make a virtue of a crime.
[tr. Storr (1859)]

But not less hateful
Seems it to me, when one that hath been caught
In wickedness would give it a brave show.
[tr. Campbell (1873)]

But, truly, I detest it, too, when one who has been caught in treachery then seeks to make the crime a glory.
[tr. Jebb (1891)]

I cannot bear to see the guilty stand
Convicted of their crimes, and yet pretend
To gloss them o'er with specious names of virtue.
[tr. Werner (1892)]

But verily this, too, is hateful, -- when one who hath been caught in wickedness then seeks to make the crime a glory.
[tr. Jebb (1917)]

But now much worse than this
Is brazen boasting of barefaced anarchy.
[tr. Fitts/Fitzgerald (1939), l. 390ff]

The criminal who being caught still tries.
To make a fair excuse , is damned indeed.
[tr. Watling (1947), l. 414ff]

I hate it too when someone caught in crime
then wants to make it seem a lovely thing.
[tr. Wyckoff (1954)]

But this is worst of all: to be convicted
And then to glorify the name as virtue.
[tr. Kitto (1962)]

But how I hate it when she's caught in the act, And the criminal still glories in her crime. [tr. Woodruff (2001)]

I hate it when someone, caught in ugliness, afterwards wants to make it look pretty. [tr. Tyrell/Bennett (2002)]

And there’s nothing I hate more than when someone is caught committing a crime and tries to hide it by embellishing it with sweet words.
[tr. Theodoridis (2004)]

How I despise
a person caught committing evil acts
who then desires to glorify the crime.
[tr. Johnston (2005), l. 562ff]

I, for my part, hate anyone caught in the act who tries to beautify his crimes thereupon.
[tr. Thomas (2005)]

I hate it when someone is caught in the midst of their evil deeds and tries to gloss over them.
[tr. @sentantiq (2020)]

There are but few Men Wise enough to know all the Mischief Wisdom does.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶270]

There are but few Men wise enough to know all the Mischief they do.
[tr. Stanhope (1706), Powell ed., ¶269]

Few men are able to know all the ill they do.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶5]

Few men are able to know all the ill they do.
[ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶252]

Few of us have abilities to know all the ill we occasion.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶3]

Scarcely any man is clever enough to know all the evil he does.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶280]

No man is clever enough to know all the evil he does.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶269]

No one is sufficiently keen to realize to the full the harm he does.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶277]

Scarcely any man is clever enough to realize all the harm he does.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶269]

There is hardly a man clever enough to recognize the full extent of the evil that he does.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶269]

Almost no one is perceptive enough to realize all the harm he does.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶269]

There is scarcely a man alive clever enough to know all the evil he does.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶269]

The sad truth of the matter is that most evil is done by people who never made up their minds to be either good or bad or to do either good or evil.