It is a rather singular argument to maintain that, because an abuse which has been permitted a temporary existence, cannot be corrected without wounding the interests of those who have profited by it, it ought, therefore, to claim perpetual duration.
[tr. McCord (1848)]

At all events, let no one pretend that because an abuse cannot be done away with, without inconvenience to those who profit by it, what has been suffered to exist for a time should be allowed to exist for ever.
[tr. Stirling (1873)]

Meekness is a thing unconquerable, if it be true and natural, and not affected or hypocritical. For how shall even the most fierce and malicious that thou shalt conceive, be able to hold on against thee, if thou shalt still continue meek and loving unto him; and that even at that time, when he is about to do thee wrong, thou shalt be well disposed, and in good temper, with all meekness to teach him, and to instruct him better? As for example; My son, we were not born for this, to hurt and annoy one another; it will be thy hurt not mine, my son.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

Gentleness and Good Humour are invincible, provided they are of the right Stamp, without any thing of Hypocrisy, or Grimace. This is the way to Disarm the most Barbarous, and Savage: A constancy in Obliging Behaviour, will make the most Outragious Person asham'd of his Malice : The worst Body imaginable can't find in his heart to do you any Mischief, if you continue kind and unmov'd under ill Usage, if you strike in with the right opportunity for Advice; If when he is going to do you an ill Turn, you endeavour to recover his Understanding, and retrieve his Temper in such gentle Language as this. Prethee Child be quiet, Men were never made to worry one another; In earnest if you go on, my dear Friend, you'l have the worst on't; As for my part, I'm proof against every Thing, but my own Folly.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

Meekness is invincible, where it is genuine, and sincere without hypocrisy. For, what can the most insolent do to you, if you steadfastly persist in kindness to him, and, upon occasion, mildly admonish and instruct him thus, at the very time he is attempting to do you an injury? “Don’t do so, my son! Nature formed us for a quite different conduct. You cannot hurt me; you hurt yourself, my son!”
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

Consider that benevolence is invincible, if it be genuine, without affectation or hypocrisy. For what can the most brutishly injurious person do to you, if you persevere in your kindness to them, and when an opportunity offers, tenderly admonish him, and at the very time when he is going to do you an injury, thus calmly instruct him: "Forbear, my son, we were formed by nature for quite a different purpose; you cannot injure me, but you hurt yourself my son."
[tr. Graves (1792)]

Consider that a good disposition is invincible if it be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For what will the most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as opportunity offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly correctest his errors at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm, saying, Not so, my child: we are constituted by nature for something else: I shall certainly not be injured, but thou art injuring thyself, my child.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Gentleness is invincible, provided it is of the right stamp, without anything of hypocrisy or malice. This is the way to disarm the most insolent, if you continue kind and unmoved under ill usage, if you strike in with the right opportunity for advice. If when he is going to do you an ill turn you endeavour to recover his undertsanding, and retrieve his temper by such language as this: I pray you, child, be quiet, men were never made to worry one another. I shall not be injured, but you are injuring yourself, child.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

Kindness is invincible if only it is honest, not fawning or insincere. What can the most aggressive do, if you keep persistently kind, and as ocasion offers gently remonstrate, and seize the moment when he is bent on mischief, for trying quietly to convert him to a better frame of mind. "Not so, my son, we are made for other ends; you cannot hurt me, you hurt yourself, my son."
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

Meekness is invincible if it be genuine, without simper or hypocrisy. For what can the most insolent of men do to you, if you persist in civility towards him; and, if occasion offers, admonish him gently and deliberately, shew him the better way at the very moment that he is endeavouring to harm you? “Nay, my son; we were born for something better. No hurt can come to me; it is yourself you hurt, my son.”
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

Kindness is irresistible, be it but sincere and no mock smile or a mask assumed. For what can the most unconscionable of men do to thee, if thou persist in being kindly to him, and when a chance is given exhort him mildly and, at the very time when he is trying to do thee harm, quietly teach him a better way thus: Nay, my child, we have been made for other things. I shall be in no wise harmed, but thou art harming thyself, my child.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Gentleness is invincible, if it be genuine and not sneering or hypocritical. For what can the most insolent do to you, if you continue gentle to him, and, if opportunity allows, mildly admonish him and quietly show him a better way at the very moment when he attempts to do you injury: "No, my child; we came into the world for other ends. It is not I that am harmed, but you are harmed, my child."
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

Kindness is irresistible, so long as it be genuine and without false smiles or duplicity. The most consummate impudence can do nothing, if you remain persistently kind to the offender, give him a gentle word of admonition when opportunity offers, and at the moment when he is about to vent his malice upon you bring him round quietly with "No, my son; it was not for this that we were made. I shall not be hurt; it is yourself you are hurting."
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

Kindness is invincible, provided it’s sincere -- not ironic or an act. What can even the most vicious person do if you keep treating him with kindness and gently set him straight -- if you get the chance -- correcting him cheerfully at the exact moment that he’s trying to do you harm. "No, no, my friend. That isn’t what we’re here for. It isn’t me who’s harmed by that. It’s you."
[tr. Hays (2003)]

Kindness is invincible — if it is sincere, not fawning or pretense. What can the most aggressive man do to you if you continue to be kind to him? If, as opportunity arises, you gently admonish him and take your time to re-educate him at the very moment when he is trying to do you harm? "No, son, we were born for other purposes than this. There is no way that I can be harmed, but you are harming yourself, son."
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

Kindness is unconquerable, so long as it is without flattery or hypocrisy. For what can the most insolent man do to you, if you continue to be kind to him and, if you have the chance, gently advise and calmly show him what is right at the very moment he is trying to harm you, saying: "No, my son. We were born for something else. I am certainly not harmed, but you bring harm to yourself?"
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

He that sinneth, sinneth unto himself. He that is unjust, hurts himself, in that he makes himself worse than he was before.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

He that commits a Fault Abroad , is a Trespasser at Home; And he that injures his Neighbour, hurts himself , for to make himself an ill Man is a shrew'd Michief.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

He who does wrong, does a wrong to himself. He who is injurious, does evil to himself, by making himself evil.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

He that commits a crime, is guilty of an offence against his own interest, and he that acts unjustly, injures himself: for to make himself a bad man, is an essential injury.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad.
[tr. Long (1862)]

He that commits a fault abroad is a trespasser at home; and he that injures his neighbour, hurts himself, for to make himself an evil man is a great mischief.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

He who sins, sins against himself; he who does wrong, wrongs himself, making himself evil.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

He that does wrong, does wrong to himself. The unjust man is unjust to himself, for he makes himself bad.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Whosoever does wrong, wrongs himself; whosoever does injustice, does it to himself, making himself evil.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

The sinner sins against himself; the wrongdoer wrongs himself, becoming the worse by his own action.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

Whoever does wrong, wrongs himself; whosever acts unjustly, acts unjustly toward himself, because he makes himself bad.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed., 2011 ed.)]

To do harm is to do yourself harm. To do an injustice is to do yourself an injustice -- it degrades you.
[tr. Hays (2003)]

The sinner sins against himself: the wrongdoer wrongs himself, by making himself morally bad.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

He who acts wrongly harms himself. If a person commits an injustice, he acts badly toward himself, thus making himself bad.
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

He that is unjust, is also impious. For the nature of the universe, having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should do one another good; more or less according to the several persons and occasions but in nowise hurt one another: it is manifest that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the most ancient and venerable of all the deities. For the nature of the universe, is the nature the common parent of all, and therefore piously to be observed of all things that are, and that which now is, to whatsoever first was, and gave it its being, hath relation of blood and kindred.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

To play the Knave is to Rebel against Religion, all sort of Injustice is no less then High Treason against Heaven: For since the Nature, or Soul of the Universe has made Rational Creatures for mutual Service, and Support Made them that they should Assist, and Oblige each other, according to the Regards of Circumstance, and Merit; but never do any body any Harm: The Case standing thus, he that crosses upon this Design, is Prophane in his Contradiction , and Outrages the most Antient Deity. For the Nature of the Universe is the Cause of it , and that which gives it Being. Thus all things are one Family, suited , and as it were of Kin to each other.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

He who does an injury is guilty of impiety. For, since the nature of the whole has formed the rational animals for one another; each for being useful to the other according to his merit, and never hurtful; he who transgresses this her will, is thus guilty of impiety against the most ancient and venerable of the Gods. For the nature of the whole is the nature of all things which exist; and things which exist, are a-kin to their causes.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

He that acts unjustly, acts impiously. For God, or the Universal Nature, having produced all rational creatures to be mutually serviceable to each other, according to their respective merits, and by no means to injure each other; he who violates this first principle of nature, prophanely insults the most antient of all Deities. For this Universal Nature is the cause of all things that exist which are connected with each other by mutual friendship and alliance.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another, to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Injustice is no less than high treason against heaven. For since the nature of the universe has made rational creatures for mutual service and support, but never to do anybody any harm, since the case stands thus: he that crosses upon this design is profane, and outrages the most ancient Deity.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

To be unjust is to sin. By Nature rational beings have been constituted for one another's sake, each to help each according to its worth, and in wise to hurt: and he who transgresses the will of Nature, sins -- to wit, against the primal deity.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

He who does injustice commits impiety. For since universal Nature has formed the rational animals for one another; each to be useful to the other according to his merit, and never hurtful; he who transgresses this her will is clearly guilty of impiety against the most ancient and venerable of the Gods.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

Injustice is impiety. For in that the Nature of the Universe has fashioned rational creatures for the sake of one another with a view to mutual benefit based upon worth, but by no means for harm, the transgressor of her will acts with obvious impiety against the most venerable of Deities.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Whosoever does injustice commits sin; for Universal Nature having made reasonable creatures for the sake of one another, to benefit each other according to desert but in no wise to do injury, manifestly he who transgresses her will sins against the most venerable of the gods, because Universal Nature is a nature of what is, and what is is related to all that exists.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

Injustice is a sin. Nature has constituted rational beings for their own mutual benefit, each to help his fellows according to their worth, and in no wise to do them hurt; and to contravene her will is plainly to sin against this eldest of all the deities.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

Whoever commits injustice acts irreverently; for since universal nature has created rational creatures for the sake of one another, to benefit their fellows according to their deserts and in no wise to do them harm, it is plain that one who offends against her will is guilty of irreverence towards the most venerable of gods.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.); tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

Injustice is sin. When universal Nature has constituted rational creatures for the sake of each other -- to benefit one another as deserved, but never to harm -- anyone contravening her will is clearly guilty of sin against the oldest of the gods: because universal Nature is the nature of ultimate reality, to which all present existence is related.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

Those first the taints, that to their Neighbours' fall
Trust for distinction on this Earthly Ball,
In talents, wealth, or fame, and feed their pride
By the sad sight of others' hopes depress'd,
And o'er their ruin lift a lofty crest,
With Venom from the fount of Good supply'd.

The next that feel this sullen Stygian flame,
Are those, that fear to lose their wealth or fame,
Or any gift, by bounteous Heav'n assign'd;
And long possess'd of Fortune's turning wheel,
In its ascent another name reveal,
That threats to leave them, and their hopes behind.

Another evil thus becomes their good,
And feeds their black desires with Demon food. --
The third are they, who, with the sense of wrong,
Burn inward, or with fell, vindictive Wrath
Pursue their brethren to the Cave of Death,
By love of Pelf, or fiend-like Frenzy stung.
[tr. Boyd (1802), st. 28-30]

There is who hopes (his neighbour’s worth deprest,)
Preeminence himself, and coverts hence
For his own greatness that another fall.
There is who so much fears the loss of power,
Fame, favour, glory (should his fellow mount
Above him), and so sickens at the thought,
He loves their opposite: and there is he,
Whom wrong or insult seems to gall and shame
That he doth thirst for vengeance, and such needs
Must doat on other’s evil.
[tr. Cary (1814)]

There is, in order neighbour to suppress,
Who would excel, himself, his sole desire
Grandeur, that sees another in the mire:
There is who power, grace, and honour, fame,
Still fears to lose, because the rest surpass,
Grows sad, and loves the counteracting cause:
There is who, for injurious affront,
Revenge desires, thirsts for another's pain,
And hence to ill of others must attain.
[tr. Bannerman (1850)]

There are, who, by abasement of their neighbour,
Hope to excel, and therefore only long
That from his greatness he may be cast down;
There are, who power, grace, honour, and renown
Fear they may lose because another rises,
Thence are so sad that the reverse they love;
And there are those whom injury seems to chafe,
So that it makes them greedy for revenge,
And such must needs shape out another's harm.
[tr. Longfellow (1867)]

There is who, through his neighbour being kept down, hopes for excellence, and only for this reason yearns that he may be from his greatness brought low. There is who fears to lose power, grace, honour, and fame, in case another mounts up, wherefore he grows so sad that he loves the contrary. And there is who through injury appears so to take shame that he becomes gluttonous of vengeance; and such an one it behoves that he put forward another's ill.
[tr. Butler (1885)]

There is, who through his neighbour's ruin, so
Hopeth pre-eminence, who hence doth call
That he from grandeur may be cast down low.
There is, who fears to lose power, grace, and all
Honour and fame, because that others rise.
Which grieves him so that he desires their fall.
There is, who seems so hurt by injuries,
That he on vengeance greedily doth brood;
And such a one another's ill must prize.
[tr. Minchin (1885)]

There is he who hopes to excel through the abasement of his neighbor, and only longs that from his greatness he may be brought low. There is he who fears loss of power, favor, honor, fame, because another rises; whereat he is so saddened that he loves the opposite. And there is he who seems so outraged by injury that it makes him gluttonous of vengeance, and such a one must needs coin evil for others.
[tr. Norton (1892)]

There is he who through his neighbour's abasement hopes to excel, and solely for this desires that he be cast down from his greatness;
there is he who fears to lose power, favour, honour and fame because another is exalted, wherefore he groweth sad so that he loves the contrary;
and there is he who seems to be so shamed through being wronged, that he becomes greedy of vengeance, and such must needs seek another's hurt.
[tr. Okey (1901)]

There is he that hopes to excel by the abasement of his neighbour and for that sole reason longs that from his greatness he may be brought low; there is he that fears to lose power, favour, honour, and fame because another surpasses, by which he is so aggrieved that he loves the contrary; and there is he that feels himself so disgraced by insult that he becomes greedy of vengeance, and such a one must needs contrive another's harm.
[tr. Sinclair (1939)]

There is, who through his neighbour's overthrow
Hopes to excel, and only for that cause
Longs that he may from greatness be brought low.
There is, who fears power, favour, fame to lose
Because another mounts; wherefore his lot
So irks, he loves the opposite to choose.
And there is, who through injury grows so hot
From shame, with greed of vengeance he is burned,
And so must needs another's ill promote.
[tr. Binyon (1943)]

Some hope their neighbour’s ruin may divert
His glory to themselves, and this sole hope
Prompts them to drag his greatness in the dirt;
Some, in their fear to lose fame, favour, scope,
And honour, should another rise to power,
Wishing the worst, sit glumly there and mope;
And some there are whose wrongs have turned them sour,
So that they thirst for vengeance, and this passion
Fits them to plot some mischief any hour.
[tr. Sayers (1955)]

There is he that hopes to excel by the abasement of his neighbor, and solely for this desires that he be cast down from greatness.
There is he that fears to lose power, favor, honor, and fame, because another is exalted, by which he is so saddened that he loves the contrary.
And there is he who seems so outraged by injury that he becomes greedy of vengeance, and such a one must needs contrive another's hurt.
[tr. Singleton (1973)]

There is the man who sees his own success
connect to his neighbor's downfall; thus,
he longs to see him fall from eminence.
Next, he who fears to lose honor and fame,
power and favor, if his neighbor rise:
vexed by this good, he wishes for the words.
Finally, he who, wronged, flares up in rage:
with his great passion for revenge, he thinks
only of how to harm his fellow man.
[tr. Musa (1981)]

There is the man who, through the suppression of his neighbour,
Hopes to excel, and for that reason only
Desires to see him cast down from his greatness:
There is the man who fears to lose power, favour,
Honour and glory because of another’s success,
And so grieves for it that he loves the opposite:
And there is the man who takes umbrage at injury
So that he becomes greedy for revenge
And such a man must seek to harm another.
[tr. Sisson (1981)]

There’s he who, through abasement of another,
hopes for supremacy; he only longs
to see his neighbor’s excellence cast down.
Then there is one who, when he is outdone,
fears his own loss of fame, power, honor, favor;
his sadness loves misfortune for his neighbor.
And there is he who, over injury
received, resentful, for revenge grows greedy
and, angrily, seeks out another’s harm.
[tr. Mandelbaum (1982)]

There are those who hope for supremacy through their neighbor’s being kept down, and only on this account desire that his greatness be brought low;
there are those who fear to lose power, favor, honor, or fame because another mounts higher, and thus are so aggrieved that they love the contrary;
and there are those who seem so outraged by injury that they become greedy for revenge, and thus they must ready harm for others.
[tr. Durling (2003)]

There are those who hope to excel through their neighbour’s downfall, and because of this alone want them toppled from their greatness. This is Pride.
There are those who fear to lose, power, influence, fame or honour because another is preferred, at which they are so saddened they desire the contrary. This is Envy.
And there are those who seem so ashamed because of injury, that they become eager for revenge, and so are forced to wish another’s harm. This is Wrath.
[tr. Kline (2002)]

Some hope, by keeping all their neighbours down, that they'll excel. They yearn for that alone -- to see them brought from high to low estate.
Then, some will fear that, if another mounts, they'll lose all honour, fame and grace and power, so, grieving at success, love what it’s not.
And some, it seems, when hurt, bear such a grudge that they crave only to exact revenge -- which means they seek to speed another’s harm.
[tr. Kirkpatrick (2007)]

There is the one, hoping to excel by bringing down
his neighbor, who, for that sole reason, longs
that from his greatness his neighbor be brought low.
There is the one who fears the loss of power, favor,
honor, fame -- should he be bettered by another.
This so aggrieves him that he wants to see him fall.
And there is the one who thinks himself offended
and hungers after vengeance,
and he must then contrive another's harm.
[tr. Hollander/Hollander (2007)]

First, there's the man who aspires to excellence
By pressing down his neighbor: only this yearning
Makes him strive to pull his neighbor to the ground.
Then there's the man with power, favor, and honor,
And so afraid of losing these when someone
Climbs above him, that he hates what once he loved.
And there's the man who, outraged at being insulted,
Lusts for the chance of taking revenge, and rushes
Into wicked plans for hurting others.
[tr. Raffel (2010)]

For men use, if they have an evil turn, to write it in marble; and whosoever does us a good turn, we write it in dust.

Men's evil manners live in brass, their virtues
We write in water.

• "Ecrivez les injures sur le sable, mais les bienfaits sur le marbre."
• "Écrivez les injures sur le sable, gravez les bienfaits sur le marbre."

The vice that is opposite to justice is injustice, of which there are two sorts: the first consists in the actual doing an injury to another; the second, in tamely looking on while he is injured, and not helping and defending him though we are able: for he that injuriously falls on another, whether prompted by rage or other violent passion, does as it were leap at the throat of his companion; and he that refuses to help him when injured, and to ward off the wrong if it lies in his power, is as plainly guilty of baseness and and injustice as though he had deserted his father, his friends, or his native country.
[tr. Cockman (1699)]

There are two kinds of injustice: Of the one, they are guilty who do an injury; of the other, they who, if they are able, do not defend those from injury to whom it is offered. For he who urged on by anger, or some violent passion, attempts to injure any man, lifts his hand against his brother' and he who interferes not to resist or repel the attempt, is as guilty as if he had deserted his parents, his friends, or his country.
[tr. McCartney (1798)]

But there are two kinds of injustice; the first of those who offer an injury, the second of those who have in their power to avert an injury from those to whom it is offered, and yet do it not. For if a man, prompted either by anger or any sudden perturbation, unjustly assaults another man, such a one seems as it were to lay violent hands on one's ally; and the man who does not repel or withstand the injury, if he can, is as much to blame as if he deserted the cause of his parents, his friends, or his country.
[tr. Edmonds (1865)]

Of injustice there are two kinds, -- one, that of those who inflict injury; the other, that of those who do not, if they can, repel injury from those on whom it is inflicted. Moreover, he who, moved by anger or by some disturbance of mind, makes an unjust assault on any person, is as one who lays violent hands on a casual companion; while he who does not, if he can, ward off or resist the injury offered to another, is as much in fault as if he were to desert his parents, or his friends, or his country.
[tr. Peabody (1883)]

There are two kinds of injustice: the positive injustice of the aggressor, and the negative injustice of neglecting to defend those who are wronged. To attack a man unjustly under the influence of anger or some other passion is to lay hands upon a comrade; not to defend the oppressed and shield them from injustice, is as great a crime as to desert our parents, friends, or country.
[tr. Gardiner (1899)]

There are two classifications of injustice. One part includes those who act unjustly. The other part includes men who, even if they have the power to do so, fail to protect from abuse those people against whom other men commit violence. The man who unjustly does harm to someone else, either in anger or because some other passion arounds him, acts as if he were striking a companion. But the man who does not avert an act of violence, or offer resistance if he has the power, is just as much at fault as if he betrayed his parents, or friends, or his fatherland.
[tr. Edinger (1974)]

That which is not good for the beehive, cannot be good for the bee.
[tr. Casaubon (1634), 6.49]

That which is not for the Interest of the whole Swarm, is not for the Interest of a single Bee.
[tr. Collier (1701); Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

What is not the interest of the hive, is not the interest of the bee.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

That which is not for the interest of the whole hive, cannot be so for any single bee.
[tr. Graves (1792), 6.48]

That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the bee.
[tr. Long (1862)]

What profits not the swarm profits not the bee.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

That which is not in the interests of the hive cannot be in the interests of the bee.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

What does not benefit the hive is no benefit to the bee.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

What is no good for the hive is no good for the bee.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

What brings no benefit to the hive brings none to the bee.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.)]

What injures the hive injures the bee.
[tr. Hays (2003)]

What does not benefit the hive does not benefit the bee either.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

What brings no benefit to the hive brings none to the bee.
[tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

What does not benefit the hive does not benefit the bee.
[tr. Gill (2013)]

Not he only that committeth, but he also that omitteth something, is oftentimes unjust.
[tr. Casaubon (1634), 9.4]

Omissions no less than Commissions, are oftentimes Branches of Injustice.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

Men are often unjust by omissions, as well as by actions.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

A man is as often guilty of injustice by omitting to do what he ought, as by doing what he ought not to do.
[tr. Graves (1792), 9.4]

He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing; not only he who does a certain thing.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Omissions no less than commission are oftentimes part of injustice.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

Wrong comes often of not doing as well as doing.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

Men are often unjust by omissions as well as by actions.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

There is often an injustice of omission as well as of commission.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Often he who omits an act does injustice, not only he who commits an act.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

A person often acts unjustly by what he fails to do, and not only by what he does.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed., 2011 ed.)]

And you can also commit injustice by doing nothing.
[tr. Hays (2003)]

There can often be wrongs of omission as well as commission.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

Very often an unjust act is done by not doing something, not only by doing something.
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

One may often injure by omission, not only by action.
[ed. Taplin (2016)]

How many things may and do oftentimes follow upon such fits of anger and grief; far more grievous in themselves, than those very things which we are so grieved or angry for.
[tr. Casaubon (1634), 11.15]

Consider that our anger and impatience often proves much more mischievous than the provocation could possibly have done.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

What worse evils we suffer by anger and sorrow for such things, than by the things themselves about which those passions rise.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

Consider, how much more we suffer from our anger and grief on those occasions, than from the things themselves which excite our anger or our grief.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

Consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we are angry and vexed.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Consider that our anger and impatience often prove much more mischievous than the things about which we are angry or impatient.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

How much mroe unconscionable are our anger and vexation at the acts, than the acts which make us angry and vexed!
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

How much worse evils we suffer from anger and grief about certain things than from the things themselves about which these passions arise.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

Bethink thee how much more grievous are the consequences of our anger and vexation at such actions than are the acts themselves which arouse that anger and vexation.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

How much more grievous are what fits of anger and the consequent sorrows bring than the actual things are which produce in us those angry fits and sorrows.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

The anger and distress that we feel at such behaviour brings us more suffering than the very things that give rise to that anger and distress.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.), (2011 ed.)]

How much more damage anger and grief do than the things that cause them.
[tr. Hays (2003)]

The greater grief comes from the consequent anger and pain, rather than the original causes of our anger and pain.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

Anger and the sorrow it produces are far more harmful than the things that make us angry.
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

To enjoy yourself and make others enjoy themselves, without harming yourself or any other; that, to my mind, is the whole of ethics.
[tr. Mathers (1926)]

Enjoy and give pleasure, without doing harm to yourself or to anyone else -- that, I think, is the whole of morality.
[tr. Merwin (1969)]

Enjoy and make others enjoy; without doing harm to yourself or anyone else: that, I think, sums up the whole of morality.
[tr. Pearson (1973)]

Give and take pleasure, without doing harm to yourself or anyone else -- that, I think, sums up morality.
[tr. Dusinberre (1992), Frag. 319]

Take your pleasure, give pleasure to others without doing harm to yourself or to anyone else: that sums up the whole of morality.
[tr. Parmée (2003), ¶ 196]

There are but few Men Wise enough to know all the Mischief Wisdom does.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶270]

There are but few Men wise enough to know all the Mischief they do.
[tr. Stanhope (1706), Powell ed., ¶269]

Few men are able to know all the ill they do.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶5]

Few men are able to know all the ill they do.
[ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶252]

Few of us have abilities to know all the ill we occasion.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶3]

Scarcely any man is clever enough to know all the evil he does.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶280]

No man is clever enough to know all the evil he does.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶269]

No one is sufficiently keen to realize to the full the harm he does.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶277]

Scarcely any man is clever enough to realize all the harm he does.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶269]

There is hardly a man clever enough to recognize the full extent of the evil that he does.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶269]

Almost no one is perceptive enough to realize all the harm he does.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶269]

There is scarcely a man alive clever enough to know all the evil he does.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶269]

Full text.