I now am well aware
What crimes I venture on: but rage, the cause
Of woes most grievous to the human race,
Over my better reason hath prevail'd.
[tr. Wodhull (1782)]

I know, I feel the ills, my soul now dares;
But rage, which lords it ov'er my breast, gives birth
To all the dreadful ills that chasten man.
[tr. Potter (1814)]

Oh I do know what sorrows I shall make,
But anger keeps the mastery of my thoughts,
Which is the chiefest cause of human woes.
[tr. Webster (1868)]

At last I understand the awful deed I am to do; but passion, that cause of direst woes to mortal man, hath triumphed o'er my sober thoughts.
[tr. Coleridge (1891)]

I know indeed the ills that I am about to dare, but my rage is master of my counsels, which is indeed the cause of the greatest calamities to men.
[tr. Buckley (1892)]

I know, indeed, the evil of that I purpose; but my inclination gets the better of my judgment.
[Bartlett's (1892)]

Now, now, I learn what horrors I intend:
But passion overmastereth sober thought:
And this is cause of direst ills to men.
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

Yea, I know to what bad things
I go, but louder than all thought doth cry
Anger, which maketh man's worst misery.
[tr. Murray (1906)]

I understand
The horror of what I am going to do; but anger,
The spring of all life's horror, masters my resolve.
[tr. Vellacott (1963)]

I understand how evilly I am about to act,
But my spirit is stronger than my will to resist,
Spirit, the greatest cause of evil for men.
[tr. Podlecki (1989)]

And I know well what pain I am about to undergo, but my wrath overbears my calculation, wrath that brings mortal men their gravest hurt.
[tr. Kovacs (Loeb) (1994)]

I am well aware how terrible a crime I am about to commit, but my passion is master of my reason, passion that causes the greatest suffering in the world.
[tr. Davie (1996)]

I know only too well how horrible the crime I am about to commit is. Logic makes it clear for me but anger, the only cause of man’s most terrible suffering, anger, conquers my logic.
[tr. Theodoridis (2004)]

I understand what evil I am about to do
but my wrath is stronger even than my thoughts,
which is the cause of the greatest wrongs of humankind.
[tr. Luschnig (2007)]

I understand too well the dreadful act
I’m going to commit, but my judgment
cannot check my anger, and that incites
the greatest evils human beings do.
[tr. Johnston (2008)]

I know well what evil I intend to do,
but anger overbears my calculation,
anger, cause of the worst misery to man.
[ed. Yeroulanos (2016)]

I know how great a crime I'm going to commit,
but anger has control over my plans
anger, which is the greatest cause of human pain.
[tr. Ewans (2022)]

At last I understand the evils [kaka] that I will perform; but my thūmos, responsible [aitios] for the greatest troubles [kaka] for mortals, is stronger than my sober thoughts.
[tr. Coleridge / Ceragioli / Nagy / Hour25]

And I know well what pain I am about to undergo, but my wrath overpowers my calculation, wrath that brings mortal men their gravest hurt.
[tr. Kovacs / Zhang / Rogak]

The Gods themselves
By gifts are sway'd, as fame relates; and gold
Hath a far greater influence o'er the souls
Of mortals than the most persuasive words.
[tr. Wodhull (1782)]

Presents with the gods
Have pow'r; and no persuasive words can charm
The hearts of men, like god.
[tr. Potter (1814)]

Gifts, they say, win even gods,
And gold makes more with men than countless reasons.
[tr. Webster (1868)]

'Tis said that gifts tempt even gods; and o'er men's minds gold holds more potent sway than countless words.
[tr. Coleridge (1891)]

Gifts, they say, persuade even the Gods, and gold is more powerful than a thousand arguments to men.
[tr. Buckley (1892)]

Gifts sway the Gods, they say.
Gold weigheth more with men than words untold
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

'Tis written, gifts persuade
The gods in heaven; and gold is stronger made
Than words innumerable to bend men's ways.
[tr. Murray (1906)]

Gifts, they say, persuade even the gods;
With mortals, gold outweights a thousand arguments.
[tr. Vellacott (1963)]

Even gods have their price, they say, And gold for men is worth a thousand words.
[tr. Podlecki (1989)]

They say gifts win over even the gods, and gold is more to mortals than ten thousand words.
[tr. Kovacs (Loeb) (1994); Kovacs / Zhang / Rogak]

Gifts win over the gods themselves, they say; gold carries more weight with mortals than any number of words.
[tr. Davie (1996)]

They say that even the gods are persuaded more by gifts and gold than by a million words.
[tr. Theodoridis (2004)]

The saying goes “gifts persuade the gods.”
And “gold is stronger than ten thousand words among men.”
[tr. Luschnig (2007)]

It's said that gifts persuade even the gods; and gold is better than a thousand words.
[tr. Ewans (2022)]

It is said that gifts persuade even the gods. Gold is more powerful for mortals than countless words.
[tr. Coleridge / Ceragioli / Nagy / Hour25]

The only Reason why we do not give our selves entirely to one Vice, is oftentimes, because our Affections are divided, and we are fond of several.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶196]

The reason we are not often wholly possessed by a single vice, is, that we are distracted by several.
[ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶187]

We are not often possessed wholly by a single vice: the reason is, we are distracted by several.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶378]

What often prevents our abandoning ourselves to a single vice is, our having more than one.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶204]

The reason which often prevents us abandoning a single vice is having so many.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶195]

We are not the victims of a single vice only because we are the victims of so many.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶200]

We are often saved from exclusive addiction to a single vice by the possession of others.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶195]

The multiplicity of our vices often prevents us from abandoning ourselves entirely to one.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶195]

What often prevents our being enslaved by a single vice is that we have a number of others.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶195]

What often prevents our giving ourselves up to a single vice is that we have several.
[tr. Tancock (1959), ¶195]

What often prevents us from giving ourselves up to one single vice, is that we possess several of them.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶195]

Whenever yu cum akrost a man who distrusts everyboddy, yu have found one whom it is safe for everyboddy to distrust.
 
[Whenever you come across a man who distrusts everybody, you have found one whom it is safe for everybody to distrust.]

The constitution is attacked with greater forces and troops than wherewith it is defended; because audacious and reckless characters are set on by a nod, and are even of their own accord incited against the constitution; whilst the good are for some reason or other slacker, and from having neglected the beginnings of things, are at last aroused to action by mere necessity; so that sometimes, while they are willing to retain their tranquility even without freedom, through their own fault they lose both from their hesitation and tardiness.
[tr. Hickie (1888)]

The republic is attacked by greater forces and more numerous bodies than those by which it is defended; because audacious and abandoned men are impelled on by a nod, and are even of their own accord excited by nature to be enemies to the republic. And somehow or other good men are slower in action, and overlooking the first beginnings of things, are at last aroused by necessity itself; so that sometimes through their very delays and tardiness of movement, while they wish to retain their ease even without dignity, they, of their own accord, lose both.
[tr. Yonge (1891)]

Oh sencelesse man, who can not possibly make a worme, and yet will make Gods by dozens.
[tr. Florio (1603)]

Man is certainly stark mad; he cannot make a flea, and yet gods by dozens.
[tr. Cotton (1686)]

Man is certainly stark mad; he cannot make a worm, and yet he will be making gods by dozens.
[tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877)]

Man is indeed mad. He could not fashion a worm, and he fashions gods by the dozen.
[tr. Ives (1925)]

Man is certainly crazy. He could not make a mite, and he makes gods by the dozens.
[tr. Frame (1943)]

Man is quite insane. He wouldn't know how to create a maggot, and he creates gods by the dozen.
[ed. Rat (1958)]

Man is indeed out of his mind. He cannot even create a fleshworm, yet creates gods by the dozen.
[tr. Screech (1987)]

The socially efficient and the intellectually gifted are precisely those who are not content to be ruled, but are ambitious either to rule or to live in an anti-social solitude. A state with a population consisting of nothing but these superior people could not hope to last for a year.

Men, generally are odd Creatures: They never keep up to true Nature. The Bounds of Reason are too narrow for them. In every Character they over-act their Parts, and the noblest Designs very often suffer in their Hands, because they will be running things into Extremes, and always carry things too far.
[tr. Clitandre (1672)]

Men, for the most part, are strange creatures, and never keep the right mean; reason's boundaries are too narrow for them; in every character they overact their parts; and they often spoil the noblest designs, because they exaggerate, and carry them too far.
[tr. Van Laun (1876)]

Men are really strange beings; they never keep to simple nature. The bounds of reason seem too narrow for them, and in every character they over-act their parts; they often spoil even the noblest thing by exaggeration.
[tr. Wall (1879)]

Men for the most part are strange creatures; they never see nature in its true light; the bounds of reason are too narrow for them. In every character they over-act their parts, and often spoil the noblest things; because they will run into extremes, and push matters too far.
[tr. Mathew (1890)]

Men, truly, are strange beings! They are never seen in their proper nature; reason's boundaries are too limited from them; in every character they over-act the part; and they often mar that which is most noble by too much exaggeration and by willful extremes.
[tr. Waller (1903)]

Men, for the most part, are strange creatures, truly!
You never find them keep the golden mean;
The limits of good sense, too narrow for them,
Must always be passed by, in each direction;
They often spoil the noblest things, because
They go too far, and push them to extremes.
[tr. Page (1909)]

Really, humanity is most peculiar!
Men won't remain in the mean middle way;
The boundaries of reason are too narrow.
They force their character beyond its limits,
And often spoil even most noble aims
By exaggeration, carrying things too far.
[tr. Bishop (1957)]

Ah, Brother, man's a strangely fashioned creature
Who seldom is content to follow Nature,
But recklessly pursues his inclination
Beyond the narrow bounds of moderation,
And often, by transgressing Reason's laws,
Perverts a lofty aim or noble cause.
[tr. Wilbur (1963), 1.5]

We humans are a curious lot
The fact is, few of us have got
A sense of Nature's golden mean,
We can't keep straight, we have to lean
To one, extreme and dangerous side;
The bounds of reason aren't that wide,
Staying within them is a feat
Beyond our scope -- you seldom meet
A man who'll tread its narrow way
If there's a chance for him to stray.
[tr. Bolt (2002)]

What strange creatures men are! They're always off balance; they think being reasonable is too limiting; they spoil what’s best by pushing things too far.
[tr. Steiner (2008), 1.5]

The majority of men are strangely made!
[tr. Campbell (2013)]

As a horse after a race, and a hunting dog when he hath hunted, and a bee when she hath made her honey, look not for applause and commendation; so neither doth that man that rightly doth understand his own nature when he hath done a good turn: but from one doth proceed to do another, even as the vine after she hath once borne fruit in her own proper season, is ready for another time.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

A Fleet Horse or Greyhound, don't use to make a Noise when they have perform'd handsomly, nor a Bee neither when she has made a little Hony: And thus a Man that's rightly Kind, never proclaims a Good Turn, but does another as soon as he can; just like a Vine that bears again the next Season.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

The horse, when he hath run his course, the hound, when he has followed the track, the bee, when it has made its honey, and the Man, when he hath done good to others, don’t make a noisy boast of it, but go on to repeat the like actions, as the vine in its season produces its new clusters again.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

This same is applicable to the horse that has finished his course, to the hound that has ended his chase, and to the bee that has produced its honey. Let the man, then, who has done a beneficent action, not look for applause; but repeat it the first opportunity; as the vine again yields its fruit at the proper season.
[tr. Graves (1792), 5.5]

A fleet horse or greyhound do not make a noise when they have done well, nor a bee neither when she has made a little honey. And thus a man that has done a kindness never proclaims it, but does another as soon as he can, just like a vine that bears again the next season.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

As the horse that runs, the hound that hunts, the bee that hives its honey, so the man who does the kindness does not raise a shout, but passes on to the next act, as a vine to the bearing of clusters for next season.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

The horse when he has run his course, the hound when he has followed the track, the bee when it has made its honey, and the man when he has done good to others, make no noisy boast of it, but set out to do the same once more, as the vine in its season produces its new clusters again.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

[...] a steed when it has run its course, a hound when it has singled out the trail, a bee when she hath made her comb. And so a man when he hath done one thing well, does not cry it abroad, but betakes himself to a second, as a vine to bear afresh her clusters in due season.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

A horse runs, a hound tracks, bees make honey, and a man does good, but doesn't know that he has done it and passes on to a second act, like a vine to bear once more its grapes in due season.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

[...] a horse that has run its race, a hound that has tracked his quarry, or a bee that has hived her honey. Like them, the man who has done one good action does not cry it aloud, but passes straight on to a second, as the vine passes on to the bearing of another summer's grapes.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

[...] a horse when it has run its race, or a dog when it has followed a trail, or a bee when it has mades its honey. And so such a person, when he has done a good deed, does not cry it abroad, but passes straight on to the next, as the vine yields new clusters of grapes when the season comes around.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.)]

A horse at the end of the race ...
A dog when the hunt is over ...
A bee with its honey stored ...
And a human being after helping others.
They don't make a fuss about it. They just go on to something else, as the vine looks forward to bearing fruit again in season.
[tr. Hays (2003)]

A horse that has raced, a dog that has tracked, a bee that has made honey, and a man that has done good -- none of these knows what they have done, but they pass on to the next action, just as the vine passes on to bear grapes again in due season.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

[...] a horse when it has run its race, or a dog when it has followed its trail, or a bee when it has made its honey. And so such a person, when he has done a good deed, does not shout about it, but passes straight on to the next one, as the vine yields new clusters of grapes when the season comes around.
[tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

[...] a horse which has run a race, a dog which has followed the scent, or a bee which has made its honey. A person who has done something good does not make a big fuss about it, but goes on to the next action, as a vine goes on to produce grapes again in season.
[tr. Gill (2013), sec. 3-4]

A man does not proclaim a good deed, but proceeds to another, as a vine bears grapes again in season.
[ed. Taplin (2016)]

Now leane thyne eares, and listen well, perceave howe all be mad,
Yea those who earste to make the woorse, such mockeries have had.
Admit there be through darkesum wood a speedie footepathe way,
On ryghte syde sum, on lefte syde sum, and all do go a stray
Through wilsumnes of wildernes: the error is all one,
Though through miswandringe diverslye, they diverslye have gone.
Thou maist be mad, frend Damasipp, thou maiste be muche unwyse,
Thy mockers staringe mad also, though in an other guyse.
[tr. Drant (1567)]

Nay give me leave, and I'le demonstrate how
He who calls thee fool's as much fool as thou.
Like Trav'lers passing through a Wood, when they
Range up and down missing their ready way,
This to the right that to the left hand strayes,
One error fools them both, though several wayes.
And tho thou think'st thou'rt mad, yet even he
Is not a jot less mad that laughs at thee,
Both to Fool-coats have like propriety.
[tr. "A. B."; ed. Brome (1666)]

Some call Thee mad, but those that call Thee so,
Observe, I'll prove them quite as mad as You:
As Men that lose their ways in Woods, divide;
Some go on this, and some on t'other side,
The Error is the same, all miss the Road,
Altho in different Quarters of the Wood.
Thus as they call thee, think that thou art mad;
But those that call thee so are quite as bad.
[tr. Creech (1684)]

And they who call you fool, with equal claim
May plead an ample title to the name.
When in a wood we leave the certain way
One error fools us, though we various stray:
Some to the left, some turn to t'other side:
So he, who dares thy madness to deride,
Though you may frankly own yourself a fool,
Behind him trails his mark of ridicule.
[tr. Francis (1747)]

Hear now why those who proudly call you mad,
In reason's view are every whit as bad.
As, when bewilder'd in a wood by night
This trav'ller takes the left and that the right,
Each strays, though in a different path he strays,
Mock'd by the self-same error various ways, --
So is it here; and he that laughs at you
May wear the cap; for he is crack-brain'd too.
[tr. Howes (1845)]

Now learn, why all those, who have fixed the name of madman upon you, are as senseless as yourself. As in the woods, where a mistake makes people wander about from the proper path; one goes out of the way to the right, another to the left; there is the same blunder on both sides, only the illusion is in different directions: in this manner imagine yourself mad; so that he, who derides you, hangs his tail not one jot wiser than yourself.
[tr. Smart/Buckley (1853)]

Now listen to the reason why all those who've called you "madman" are as mad as you. As in the woods, when some mistake drives from the beaten track men vaguely wandering, one goes off to the right, another to the left, -- they make the same mistake, but in quite opposite directions; -- so think that you're mad, and that the man who mocks you is no saner than yourself, and a fit laughingstock for boys.
[tr. Millington (1870)]

Now let me show you why all who have dubbed you "madman" are quite as crazy as you. When men miss the path in a forest and go astray in every direction, all miss it equally, though one is led wrong on the right side of the road and one on the left. So for yourself, believe that if you are mad it is only in such a sense that the man who is laughing at you drags his tail also.
[tr. Wickham (1903)]

Now learn why all, who have given you the name of madman, are quite as crazy as yourself. Just as in a forest, where some error drives men to wander to and fro from the proper path, and this one goes off to the left and that one to the right: both are under the same error, but are led astray in different ways: so believe yourself to be insane only so far that he who laughs at you drags a tail behind him, no whit the wiser man.
[tr. Fairclough (Loeb) (1926)]

Now learn
Why it is that all who have fastened the name on you
Are quite as crazy as you. Just as men in a forest,
Whom confusion forces to wander away from the right path,
Will veer off, one to the left, the other to the right,
Misled by the same mistake but misled in different
Directions, so you may consider yourself deluded
To the exact degree of the man who makes fun of you,
Who is dragging a tail behind himself all unawares.
[tr. Palmer Bovie (1959)]

Now, hear why you're no madder
than all those others, who bestowed on you the name
‘insane.’ Think of travelers in a forest who get lost
and leave the proper path: one might wander over
to the left, the other to the right. They're deceived
in different ways, but it's the same mistake. Similarly,
you think you're insane, but who is any wiser
among those tail-draggers who make fun of you?
[tr. Fuchs (1977)]

Listen: here is why everyone
Who calls you mad is just as senseless himself.
It's like a forest, where people wander this way and that,
Hunting the path and never finding it, not right, or left,
Or center, all confused, all equally lost, but all
Lost in different directions. Believe yourself mad,
If you like, but as sane as the man who laughs at you
And never sees the tail tied behind him.
[tr. Raffel (1983)]

Now hear me: why all those who have
called you crazy are brainless like yourself.
As in the woods folk wander off
the true path in error and scatter
here and there, this one to the left,
this one to the right, both of them in
different directions; in the same way
you may consider yourself insane.
Yet you know full well that he who
derides you is no wiser than you
but drags a tail behind him.
[tr. Alexander (1999)]

Now, here’s how
those who call you mad are mad. In a wood,
error diverts men from the strict path, some
left, some right. They’re all wrong, each in his
way. Who says he’s right is of course wrong —
is he the one you’ll let pronounce you wrong?
[tr. Matthews (2002)]

Now this is the reason
why those who call you mad are every bit as crazy
as you are: You know how people lose their way in the woods --
one goes wandering off to the left, another to the right;
both are equally wrong, though each has strayed in a different
direction. So you may rest assured that if you're to be counted
mad the fellow who laughs at you is no saner himself.
He too has straw in his hair.
[tr. Rudd (2005 ed.)]

Now learn why all those who call
You insane, are every bit as foolish themselves.
It’s like a wood, where error leads men to wander
Here and there, from the true path, one off to the left,
Another off to the right, the same error both times,
But leading them in different directions: so know
You’re only as mad as the man no wiser than you
Who laughs at you, but still has a tail pinned behind.
[tr. Kline (2015)]

Men, so long as they are men, relax at times even amid the heaviest perplexities.
[tr. King (1877)]

Men, in whatever anxiety they may be, if they are men, sometimes indulge in relaxation.
[ed. Hoyt (1896)]

But men, in however troublous times -- if only they are human -- sometimes relax their minds.
[tr. Ker (Loeb) (1926)]

Although men are in great difficulties, still, provided they are men, they sometimes relax their minds.
[tr. Yonge (1903)]

In whatever trouble men may be, yet so long as they are men, they must occasionally have their moments of cheerfulness.
[ed. Harbottle (1906)]

Human beings, even in times of crisis, do sometimes unwind, if they are human at all.
[tr. Berry (2006)]

Even when they are in troubled situations, men, if they are human, still relax their minds from time to time.
[tr. McElduff (2011)]

There are more fools than wise men, and even in the wise man himself there is more folly than wisdom.
[tr. Hutchinson (1902)]

There are more fools than wise men, and even in a wise man there is more folly than wisdom.
[tr. Mathers (1926)]

There are more fools than wise people, and in wise people themselves there is more folly than wisdom.
[tr. Siniscalchi (1994)]

Such is the might of your bewitching beauty, that love constrains me thus to act. And, let me tell you, good cause have you to vaunt you of your beauty more than other women, in that it delights the saints, who are used to contemplate celestial beauties; whereto I may add that, albeit I am an abbot, yet I am a man even as others.
[tr. Rigg (1903)]

Ah! being a Devotee does not make me less a Man; and when one comes to view your celestial Charms, the Heart surrenders, and reasons no more. I know, that such Language from me, seems somewhat strange; but, Madam, after all, I am not an Angel, and shou'd you condemn the Declaration I make, you must lay the Blame upon your attractive charms.
[tr. Clitandre (1672)]

Ah! although I am a pious man, I am not the less a man; and, when one beholds your heavenly charms, the heart surrenders and reasons no longer. I know that such discourse from me must appear strange; but, after all, Madam, I am not an angel; and if my confession be condemned by you, you must blame your own attractions for it.
[tr. Van Laun (1876)]

Ah! Although a devotee, I am no less a man. When your celestial attractions burst upon the sight, the heart surrenders, and reasons no more. I know that such language from me seems somewhat strange; but after all, madam, I am not an angel; and, if you condemn the confession I make, you have only your own attractions to blame for it.
[tr. Wall (1879)]

Ah, being devout does not make me less a man; and when one comes to view your celestial charms the heart surrenders, and thinks no more. I know that this longing seems strange coming from me, but I am not an angel, and if you condemn the declaration I make, you must lay the biame on your attractive charms.
[tr. Mathew (1890)]

Ah! I may be pious, but I am none the less a man; and when your heavenly charmes are seen the heart surrenders without reasoning. I know such language from me must seem strange; but, after all, Madame, I am not an angel, and, if you condemn my avowal, you must lay the blame on your captivating attractions.
[tr. Waller (1903)]

Though pious, I am none the less a man;
And when a man beholds your heavenly charms,
The heart surrenders, and can think no more.
I know such words seem strange, coming from me;
But, madam, I'm no angel, after all;
If you condemn my frankly made avowal
You only have your charming self to blame.
[tr. Page (1909)]

Ah, pious though I be, I'm still a man.
And when one glimpses your celestial beauties,
The heart is captured, and it cannot argue.
I know such words from me may seem surprising.
But after all, madame, I'm not an angel.
If you condemn the avowal I make to you,
You must accuse your own bewitching charms.
[tr. Bishop (1957)]

I may be pious, but I'm human too:
With your celestial charms before his eyes,
A man has not the power to be wise.
I know such words sound strangely, coming from me,
But I'm no angel, nor was meant to be,
And if you blame my passion, you must needs
Reproach as well the charms on which it feeds.
[tr. Wilbur (1963)]

I'm pious, but I'm still a man.
To glimpse your beauty is to fall,
To lose oneself beyond recall,
And when a heart is forced to yield,
Reason gives up; it quits the field.
You don't expect such words from me
But I'm no saint, why should I be?
You find this declaration strange?
To change it, you will have to change,
Become less lovely, less divine.
(Ha! Tell the sun it shouldn't shine!)
[tr. Bolt (2002)]

Ah! Pious one may be: one is still a man. The heart, seeing such celestial charms, is captivated and is incapable of reason. Perhaps what I have said seems unexpected, but after all, I am a man, not an angel; and if you fault this admission that I have made, blame your unearthly beauty, which provoked it.
[tr. Steiner (2008)]

MORE: Listen, Meg, God made the angels to show Him splendor, as He made animals for innocence and plants for their simplicity. But Man He made to serve Him wittily, in the tangle of his mind. If He suffers us to come to such a case that there is no escaping, then we may stand to our tackle as best we can, and, yes, Meg, then we can clamor like champions, if we have the spittle for it. But it's God's part, not our own, to bring ourselves to such a pass. Our natural business lies in escaping.

For we are all born to be fellow-workers, as the feet, the hands, and the eyelids; as the rows of the upper and under teeth: for such therefore to be in opposition, is against nature; and what is it to chafe at, and to be averse from, but to be in opposition?
[tr. Casaubon (1634), 1.15]

For we are all made for mutual Assistance, no less than the Parts of the Body are for the Service of the whole; From whence it follows that Clashing and Opposition is perfectly Unnatural: Now such an unfriendly Disposition is imply'd in Resentment and Aversion.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

We were formed by nature for mutual assistance, as the two feet, the hands, the eye¬ lids, the upper and lower rows of teeth. Opposition to each other is contrary to nature: All anger and aversion is an opposition.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

For we are all born for our mutual assistance; as the hands and feet, and every part of the human body, are for the service of the whole; to thwart and injure each other, therefore, is contrary to nature. Now injuries and hostilities are generally the consequence of hatred and resentment.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

For we are made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of the upper and lower teeth. To act against one another, then, is contrary to nature; and it is acting against one another to be vexed and to turn away.
[tr. Long (1862)]

For we are all made for mutual assistance, as the feet, the hands, and the eyelids, as the rows of the upper and under teeth, from whence it follows that clashing and opposition is perfectly unnatural. Now such an unfriendly disposition is implied in resentment and aversion.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

For we are made for co-operation, like the feet, the hands, the eyelids, the upper and the lower rows of teech. To thwart one another is contrary to nature; and one form of thwarting is resentment and estrangement.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

For we are made by nature for mutual assistance, like the feet, the hands, the eyelids, the upper and lower rows of teeth. It is against nature for men to oppose each other; and what else is anger and aversion?
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

For we have come into being for co-operation, as have the feet, the hands, the eyelids, the rows of upper and lower teeth. Therefore to thwart one another is against Nature; and we do thwart one another by shewing resentment and aversion.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

For we have come into the world to work together, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth. To work against one another therefore is to oppose Nature, and to be vexed with another or to turn away from him is to tend to antagonism.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

For he and I were born to work together, like a man’s two hands, feet, or eyelids, or like the upper and lower rows of his teeth. To obstruct each other is against Nature’s law -- and what is irritation or aversion but a form of obstruction?
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

For we have come into being to work together, like feet, hands, or eyelids, or the two rows of teeth in our upper and lower jaws. To work against one another is therefore contrary to nature; and to be angry with another and turn away form him is surely to work against him.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.)]

We were born to work together like feet, hands, and eyes, like the two rows of teeth, upper and lower. To obstruct each other is unnatural. To feel anger at someone, to turn your back on him: these are obstructions.
[tr. Hays (2003)]

We were born for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth. So to work in opposition to one another is against nature: and anger or rejection is opposition.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

For we have been made for cooperation, just like the feet, the hands, the eyelids, and the upper and lower teeth. To hinder one another, then, is contrary to Nature, and this is exactly what happens when we are angry and turn away from each other.
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

For we have come into being to work together, like feet, hands, eyelids, or the two rows of teeth in our upper and lower jaws. To work against one another is therefore contrary to nature; and to be angry with another person and turn away from him is surely to work against him.
[tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

For both they and I need each other. To act against them would be to act against myself. And to become angry and turn away from them is also to act against them.
[tr. McNeill (2019)]

But I that understand the nature of that which is good, that it only is to be desired, and of that which is bad, that it only is truly odious and shameful: who know moreover, that this transgressor, whosoever he be, is my kinsman, not by the same blood and seed, but by participation of the same reason, and of the same divine particle; How can I either be hurt by any of those, since it is not in their power to make me incur anything that is truly reproachful? or angry, and ill affected towards him, who by nature is so near unto me?
[tr. Casaubon (1634), 1.15]

And since it's fallen to my share to understand the Natural Beauty of a good Action, and the Deformity of an ill One; since I am satisfied the Person disobliging is of Kin to me, and tho we are not just of the same Flesh and Blood, yet our Minds are nearly related, being both extracted from the Deity; since I am likewise convinc'd that no Man can do me a real injury, because no Man can force me to misbehave my self; For these Reasons, I can't find in my Heart to Hate, or to be Angry with one of my own Nature and Family.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

But I have fully comprehended the nature of good, as only what is beautiful and honourable; and of evil, that it is always deformed and shameful; and the nature of those persons too who mistake their aim; that they are my kinsmen, by partaking, not of the same blood or seed, but of the same intelligent divine part; and that I cannot be hurt by any of them, since none of them can involve me in any thing dishonourable or deformed. I cannot be angry at my kinsmen, or hate them.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

But I, who have a more just idea of things, that nothing is good, but what is honourable, and nothing evil, but what is base; and am also sensible that the persons who offend me are in some sense allied to me, (I do not mean of the same flesh and blood, but that our souls are derived from, and particles of, the same divine nature) I can neither suffer any real injury from them, because they cannot compel me to do a base action; nor can I be angry with or hate thoe whom I consider as of the same nature and the same family with myself.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful, and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does wrong, that it is akin to me; not [only] of the same blood or seed, but that it participates in [the same] intelligence and [the same] portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Since it has fallen to my share to understand the natural beauty of a good action, and the deformity of an ill one -- since I am satisfied the person disobliging is of kin to me, and though we are not just of the same flesh and blood, yet our minds are nearly related, being both extracted from the Deity I am likewise convinced that no man can do me a real injury, because no man can force me to misbehave myself, nor can I find it in my heart to hate or to be angry with one of my own nature and family.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

But seeing that I have beheld the nature and nobility of good, and the nature and meanness of evil, and the nature of the sinner, who is my brother, participating not indeed in the same flesh and blood, but in the same mind and partnership with the divine, I cannot be injured by any of them; for no man can involve me in what demeans. Neither can I be angry with my brother, or quarrel with them.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

But I have considered the nature of the good, and found it beautiful: I have beheld the nature of the bad, and found it ugly. I also understand the nature of the evil-doer, and know that he is my brother, not because he shares with me the same blood or the same seed, but because he is a partaker of the same mind and of the same portion of immortality. I therefore cannot be hurt by any of these, since none of them can involve me in any baseness. I cannot be angry with my brother, or sever myself from him.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

But I, in that I have comprehended the nature of the Good that it is beautiful, and the nature of Evil that it is ugly, and the nature of the wrong-doer himself that it is akin to me, not as partaker of the same blood and seed but of intelligence and a morsel of the Divine, can neither be injured by any of them -- for no one can involve me in what is debasing -- nor can I be wroth with my kinsman and hate him.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

But I, because I have seen that the nature of good is the right, and of ill the wrong, and that the nature of the man himself who does wrong is akin to my own (not of the same blood and seed, but partaking with me in mind, that is in a portion of divinity), I can neither be harmed by any of them, for no man will involve me in wrong, nor can I be angry with my kinsman or hate him.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

But for my part I have long perceived the nature of good and its nobility, the nature of evil and its meanness, and also the nature of the culprit himself, who is my brother (not in the physical sense, but as a fellow-creature similarly endowed with reason and a share of the divine); therefore none of those things can injure me, for nobody can implicate me in what is degrading. Neither can I be angry with my brother or fall foul of him.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

But I, who have beheld the nature of the good, and seen that it is the right; and of the bad, and seen that it is the wrong; and for the wrongdoer himself, and seeing that his nature is akin to my own -- not because he is of the same blood and seed, but because he shares with me in mind and a portion of the divine -- I, then, can neither be harmed by any of these men, nor can I become angry with one who is akin to me, nor can I hate him.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.)]

But I have seen that the nature of good is what is right, and the nature of evil what is wrong; and I have reflected that the nature of the offender himself is akin to my own -- not a kinship of blood or seed, but a sharing in the same mind, the same fragment of divinity. Therefore I cannot be harmed by any of them, as none will infect me with their wrong. Nor can I be angry with my kinsman or hate him.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

But insofar as I have comprehended the true nature of what is good, namely that it is fine and noble, and the true nature of what is bad, that it is shameful, and the true nature of the person who has gone astray: that he is just like me, not only in the physical sense but also with respect to Intelligence and having a portion of the divine -- insofar as I have comprehended all this, I can neither be harmed by any of them, for no one else can involve me in what is shameful and debasing, nor can I be angry with my fellow man or hate him.
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

But I, who have observed the nature of the good, and seen that it is the right; and of the bad, and seen that it is the wrong; and of the wrongdoer himself, and seen that his nature is akin to my own -- not because he is of the same blood and seed, but because he shares as I do in mind and thus in a portion of the divine -- I, then, can neither be harmed by these people, nor become angry with one who is akin to me, nor can I hate him.
[tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

But I have recognized the nature of the good and seen that it is the right, and the nature of the bad and seen that it is the wrong, and nature of th wrongdoer himself, and seen that he is related to me, not because he has the same blood or seed, but because he shares in the same mind and portion of divinity. So I cannot be harmed by any of them, as no one will involve me in what is wrong. Nor can I be angry with my relative or hate him.
[tr. Gill (2013)]

But I, who know what is truly beautiful and truly ugly, and who know the wickedness of their hearts, also know that all these people are akin to me, that they are part of the same divine pattern. I cannot be injured by any of them, for no one can force me to see the world the way they do. Neither can I hate them, for both they and I need each other.
[tr. McNeill (2019)]

There is no certain mark of generous souls:
For in the tempers of mankind prevails
A strange confusion. I have seen the son
Of a great father dwindle into nothing.
And virtuous children spring from wicked Sires;
Among the rich a mean contracted spirit
Have I discover'd, and the poor man's breast
Withi most exalted sentiments inspir'd.
[tr. Wodhull (1809)]

Ah! there is no sure mark to recognize a man's worth; for human nature hath in it an element of confusion. For I have seen ere now the son of a noble sire prove himself a worthless knave, and virtuous children sprung from evil parents; likewise dearth in a rich man's spirit, and in a poor man's frame a mighty soul.
[tr. Coleridge (1891)]

Alas! there is no sure mark of manliness; for the natures of mortals exhibit a confusion. For already have I seen a man who was naught sprung from a noble sire, and good children [sprung] from bad [fathers[,. and hunger in the spirit of a rich man, and a great mind in a poor body.
[tr. Buckley (1892)]

Lo, there is no sure test for manhood’s worth:
For mortal natures are confusion-fraught. --
I have seen ere now a noble father’s son
Proved nothing-worth, seen good sons of ill sires,
Starved leanness in a rich man’s very soul,
And in a poor man’s body a great heart.
[tr. Way (1896)]

How dark lies honour hid! And what turmoil
In all things human: sons of mighty men
Fallen to naught, and from ill seed again
Good fruit: yea, famine in the rich man's scroll
Writ deep, and in poor flesh a lordly soul.
[tr. Murray (1905)]

Ah! There is no exact way to test a man's worth; for human nature has confusion in it. I have seen before now the son of a noble father worth nothing, and good children from evil parents; famine in a rich man's spirit, and a mighty soul in a poor man's body.
[tr. Coleridge (1938 ed.)]

It is impossible to judge a man’s virtue with accuracy. There’s always great confusion in the nature of mortals. I, myself, have seen worthless children born of a virtuous man and from evil parents born brilliant children. I have seen a small, poor mind in a wealthy man and in the soul of a poor man, a great one.
[tr. Theodoridis (2006)]

Well, nothing is precise
when it comes to how a man is valued --
men’s natures are confusing. Before this,
I’ve seen a man worth nothing, yet he had
a noble father; I’ve known evil parents
with outstanding children, seen famine
in a rich man’s mind and a great spirit
in a poor man’s body.
[tr. Johnston (2009)]

I have known a man of a noble father who turns out
To be nothing while powerful men can rise from the low.
I have seen emptiness in a rich man’s thought
And great judgement in a poor person’s frame.
[tr. @sententiq (2020)]

To be a saint is the exception; to be upright is the rule. Err, falter, sin, but be upright.
[tr. Wilbour (1862); Wilbour / Fahnestock / MacAfee (1987)]

To be a saint is the exception, to be a just man is the rule. Err, fail, sin, but be just.
[tr. Wraxall (1862)]

To be a saint is the exception; to be an upright man is the rule. Err, fall, sin if you will, but be upright.
[tr. Hapgood (1887)]

To be a saint is to be an exception; to be a true man is the rule. Err, fail, sin if you must, but be upright.
[tr. Denny (1976)]

If but the Vine and Love-abjuring Band
Are in the Prophet's Paradise to stand,
Alack, I doubt the Prophet's Paradise
Were empty as the hollow of one's hand.
[tr. FitzGerald, 2nd Ed (1868), # 65; this does not appear in other editions before or after]

Folk say that there is a hell. This is a vain error, in which no trust should be placed, for if there were a hell for lovers and for bibbers of wine, why heaven would be, from to-morrow morn, as empty as the hollow of my hand.
[tr. McCarthy (1879), # 131]

If wine be an unpardonable sin,
God help Khayyam and his wine-bibbing kin!
If all poor drouthy souls be lodged elsewhere,
Heaven's plains must be as bare as maiden's chin.
[tr. Whinfield (1882), # 33]

Drunkards are doomed to hell, so men declare,
Believe it not, 'tis but a foolish scare;
Heaven will be empty as this hand of mine,
If none who love good drink find entrance there.
[tr. Whinfield (1883), # 67]

To drain the cup, to hover round the fair,
Can hypocritic arts with these compare?
If all who love and drink are going wrong,
There's many a wight of heaven may well despair!
[tr. Winfield (1883), #381]

With Tales of future pains men threaten me,
They say there is a Hell in store for thee; --
Love, if there is a Hell for all like us,
Their Heaven as empty as my Palm will be.
[tr. Garner (1887), 1.19]

To drink wine and consort with a company of the beautiful
is better than practising the hypocrisy of the zealot;
if the lover and the drunkard are doomed to hell,
then no one will see the face of heaven.
[tr. Heron-Allen (1898), # 127]

Better to drink, with fair maids wander free.
Than in deceit to practice piety;
If sots and lovers all in Hell will be.
Then who would wish the face of Heaven to see?
[tr. Thompson (1906), # 425]

Tis better here with Love and Wine to sit
Than to become the zealous hypocrite;
If all who love or drink are doom'd to Hell,
On whom shall Heaven bestow a benefit?
[tr. Talbot (1908), # 127]

Drinking wine and wooing fair ones
Is a better thing than the hypocrisy of fanatics.
If all who drink wine were to go to Hell
No one would then behold Paradise.
[tr. Rosen (1928), # 256]

Better to drink and dance with rosy fairs,
Than cheat the folk with doubtful pious wares;
Tho' drunkards, so they say, are doomed to hell,
To go to heaven with cheats who ever cares?
[tr. Tirtha (1941), # 10.88]

They say lovers and drunkards go to hell,
A controversial dictum not easy to accept:
If the lover and drunkard are for hell,
Tomorrow Paradise will be empty.
[tr. Avery/Heath-Stubbs (1979), # 87]

Man has gradually become a visionary animal, who has to fulfil one more condition of existence than the other animals: man must from time to time believe that he knows why he exists; his species cannot flourish without periodically confiding in life! Without the belief in reason in life!
[tr. Common (1911)]

Gradually, man has become a fantastic animal that has to fulfil one more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to believe, to know, from time to time why he exists; his race cannot flourish without a periodic trust in life -- without faith in reason in life.
[tr. Kaufmann (1974)]

Man has gradually become a fantastic animal that must fulfil one condition of existence more than any other animal: man must from time tot time believes he knows why he exists; his race cannot thrive without a periodic trust in life -- without faith in the reason in life!
[tr. Nauckhoff (2001)]

I've learned one thing from experience -- that I'll bear watching about as much as some of my neighbors.

Mankind loves misterys -- a hole in the ground, excites more wonder than a star in the heavens.  

Mankind in general love MYSTERIES. A hole in the ground generally excites more wonder and stirs up more curiosity than a strange star in the heavens.

MORALITY. The theory that every human act must be either right or wrong, and that 99% of them are wrong.
[A Book of Burlesques, "The Jazz Webster" (1924)]

Morality is the theory that every human act must be either right or wrong, and that 99% of them are wrong.
[Chrestomathy, ch. 30 "Sententiae" (1949)]

There are depths in man that go to the lowest hell, and heights that reach the highest heaven, for are not both heaven and hell made out of him, everlasting miracle and mystery that he is.

There is no end to a Man's desire of growing rich and great; when the Cough seizes him, when Death approaches, his Face shrivel'd, and his Legs weak, he cries, My Fortune, my Establishment.
[Bullord ed. (1696)]

There is no end to a Man's Desire of growing rich and great; the Cough seizes him, Death approaches, his Face is shrivel'd, and his Legs weak, yet he cries, My Fortune, my Preferment.
[Curll ed. (1713)]

There is no end of desiring Riches and Grandeur; before the Rattle seizes him, and Death approaches, though his Face be shriveled, and his Legs totter, yet he is ever talking of, my Fortune, my Preferment.
[Browne ed. (1752)]

All that a man wishes for is riches and grandeur; he falls very ill, and death draws near, and though his face be shrivelled and his legs totter, yet he is still talking of his fortune and his post.
[tr. Van Laun (1885)]

It’s a good thing when a man is different from your image of him. It shows he isn’t a type. If he were, it would be the end of him as a man. But if you can’t place him in a category, it means that at least a part of him is what a human being ought to be. He has a grain of immortality.
[tr. Hayward & Harari (1958), UK ed.]

It’s good when a man deceives your expectations, when he doesn’t correspond to the preconceived notion of him. To belong to a type is the end of a man, his condemnation. If he doesn’t fall under any category, if he’s not representative, half of what’s demanded of him is there. He’s free of himself, he has achieved a grain of immortality.
[tr. Pevear & Volokhonsky (2010)]

Furthermore, beasts see, hear, and can perceive corporeal things by touch, taste, and smell more keenly than we. Add to this energy, power, strength of limb, speed, and agility of bodily motion. In all of these faculties we excel some, equal others, and to some are inferior. Things of this sort we clearly share with beasts. Indeed, to seek the pleasures of the body and to avoid harm constitute the entire activity of a beast's life.
[tr. Benjamin/Hackstaff (1964), ch. 8, sec. 62]

We recognize and acknowledge that animals can see and hear, and can sense material objects by touch, taste, and smell, often better than we can. Consider also strength, health, and bodily vigor, ease and swiftness of motion. In all of these respects we are superior to some animals, equal to others, and inferior to quite a few. Yet we have these sorts of traits in common with animals, though life of the lower animals consists entirely in the pursuit of physical pleasures and the avoidance of pains.
[tr. Williams (1993)]

For as every wyne long kept and olde waxith not eagre of his owne propre nature, right so all mankynde is not aygre fell cruell ungracious chargyng nor inportune in olde age of their owne kynde though some men among many be fonde of that condicion. I approve & preyse in olde age the man which hath severitee & stidfast abydyng in hym. Seuerite is contynuance & perseverance of oon maner of lyvyng as wele in the thyngys within as in theym withoute. But I approve nat that in an olde man be egrenesse nor hardnesse & sharpnesse of maners of condicions.
[tr. Worcester/Worcester/Scrope (1481)]

For even as every wine being old and standing long is not converted into vineigre, so likewise is not every age sour, eigre, and unpleasant. Severity and sternness in old age I well allow and commend, so that a moderate mean therein (as in all other things) be observed; but bitterness and rigorous dealing I can in no wise brook nor away withal.
[tr. Newton (1569)]

For as all wines do not grow soure and tart in continuance, so not all age. I like severity in an old man, but not bitternesse.
[tr. Austin (1648), ch. 19]

Our nature here, is not unlike our wine,
Some sorts, when old, continue brisk, and fine.
So Age's gravity may seem severe,
But nothing harsh, or bitter ought to appear.
[tr. Denham (1669)]

In short, as it fares with Wines, so it does with Old Men: all are not equally apt to grow sour with Age. A serious and moderately grave Deportment well become us, but nothing of an austere Severity.
[tr. Hemming (1716)]

Thus it is, for as all Wines are not prick'd by Age, so neither is Human Life sower'd by Old Age; a Severity I approve of in Old Men, but with Moderation; Bitterness by no means.
[tr. J. D. (1744)]

Some Wines sour with Age, while others grow better and richer. A Gravity with some Severity is to be allowed; but by no means Ill nature.
[tr. Logan (1744)]

As it is not every kind of wine, so neither is it every sort of temper, that turns sour by age. But I must observe at the same time there is a certain gravity of deportment extremely becoming in advanced years, and which, as in other virtues, when it preserves its proper bounds, and does not degenerate into an acerbity of manners, I very much approve.
[tr. Melmoth (1773)]

For, as not every wine, so not every life, grows sour by age. Strictness in old age, I approve; but that, even as other things, in moderate degree: bitterness I nowise approve.
[Cornish Bros. ed. (1847)]

Neither every wine nor every life turns to vinegar with age.
[ed. Harbottle (1906)]

For as it is not every wine, so it is not every man's life, that grows sour from old age. I approve of gravity in old age, but this in a moderate degree, like everything else; harshness by no means.
[tr. Edmonds (1874)]

For as it is not wine of every vintage, so it is not every temper that grows sour with age. I approve of gravity in old age, so it be not excessive; for moderation in all things is becoming: but for bitterness I have no tolerance.
[tr. Peabody (1884)]

The fact is that, just as it is not every wine, so it is not every life, that turns sour from keeping. Serious gravity I approve of in old age, but, as in other things, it must be within due limits: bitterness I can in no case approve.
[tr. Shuckburgh (1895)]

Not every wine grows sour by growing old.
Severity in age is well enough:
But not too much, and naught of bitterness.
[tr. Allison (1916)]

As it is not every wine, so it is not every disposition, that grows sour with age. I approve of some austerity in the old, but I want it, as I do everything else, in moderation. Sourness of temper I like not at all.
[tr. Falconer (1923)]

Human nature is like wine: it does not invariably sour just because it is old. Some old men seem very stern, and rightly so -- although there must be, as I always say, moderation in all things. There is never any reason for ill temper.
[tr. Cobbold (2012)]

Certainly neither all wines go sour
Nor do all men because of agedness.
I approve of old men’s calm severity,
But I don’t put up with those who are dour.
[tr. Bozzi (2015)]

The truth is that a person's character, like wine, does not necessarily grow sour with age. Austerity in old age is proper enough, but like everything else it should be in moderation. Sourness of disposition is never a virtue.
[tr. Freeman (2016)]

What is our labour to remember things, our labour to learn, and our ignorance without this labour? our agility got by toil, and our dullness if we neglect it?
[tr. Healey (1610)]

For why is it that we remember with difficulty, and without difficulty forget? learn with difficulty, and without difficulty remain ignorant? are diligent with difficulty, and without difficulty are indolent?
[tr. Dods (1871)]

How difficult it is to remember, how easy to forget; how hard to learn and how easy to be ignorant; how difficult to make an effort and how easy to be lazy.
[tr. Walsh/Honan (1954)]

How is it that what we learn with toil we forget with ease? that it is hard to learn, but easy to be in ignorance? That activity goes against the grain, while indolence is second nature?
[tr. Bettenson (1972)]

Why is it that we remember with such difficulty, but forget so easily? Why is it that we learn with such difficulty, yet so easily remain ignorant? Why is it that we are vigorous with such difficulty, yet so easily inert?
[tr. Dyson (1998)]

For eche of thies ages which men name Childhode, adolescence, yongth, virilite, manhode & olde age semyn to be hevy & noxous to men the which in them silf have nothyng that may help & socoure them to lyve goodly & blessidly as bee, the which excercisen sciences & vertues & good werkis, but as to suche men which sechyn & fyndyn in themsilf alle the goods & thyngis which belongyn wele & blessidly for to lyve, ther is nothyng that comyth to them in age by the defaute of nature that may seme unto them evyll nor noxous. It is certayne that olde age is suche that it serchith & fyndyth in it self all the goodnesses whch longen to live wel & blyssidly, and yet is olde age such that alle men desyre to come untyll hit, And never the lesse the mutablenes & evyl dysposicion of men it is so grete in oure dayes that they blamyn olde age whan they be come therto by cause that then they may not use delectacions.
[tr. Worcester/Worcester/Scrope (1481)]

For they that have no power, pith of wit, help, way nor virtue in themselves to conduct and bring them to a good and blessed life, unto such as these be, all their age is cumbersome and unpleasant. But unto such as lead their lives virtuously, measuring all their actions by the square of reason, and have their minds with all good gifts of grace beautified and garnished, there is nothing thought nor deemed evil that cometh by necessity of nature. Of the which sort old age is principally to be considered, unto which all men wish to arrive, and yet when they have their desire, they accuse it as painful, sickly, unpleasant and tedious, such is the brainless unconstancy, foolish sottage, and perverse overthwartness of wayward people.
[tr. Newton (1569)]

For that age is only grievous to those that have no taste of wisdome and learning in themselves to make them live happily: but to them which see all perfection and consolation from their own experience, nothing can seem heavy which the necessity of nature bringeth: of which sort old age is chief, which all desire to obtain, and blame being obtained; such is their unconstancy, foolishnesse and perversity.
[tr. Austin (1648)]

For to those who have nothing within themselves capable of making Life happy, and satisfactory, no wonder if every Stage of it should prove irksome, and vexatious: but, to those who derive all their satisfaction from an easy mind, nothing can seem grievous and tormenting, that proceeds from the irreversible Laws of Nature; which certainly is the case of Old Age,, whereunto though 'tis the earnest desire of all men to arrive, yet such is their unaccountable folly, and perverseness, that they are never more uneasy than when they have arrived at it.
[tr. Hemming (1716)]

All Ages are grievous to those who have not in themselves the Means of living Holy and Happy; but those who expect all Happiness from their own Virtues, don't look up on the Decay of Nature as a Hardship, whereof Old Age is the chiefest, and which all desire to attain to; but is no sooner tasted than declaim'd against. Such are the Effects of Inconstancy, Folly, and the Want of Wisdom.
[tr. J. D. (1744)]

For know this, that those who have no Aid or Support within themselves, to render their Lives easy, will find every State irksome: While such as are convinced, they must owe their Happiness to themselves, and that if they cannot find it in their own Breasts, they will never meet with it from abroad; will never consider any thing as an Evil, that is but a necessary Effect of the established Order of Nature; which Old Age most undoubtedly is. 'Tis certainly strange, that while all Men hope they may live to attain it, any should find Fault with it, when it comes their Share. Yet such is the Levity, Folly, and Perverseness of Mankind, that we see there is nothing more common.
[tr. Logan (1744)]

Those indeed who have no internal resource of happiness, will find themselves uneasy in every stage of human life: but to him who is accustomed to derive all his felicity from within himself, no state will appear as a real evil into which he is conducted by the common and regular course of nature. Now this is peculiarly the case with respect to old age : yet such is the inconsistency of human folly, that the very period which at a distance is every man's warmest wish to attain, no sooner arrives than it is equally the object of his lamentations.
[tr. Melmoth (1773)]

For to those that have nought of resource in themselves for living well and happily, every stage of life is burthensome; while to those that seek all their goods from themselves, nothing can seem an evil, which the law of Nature may bring them. In which class foremost stands old age, which all desire to attain, but arraign the same when attained; so great is the inconsistency and perverseness of folly.
[Cornish Bros. ed. (1847)]

For to those who have no resource in themselves for living well and happily, every age is burdensome; but to those who seek all good things from themselves, nothing can appear evil which the necessity of nature entails; in which class particularly is old age, which all men wish to attain, and yet they complain of it when they have attained it; so great is the inconsistency and waywardness of folly.
[tr. Edmonds (1874)]

For those who have in themselves no resources for a good and happy life, every period of life is burdensome; but to those who seek all goods from within, nothing which comes in the course of nature can seem evil. Under this head a place especially belongs to old age, which all desire to attain, yet find fault with it when they have reached it. Such is the inconsistency and perverseness of human folly.
[tr. Peabody (1884)]

But those who look for all happiness from within can never think anything bad which nature makes inevitable. In that category before anything else comes old age, to which all wish to attain, and at which all grumble when attained. Such is Folly's inconsistency and unreasonableness!
[tr. Shuckburgh (1895)]

Of course
To those who've no resources in themselves
For a good and happy life, why, every age
Is hard to bear: but those who have within
All that is needful for a life well-spent,
Can never find misfortune in the lot
That nature's laws impose. And one such lot
Is that old age must come to each and all,
Old age so fondly hoped for, when it comes,
So Oft found to be irksome. Such, alas!
Is Folly's want of reason and resolve.
[tr. Allison (1916)]

For to those who have not the means within themselves of a virtuous and happy life every age is burdensome; and, on the other hand, to those who seek all good from themselves nothing can seem evil that the laws of nature inevitably impose. To this class old age especially belongs, which all men wish to attain and yet reproach when attained; such is the inconsistency and perversity of Folly!
[tr. Falconer (1923)]

People, you see, who have no inner resources for living the good and happy life, find every age a burden. But men who seek all good from within themselves are simply unable to view as evil anything that comes about through nature’s law. Now old age, as much as anything else in this world, is such a thing. All men hope and pray to attain it; once they have attained it, they start finding fault with it.
[tr. Copley (1967)]

Some people just do not possess the optimism that would allow them to live contentedly under any circumstances: for them every stage of life is a burden. But if only they expected nothing but good for themselves, nothing that the natural passage of time brought them could seem bad. This is especially true of old age. Everybody wants to live for a long time, but when they have attained their goal, they grumble. It makes no sense -- but that’s what life is: perverse and inconsistent.
[tr. Cobbold (2012)]

Someone who doesn't have much in the way of inner resources will find all stages of life irksome, but someone whose character is in order will accept what nature brings and not complain about something perfectly natural, calling it evil. There is much nonsense bandied about old age, something which everyone wishes to reach, but which most complain about once they get there. That seems more than slightly inconsistent and perverse, doesn't it?
[tr. Gerberding (2014)]

They find every age oppressive, of course,
Who in their inner selves have no resource
To live an easy life in happiness,
But they who in themselves only find
Their own contentment and peace of mind
See no harm in nature’s due process
Whose termination inevitably
May lead to that state of senility
To which they keenly lay claim,
But once attained rather foolishly,
With malice and incongruity,
Promptly find reasons to blame.
[tr. Bozzi (2015)]

Those who lack within themselves the means for living a blessed and happy life will find any age painful. But for those who seek good things within themselves, nothing imposed on them by nature will seem troublesome. Growing older is a prime example of this. Everyone hopes to reach old age, but when it comes, most of us complain about it. People can be so foolish and inconsistent.
[tr. Freeman (2016)]

Every age is burdensome to those who have no means of living well and happily. But to those who seek all good from themselves, nothing which the necessity of nature offers can appear bad. Old age is a prime example of this sort of thing -- everyone wishes to attain it, but they always complain about it once it is attained. Such is the inconstancy and perversity of stupidity.
[tr. Robinson [@sentantiq] (2017)]

Men willingly post of their cruelty, their anger, their greed even, but never of their cowardice, because to admit such a thing would put them, whether in a primitive or a civilized society, in mortal peril.
[tr. Davies (1979)]

Seeing the rogueries of little men and the extortions of the great in office, one is tempted to look upon Society as a wood infested by robbers, the most dangerous being the constables sent to arrest the others.
[tr. Mathers (1926)]

At times, seeing the petty thieveries of the petty, and the robberies of those in office, one is tempted to regard society as a wood full of thieves, of which the most dangerous are the officers set there to arrest the others.
[tr. Merwin (1969)]

Sometimes, when one observes the rogueries perpetuated by petty people and the graft committed by men in office, one is tempted to think of society as a wood infested by thieves, of which the most dangerous are the archers, posted to prevent the others from escaping.
[tr. Pearson (1973)]

There are times when, seeing the nasty tricks people get up to, the gross frauds of high officers, you're tempted to think that you're in a wood infested by thieves, amongst whom the most dangerous are the police, whose purpose is supposed to be that of arresting them.
[tr. Parmée (2003), ¶ 152]

Everything beautiful and noble is the result of reason and calculation. Crime, for which the human creature has acquired a taste in its mother’s womb, is natural in origin. Virtue, on the contrary, is artificial, unnatural since, at all times and among all nations, gods and prophets were necessary to teach virtue to animalistic humanity, which humanity alone was unable to discover. Evil occurs without effort, naturally, through fatality; good is always the product of artifice.
[tr. Kline (2020)]

The physical plagues and misfortunes of human nature have made Society necessary. Society has added to the ills of Nature. The difficulties of Society have created the necessity for Government, and Government now adds to the evils of Society. There you have the history of man.
[tr. Mathers (1926)]

Physical disasters and the calamities of human nature have rendered society necessary. To the miseries of nature, society has added its own. The difficulties of society have evolved the necessity for government, and government has added to the miseries of society. This is the history of human nature.
[tr. Merwin (1969)]

Physical disasters and the calamities of human nature made society necessary. Society's ordeals were then added to those of nature. The drawbacks of society led to the need for government, whereupon the evils of government were added to those of society. Such is the history of human nature.
[tr. Dusinberre (1992)]

Physical plagues and the calamities of nature made society necessary. Society added to the misfortunes of nature. The inconveniences of society brought the necessity of government, and the government added to the misfortunes of society. This is the history of human nature.
[tr. Siniscalchi (1994)]

Tricks and dark schemes are mankind's invention as
cowardly remedies against need.
[tr. Collard, Hargreaves, Cropp (1995)]

Trickery and devious devices are man’s unmanly means to meet his needs.
[tr. Stevens (2012)]

Life is a hospital, in which every patient is possessed by the desire of changing his bed. One would prefer to suffer near the fire, and another is certain that he would get well if he were by the window.
[tr. Symons (<1919)]

This life is a hospital where every patient is possessed with the desire to change beds; one man would like to suffer in front of the stove, and another believes that he would recover his health beside the window.
[tr. Hamburger (1946)]

Life is a hospital where every patient is obsessed by the desire of changing beds. One would like to suffer opposite the stove, another is sure he would get well beside the window.
[tr. Varèse (1970)]

This life is a hospital where each patient is possessed with the desire of changing his bed. One would like to suffer in front of the stove, and another believes he would get well beside the windows.
[tr. Fowlie (1992)]

This life is a hospital, where each patient is possessed by the desire to change beds. That one prefers to suffer nearer the stove and this one believes he would get well next to the window.
[tr. Waldrop (2009)]

Perhaps I know best why man is the only animal that laughs : he alone suffers so excruciatingly that he was compelled to invent laughter.
[tr. Ludovici (1910)]

Perhaps I know best why it is man alone who laughs; he alone suffers so deeply that he had to invent laughter.
[Common, e.g.]

Perhaps I know best why man alone laughs: only he suffers so profoundly that he was bound to invent laughter.
[tr. Hill/Scarpitti (2017)]

Humans need fantasy to be human. To be the place where the falling angel meets the rising ape.
-- Hogfather (1996)

Who would not rather be a rising ape than a falling angel.
-- "I create gods all the time," Daily Mail (2008-06-21)

"I'd much rather be a rising ape than a fallen angel"
-- Guardian Book Club Q&A video, 7:19 Guardian (2009-12-19)

In the last few years science has been racked by vexing questions concerning the nature of man. The fallen angel has departed and the rising ape appeared.

Softness and voluptuousness are innate, they are born with men and die with them, happy, or unhappy accidents never cure 'em, good and bad fortune equally produce them.
[Bullord ed. (1696)]

Luxury and Voluptuousness are innate, born with Man and die with them, happy or unhappy Accidents never part him from them; the fruits he enjoys of a good Fortune and the amends of a bad one.
[Curll ed. (1713)]

Softness and Voluptuousness are innate to Men, and stick by them till they die; it is beyond the Power of happy, or unhappy Accidents to detach them: they are the Emanations of Prosperity or used as Solaces in Adversity.
[Browne ed. (1752)]

Want of vigour and voluptuousness are innate in man and cease with him, and fortunate or unfortunate circumstances never make him abandon them; they are the fruits of prosperity or become a solace in adversity.
[tr. Van Laun (1885)]

There is indeed a law, right reason, which is in accordance with nature; existing in all, unchangeable, eternal. Commanding us to do what is right, forbidding us to do what is wrong. It has dominion over good men, but possesses no influence over bad ones. No other law can be substituted for it, no part of it can be taken away, nor can it be abrogated altogether. Neither the people or the senate can absolve us from 38it. It wants no commentator or interpreter. It is not one thing at Rome, and another thing at Athens: one thing to-day, and another thing to-morrow; but it is a law eternal and immutable for all nations and for all time. God, the sole Ruler, and universal Lord, has framed and proclaimed this law. He who does not obey it, renounces himself, and is false to his own nature: he brings upon himself the direst tortures, even when he escapes human punishments.
[tr. Featherstonhaugh (1829)]

There is a true law, a right reason, conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome and another at Athens; one thing to–day and another to–morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must for ever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, -- its promulgator, -- its enforcer. He who obeys it not, flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. For his crime he must endure the severest penalties hereafter, even if he avoid the usual misfortunes of the present life.
[tr. Barham (1841)]

True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any other law, and is not liable either to derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our own conscience. It is not one thing at Rome, and another at Athens; one thing to-day, and another to-morrow; but in all times and nations this universal law must forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its author, its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from himself, and does violence to the very nature of man. And by so doing he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils which are usually accounted punishments.
[tr. Yonge (1853)]

True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment.
[tr. Keyes (1928)]

There is in fact a true law -- namely, right reason -- which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but are without effect upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible. Neither the senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation to obey this law, and it requires no Sextus Aelius to expound and interpret it. It will not lay down one rule at Rome and another at Athens, nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow. But there will be one law, eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times upon all peoples; and there will be, as it were, one common master and ruler of men, namely God, who is the author of this law, its interpreter, and its sponsor. The man who will not obey it will abandon his better self, and, in denying the true nature of a man, will thereby suffer the severest of penalties, though he has escaped all the other consequences which men call punishment.
[tr. Sabine/Smith (1929)]

... law in the proper sense is right reason in harmony with nature. It is spread through the whole human community, unchanging and eternal, calling people to their duty by its commands and deterring them from wrong-doing by its prohibitions. When it addresses a good man, its commands and prohibitions are never in vain; but those same commands and prohibitions have no effect on the wicked. This law cannot be countermanded, nor can it be in any way amended, nor can it be totally rescinded. We cannot be exempted from this law by any decree of the Senate or the people, nor do we need anyone else to expound or explain it. There will not be one such law in Rome and another in Athens, one now and another in the future, but all peoples at all times will be embraced by a single eternal and unchangeable law; and there will be, as it were, one lord and master of us all -- the god who is the author, proposer, and interpreter of that law. Whoever refuses to obey it will be turning his back on himiself. Because he has denied his nature as a human being he will face the gravest penalties for this alone, even if he succeeds in avoiding all the other things that are regarded as punishments ...
[tr. Rudd (1998)]

True law is right reason, consistent with nature, spread through all people. It is constant and eternal; it summons to duty by its orders, it deters crime by its prohibitions. Its orders and prohibitions to good people are never given in vain; but it does not move the wicked by these orders or prohibitions. It is wrong to pass laws obviating this law; it is not permitted to abrogate any of it; it cannot be totally repealed. We cannot be released from this law by the senate or the people, and it needs no exegete or interpreter like Sextus Aelius. There will not be one law at Rome and another at Athens, one now and another later; but all nations at all times will be bound by this one eternal and unchangeable law, and the god will be the one common master and general (so to speak) of all people. He is the author, expounder, and mover of this law; and the person who does not obey it will be in exile from h imself. Insofar as he scorns his nature as a human being, but his very fact he will pay the greatest penalty, even if he escapes all the other things that are generally regarded as punishments.
[tr. Zetzel (1999)]

It is not then true, that there is not a bridell and Master for Nature, Nay, she is guided and ruled by twaine: Custome I meane, and Reason.
[tr. Peterson (1576)]

Which being so, it is not true, that we are not furnished with reins, or a proper guide against the impetuosity of our nature: for we have two; one of which is Experience, and the other right Reason.
[tr. Graves (1774)]

The beauty of literature is that it’s ageless. You discover that your longings are universal longings, that you’re not lonely and isolated from anyone. You belong.

And having since observ’d in my travails, That all those whose opinions are contrary to ours, are not therefore barbarous or savage, but that many use as much or more reason then we; and having consider’d how much one Man with his own understanding, bred up from his childhood among the French or the Dutch, becomes different from what he would be, had he alwayes liv’d amongst the Chineses, or the Cannibals: And how even in the fashion of our Clothes, the same thing which pleas’d ten years since, and which perhaps wil please ten years hence, seems now to us ridiculous and extravagant. So that it’s much more Custome and Example which perswades us, then any assured knowledg.
[tr. Newcombe ed. (1649)]

I further recognized in the course of my travels that all those whose sentiments are very contrary to ours are yet not necessarily barbarians or savages, but may be possessed of reason in as great or even a greater degree than ourselves. I also considered how very different the self-same man, identical in mind and spirit, may have become, according as he is brought up from childhood amongst the French or Germans, or has passed his whole life amongst Chinese or cannibals. I likewise noticed how even in the fashions of one's clothing the same thing that pleased us ten years ago, and which will perhaps please us once again before ten years are passed, seems at the present time extravagant and ridiculous. I thus concluded that it is much more custom and example that persuade us than any certain knowledge.
[tr. Haldane & Ross (1911)]

Since then I have recognized through my travels that those with views quite contrary to ours are not on that account barbarians or savages, but that many of them make use of reason as much or more than we do. I thought, too, how the same man, with the same mind, if brought up from infancy among the French or Germans, develops otherwise than he would if he had always lived among the Chinese or cannibals; and how, even in our fashions of dress, the very thing that pleased us ten years ago, and will perhaps please us again ten years hence, now strikes us as extravagant and ridiculous. Thus it is custom and example that persuade us, rather than any certain knowledge.
[tr. Cottingham, Stoothoff (1985)]