In my judgement, he
Who tramples on the laws, but can express
His thoughts with plausibility, deserves
Severest punishment: for that injustice
On which he glories, with his artful tongue.
That he a fair appearance can bestow,
He dares to practise.
[tr. Wodhull (1782)]

Th' injurious man, whose tongue
Flows with pernicious rhetoric, I hold
To merit the severest punishment.
For confident his speech can varnish o'er
The blackest deeds, his craft dares venture on them.
[tr. Potter (1814)]

For him who does wrong and is wise to gloze it
I hold worth worser doom. For making sure
He'll show wrong gracious with his tongue, he's bold
To every crime.
[tr. Webster (1868)]

To my mind, whoso hath skill to fence with words in an unjust cause, incurs the heaviest penalty; for such an one, confident that he can cast a decent veil of words o'er his injustice, dares to practise it.
[tr. Coleridge (1891)]

In my judgment, whatever man being unjust, is deeply skilled in argument, merits the severest punishment. For vaunting that with his tongue he can well gloze over injustice, he dares to work deceit.
[tr. Buckley (1892)]

For in my sight the villain subtle-tongued
Getteth himself for gain exceeding loss,
Who, confident his tongue can gloze the wrong,
Becomes a bold knave.
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

To me it seemeth, when
A crafty tongue is given to evil men
'Tis like to wreck, not help them. Their own brain
Tempts them with lies to dare and dare again,
Till .... [tr. Murray (1906)]

I think that the plausible speaker
Who is a villain deserves the greatest punishment.
Confident in his tongue’s power to adorn evil,
He stops at nothing.
[tr. Warner (1944)]

To me, a wicked man who is also eloquent
Seems the most guilty of them all. He’ll cut your throat
As bold as brass, because he knows he can dress up murder
In handsome words.
[tr. Vellacott (1963)]

For me, the man who is a villain, but clever
In speech, would have to pay the highest fine;
Confident of cloaking his villainy in fine words,
He dares anything.
[tr. Podlecki (1989)]

To my mind, the plausible speaker who is a scoundrel incurs the greatest punishment. For since he is confident that he can cleverly cloak injustice with his words, his boldness stops at no knavery.
[tr. Kovacs (Loeb) (1994)]

For in my eyes the criminal with a gift for speaking deserves the worst of punishments. So confident is he in his tongue’s ability to dress his foul thoughts in fair words, there is nothing he dares not do.
[tr. Davie (1996)]

What I believe, for example is the more eloquent the misfit, the greater the punishment he deserves because, thinking that his eloquence and his pretty words will get him out of any injustice, he has the audacity to commit even greater evils.
[tr. Theodoridis (2004)]

In my opinion,
the unjust man who speaks so plausibly
brings on himself the harshest punishment.
Since he’s sure his tongue can hide injustice,
he dares anything.
[tr. Johnston (2008), l. 689ff]

To my mind, whoever is naturally sophos in speaking but has no dikē deserves the heaviest punishment. Such a man boasts that he can cast a decent veil of words over his unjust deeds, and boldly proceeds to wickedness.
[tr. Coleridge / Ceragioli / Nagy / Hour25]

To my mind, the plausible speaker who is a scoundrel incurs the greatest punishment. For since he is confident that he can cleverly cloak injustice with his words, his boldness stops at no dishonesty.
[tr. Kovacs / Zhang / Rogak]

He that is unjust, is also impious. For the nature of the universe, having made all reasonable creatures one for another, to the end that they should do one another good; more or less according to the several persons and occasions but in nowise hurt one another: it is manifest that he that doth transgress against this her will, is guilty of impiety towards the most ancient and venerable of all the deities. For the nature of the universe, is the nature the common parent of all, and therefore piously to be observed of all things that are, and that which now is, to whatsoever first was, and gave it its being, hath relation of blood and kindred.
[tr. Casaubon (1634)]

To play the Knave is to Rebel against Religion, all sort of Injustice is no less then High Treason against Heaven: For since the Nature, or Soul of the Universe has made Rational Creatures for mutual Service, and Support Made them that they should Assist, and Oblige each other, according to the Regards of Circumstance, and Merit; but never do any body any Harm: The Case standing thus, he that crosses upon this Design, is Prophane in his Contradiction , and Outrages the most Antient Deity. For the Nature of the Universe is the Cause of it , and that which gives it Being. Thus all things are one Family, suited , and as it were of Kin to each other.
[tr. Collier (1701)]

He who does an injury is guilty of impiety. For, since the nature of the whole has formed the rational animals for one another; each for being useful to the other according to his merit, and never hurtful; he who transgresses this her will, is thus guilty of impiety against the most ancient and venerable of the Gods. For the nature of the whole is the nature of all things which exist; and things which exist, are a-kin to their causes.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

He that acts unjustly, acts impiously. For God, or the Universal Nature, having produced all rational creatures to be mutually serviceable to each other, according to their respective merits, and by no means to injure each other; he who violates this first principle of nature, prophanely insults the most antient of all Deities. For this Universal Nature is the cause of all things that exist which are connected with each other by mutual friendship and alliance.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another, to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Injustice is no less than high treason against heaven. For since the nature of the universe has made rational creatures for mutual service and support, but never to do anybody any harm, since the case stands thus: he that crosses upon this design is profane, and outrages the most ancient Deity.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

To be unjust is to sin. By Nature rational beings have been constituted for one another's sake, each to help each according to its worth, and in wise to hurt: and he who transgresses the will of Nature, sins -- to wit, against the primal deity.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

He who does injustice commits impiety. For since universal Nature has formed the rational animals for one another; each to be useful to the other according to his merit, and never hurtful; he who transgresses this her will is clearly guilty of impiety against the most ancient and venerable of the Gods.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

Injustice is impiety. For in that the Nature of the Universe has fashioned rational creatures for the sake of one another with a view to mutual benefit based upon worth, but by no means for harm, the transgressor of her will acts with obvious impiety against the most venerable of Deities.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Whosoever does injustice commits sin; for Universal Nature having made reasonable creatures for the sake of one another, to benefit each other according to desert but in no wise to do injury, manifestly he who transgresses her will sins against the most venerable of the gods, because Universal Nature is a nature of what is, and what is is related to all that exists.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

Injustice is a sin. Nature has constituted rational beings for their own mutual benefit, each to help his fellows according to their worth, and in no wise to do them hurt; and to contravene her will is plainly to sin against this eldest of all the deities.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

Whoever commits injustice acts irreverently; for since universal nature has created rational creatures for the sake of one another, to benefit their fellows according to their deserts and in no wise to do them harm, it is plain that one who offends against her will is guilty of irreverence towards the most venerable of gods.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.); tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

Injustice is sin. When universal Nature has constituted rational creatures for the sake of each other -- to benefit one another as deserved, but never to harm -- anyone contravening her will is clearly guilty of sin against the oldest of the gods: because universal Nature is the nature of ultimate reality, to which all present existence is related.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]