WIST Quotations

Ivins, Molly -- Essay (1992-03-01), “Good morning, Fort Worth! Glad to be here,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram

Dave — Wed, 27 May 2026 16:26:46 +0000

It’s all very well to dismiss the dismal sight of our Legislature in action by saying, “I’m just not interested in politics,” but the qualifications of the people who prescribe your eyeglasses, how deep you will be buried, what books your kids read in school, whether your beautician knows how to give a perm, the size of the cells in Stripe City, and a thousand and one other matters that touch your lives daily are decided by the dweebs, dorks, geeks, crooks, and bozos we’ve put into public office.

Molly Ivins (1944-2007) American writer, political columnist [Mary Tyler Ivins]
Essay (1992-03-01), “Good morning, Fort Worth! Glad to be here,” Fort Worth Star-Telegram
(Source)

Collected in Nothin' but Good Times Ahead (1993)

Hoover, Herbert -- The Challenge to Liberty, ch. 7 (1934)

Dave — Mon, 26 Jan 2026 02:42:22 +0000

More particularly does the weakening of the legislative arm lead to encroachments by the executive upon legislative and judicial functions, and inevitably that encroachment is upon individual liberty. If we examine the fate of wrecked republics over the world we shall find first a weakening of the legislative arm.

Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) American engineer, bureaucrat, US President (1929-33)
The Challenge to Liberty, ch. 7 (1934)
(Source)

Montesquieu -- Spirit of Laws [The Spirit of the Laws; De l’esprit des lois], Book 11, ch. 6 (1748) [tr. Cohler/Miller/Stone (1989)]

Dave — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 23:24:00 +0000

When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically.
Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor.
All would be lost if the same man or the same body of principal men, either of nobles, or of the people, exercised these three powers: that of making the laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or the disputes of individuals.

[Lorsque, dans la même personne ou dans le même corps de magistrature, la puissance législative est réunie à la puissance exécutrice, il n’y a point de liberté ; parce qu’on peut craindre que le même monarque ou le même sénat ne fasse des loix tyranniques, pour les exécuter tyranniquement.
Il n’y a point encore de liberté, si la puissance de juger n’est pas séparée de la puissance législative, & de l’exécutrice. Si elle étoit jointe à la puissance législative, le pouvoir sur la vie & la liberté des citoyens seroit arbitraire; car le juge seroit législateur. Si elle étoit jointe à la puissance exécutrice, le juge pourroit avoir la force d’un oppresseur.
Tout seroit perdu, si le même homme, ou le même corps des principaux, ou des nobles, ou du peuple, exerçoient ces trois pouvoirs; celui de faire des loix, celui d’exécuter les résolutions publiques, & celui de juger les crimes ou les différends des particuliers.]

Charles-Lewis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) French political philosopher
Spirit of Laws [The Spirit of the Laws; De l’esprit des lois], Book 11, ch. 6 (1748) [tr. Cohler/Miller/Stone (1989)]
(Source)

(Source (French)). Other translations:

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
[tr. Nugent (1750)]

There would be an end of everything, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals.
[ed. Guterman (1963)]

When in the same person or in the same body of magistracy the legislative authority is combined with the executive authority, there is no freedom, because one can fear lest the same monarch or the same senate make tyrannical laws in order to carry them out tyrannically.
Again there is no freedom if the authority to judge is not separated from the legislative and executive authorities. If it were combined with the legislative authority, power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator. If it were combined with the executive authority, the judge could have the strength of an oppressor.
All would be lost if the same man or the same body of principals, or of nobles, or of the people, exercised these three powers: that of making laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging crimes or disputes between individuals.
[tr. Stewart (2018)]

Arendt, Hannah -- Interview (1973-10) with Roger Errera, Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF)

Dave — Tue, 08 Apr 2025 23:20:11 +0000

The [American] Founding Fathers never believed that tyranny could arise out of the executive office, because they did not see this office in any different light but as the execution of what the legislation has decreed in various forms. I leave it at that. We know today that the greatest danger of tyranny is, of course, the executive.

Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) German-American philosopher, political theorist
Interview (1973-10) with Roger Errera, Office de Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF)

Arendt was referring specifically to the Watergate Scandal and Nixon's abuse of power.

Parts of this interview were turned into an episode of the French TV series "Un certain regard," directed by Jean-Claude Lubtchansky, first broadcast 1974-07-06. (Source (Video))

Carlyle, Thomas -- The French Revolution: A History, Part 1, Book 6, ch. 3 (1.6.3) (1837)

Dave — Thu, 11 Apr 2024 22:47:39 +0000

Do nothing, only keep agitating, debating; and things will destroy themselves.

Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) Scottish essayist and historian
The French Revolution: A History, Part 1, Book 6, ch. 3 (1.6.3) (1837)
(Source)

On the inactivity of the elected National Assembly leading up to the Revolution.

Huber, Ernst Rudolf -- Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich [Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches] (1939)

Dave — Fri, 10 Sep 2021 18:50:13 +0000

The parliamentary battle of the NSDAP [Nazi Party] had the single purpose of destroying the parliamentary system from within through its own methods. It was necessary above all to make formal use of the possibilities of the party-state system but to refuse real cooperation and thereby to render the parliamentary system, which is by nature dependent upon the responsible cooperation of the opposition, incapable of action.

Ernst Rudolf Huber (1903-1990), German jurist and constitutional historian
Constitutional Law of the Greater German Reich [Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches] (1939)
(Source)

Reprinted in National Socialism, US State Department (1943).

Madison, James -- The Federalist #57 “The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many” (19 Feb 1788)

Dave — Thu, 07 Aug 2014 13:19:10 +0000

If this spirit ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature as well as on the people, the people will be able to tolerate anything but liberty.

James Madison (1751-1836) American statesman, political theorist, US President (1809-17)
The Federalist #57 “The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many” (19 Feb 1788)

Rogers, Will -- Column (1930-07-04), “Daily Telegram: Congress Session, Rogers Says, Is Like Baby Getting a Hammer”

Dave — Fri, 10 Oct 2008 09:46:53 +0000

This country has come to feel the same when Congress is in session as we do when the baby gets hold of a hammer. It’s just a question of how much damage he can do with it before you can take it away from him.

Will Rogers (1879-1935) American humorist
Column (1930-07-04), “Daily Telegram: Congress Session, Rogers Says, Is Like Baby Getting a Hammer”
(Source)

Written from Minneapolis. Also collected, in a slightly shorter form, in The Autobiography of Will Rogers, ch. 15 (1949) [ed. Donald Day].

Jefferson, Thomas -- Letter (1789-07-19) to Abbé Arnoux

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative. The execution of the laws is more important than the making them.

Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) American political philosopher, polymath, statesman, US President (1801-09)
Letter (1789-07-19) to Abbé Arnoux
(Source)