WIST Quotations

Watterson, Bill -- Calvin and Hobbes (1994-01-27)

Dave — Tue, 30 Dec 2025 20:48:07 +0000

CALVIN: As you can see, I have memorized this utterly useless piece of information long enough to pass a test question. I now intend to forget it forever. You’ve taught me nothing except how to cynically manipulate the system. Congratulations.

Bill Watterson (b. 1958) American cartoonist
Calvin and Hobbes (1994-01-27)
(Source)

Schopenhauer, Arthur -- Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2, ch. 22 “On Thinking for Oneself [Selbstdenken],” § 260 (1851) [tr. Saunders (1890)]

Dave — Tue, 24 Oct 2023 15:23:10 +0000

Truth that has been merely learned is like an artificial limb, a false tooth, a waxen nose; at best, like a nose made out of another’s flesh; it adheres to us only because it is put on. But truth acquired by thinking of our own is like a natural limb; it alone really belongs to us. This is the fundamental difference between the thinker and the mere man of learning.

[Hingegen klebt die bloß erlernte Wahrheit uns nur an, wie ein angeseßtes Glied, ein falscher Zahn, eine wächserne Nase, oder höchstens wie eine rhinoplastische aus fremdem Fleische. Die durch eigenes Denken erworbene Wahrheit aber gleicht dem natürlichen Gliede: fie allein gehört uns wirklich an. Darauf beruht der Unterschied zwischen dem Denker und dem bloßen Gelehrten.]

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) German philosopher
Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2, ch. 22 “On Thinking for Oneself [Selbstdenken],” § 260 (1851) [tr. Saunders (1890)]
(Source)

Source (German). Alternate translations:

Truth that has been merely learned adheres to us like an artificial limb, a false tooth, a waxen nose, or at best like one made out of another's flesh; truth which is acquired by thinking for oneself is like a natural member: it alone really belongs to us. Here we touch upon the difference between the thinking man and the mere man of learning.
[tr. Dircks (1897)]

Truth that has merely been learnt adheres to us only as an artificial limb, a false tooth, a was nose does, or at most like transplanted skin; but a truth won by thinking for ourself is like a natural limb: it alone really belongs to us. This is what determines the difference between a thinker and a mere scholar.
[tr. Hollingdale (1970)]

... other hand, the truth acquired through our own thinking is like the natural limb; it alone really belongs to us. On this rests the distinction between the thinker and the mere scholar.
[tr. Payne (1974)]

Nightingale, Florence -- Letter to Lord Edward Geoffrey Stanley (17 May 1857)

Dave — Thu, 05 Aug 2021 16:36:10 +0000

I agree as to the doubtful value of competitive examination. The qualities which you really want, viz., self-control, self-reliance, habits of accurate thought, integrity and what you generally call trustworthiness, are not decided by competitive examination, which test little else than the memory.

Florence Nightingale (1820-1910) English social reformer, statistician, founder of modern nursing
Letter to Lord Edward Geoffrey Stanley (17 May 1857)
(Source)

Regarding selection processes for military officers. This was undergoing reform during the period, including the radical proposal to prevent people from buying their way into lower officer ranks.

Montaigne, Michel de -- Essays, Book 1, ch. 24 (1.24), “Of Pedantry [Du pedantisme]”(1572-1578) [tr. Screech (1987), ch. 25]

Dave — Mon, 30 Oct 2017 21:51:12 +0000

We readily inquire, “Does he know Greek or Latin?” “Can he write poetry and prose?” But what matters most is what we put last: “Has he become better and wiser?” We ought to find out not who understands most but who understands best. We work merely to fill the memory, leaving the understanding and the sense of right and wrong empty.

[Nous enquerons volontiers, Sçait-il du Grec ou du Latin ? escrit-il en vers ou en prose ? mais, s’il est devenu meilleur ou plus advisé, c’estoit le principal, & c’est ce qui demeure derriere. Il falloit s’enquerir qui est mieux sçavant, non qui est plus sçavant. Nous ne travaillons qu’à remplir la memoire, & laissons l’entendement & la conscience vuide.]

Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) French essayist
Essays, Book 1, ch. 24 (1.24), “Of Pedantry [Du pedantisme]”(1572-1578) [tr. Screech (1987), ch. 25]
(Source)

This chapter was present in the 1580 edition, and was expanded in succeeding ones. In the case of this passage, the words "and the sense of right and wrong" were added in the 1595 ed.

The 1595 ed. and beyond labeled this as ch. 24; the 1588 ed. used ch. 25. Different translators may vary.

(Source (French)). Alternate translations:

We are ever ready to aske, Hath he any skill in the Greeke and Latine tongue? can he write well? doth hee write in prose or verse? But whether hee bee growne better or wiser, which should bee the chiefest of his drift, that is never spoken of, we should rather enquire who is better wise, then who is more wise. We labour, and toyle, and plod to fill the memorie, and leave both understanding and conscience emptie.
[tr. Florio (1603), ch. 24]

Men are ready to ask, does he understand Greek or Latin? Is he a poet or prose writer? But whether he is the better or more discreet man, though it is the main question, is the last; for the inquiry should be, who has the best learning, not who has the most.
We only take pains to stuff the memory, and leave the understanding and conscience quite unfurnished. [tr. Cotton (1686), ch. 24]

Men are apt presently to inquire, does such a one understand Greek or Latin? Is he a poet? or does he write in prose? But whether he be grown better or more discreet, which are qualities of principal concern, these are never thought of. We should rather examine, who is better learned, than who is more learned.
We only labor to stuff the memory, and leave the conscience and the understanding unfurnished and void.
[tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877), ch. 24]

Men are apt to inquire, "Does such a one undersdtand Greek and Latin? Is he a poet, or does he write prose?" But the main point, whether he be better or more discreet, we inquire into the lastd. The question should be, Who is the better learned? rather than, Who is the more learned?
We labor and plot to stuff the memory8 and in the meantime leave the conscience and the understanding empty.
[tr. Rector (1899)]

We readily ask ourselves: "Does he know Greek or Latin? Does he write in verse or in prose?" but whether he has become better or more thoughtful -- that is the principal thing, and that is left in the background. The enquiry should be, who is best learned, not who is most learned. We labour only to fill the memory, and we leave the understanding and the conscience empty.
[tr. Ives (1925), ch. 25]

We are eager to inquire: “Does he know Greek or Latin? Does he write in verse or in prose?” But whether he has become better or wiser, which would be the main thing, that is left out. We should have asked who is better learned, not who is more learned.
We labor only to fill our memory, and leave the understanding and the conscience empty.
[tr. Frame (1943), ch. 25]

Montaigne, Michel de -- Essays, Book 2, ch. 17 (2.17), “Of Presumption [De la Presomption] (1578) [tr. Frame (1943)]

Dave — Sat, 02 Sep 2017 19:00:45 +0000

I gladly return to the subject of the ineptitude of our education. Its goal has been to make us not good or wise, but learned; it has attained this goal. It has not taught us to follow and embrace virtue and wisdom, but has imprinted in us their derivation and etymology. We know how to decline virtue, if we cannot love it. If we do not know what wisdom is by practice and experience, we know it by jargon and by rote.

[Je retombe volontiers sur ce discours de l’ineptie de nostre institution : Elle a eu pour sa fin, de nous faire, non bons & sages, mais sçavans : elle y est arrivée. Elle ne nous a pas appris de suyvre & embrasser la vertu & la prudence : mais elle nous en a imprimé la derivation & l’etymologie. Nous sçavons decliner vertu, si nous ne sçavons l’aymer. Si nous ne sçavons que c’est que prudence par effect, & par experience, nous le sçavons par jargon & par cœur.]

Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) French essayist
Essays, Book 2, ch. 17 (2.17), “Of Presumption [De la Presomption] (1578) [tr. Frame (1943)]
(Source)

This essay appeared in the 1st (1580) edition, and this section remained the same through later editions.

(Source (French)). Alternate translations:

I willingly returne to this discourse of the fondnesse of our institution: whose aime hath beene to make us not good and wittie, but wise and learned; She hath attained her purpose. It hath not taught us to follow vertue and embrace wisedome; but made an impression in us of it’s Ethimoligie and derivation. Wee can decline vertue, yet can we not love it. If we know not what wisedome is by effect and experience, we know it by prattling and by rote.
[tr. Florio (1603)]

I willingly fall again into the discourse of the folly of our education; the end of which has not been to render us good and wise, but learned, and it has obtained it: it has not taught us to follow and embrace virtue and prudence, but has imprinted in us the derivation and etymology, of those words: we know how to decline virtue, yet we know not how to love it: if we do not know what prudence is in effect, and by experience, we have it, however, by jargon and by heart.
[tr. Cotton (1686), 2.8]

I willingly fall again into the discourse of the vanity of our education, the end of which is not to render us good and wise, but learned, and she has obtained it. She has not taught us to follow and embrace virtue and prudence, but she has imprinted in us their derivation and etymology; we know how to decline Virtue, if we know not how to love it; if we do not know what prudence is really and in effect, and by experience, we have it however by jargon and heart.
[tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877)]

I again fall to talking of the vanity of our education, the end of which is not to make us good and wise, but learned. Education has not taught us to follow and embrace virtue and prudence, but she has imprinted in us their derivation and etymology. We know how to decline the word virtue, even if we know not how to love it. If we do not know what prudence really is, in effect and by experience, we at least have the etymology and meaning of the word by heart.
[tr. Rector (1899)]

I recur readily to discourses on the utility of our education: its aim has been to make us, not good men and wise, but learned; it has succeeded. It has not taught us to follow and embrace virtue and wisdom, but it has impressed on us their verbal derivation and etymology. We know how to decline virtue, if we do not know how to love it; if we do not know what wisdom is, by results and by experience, we know it by unmeaning words and by hearsay.
[tr. Ives (1925)]

I readily relapse into my reflections on the uselessness of our education. Its aim has been to make us not good and wise, but learned; and in this it has succeeded. It has not taught us to follow and embrace virtue and wisdom, but has imprinted their derivations and etymologies on our minds. We are able to decline virtue, even if we are unable to love it; if we do not know what wisdom is in fact and by experience, we are familiar with it as a jargon learned by heart.
[tr. Cohen (1958)]

I gladly come back to the theme of the absurdity of our education: its end has not been to make us good and wise but learned. And it has succeeded. It has not taught us to seek virtue and to embrace wisdom: it has impressed upon us their derivation and their etymology. We know how to decline the Latin word for virtue: we do not know how to love virtue. Though we do not know what wisdom is in practice or from experience we do know the jargon off by heart.
[tr. Screech (1987)]

Goldsmith, Oliver -- The History of England; in a Series of Letters from a Nobleman to His Son, Letter 1 (1764)

Dave — Fri, 09 Jun 2017 04:15:16 +0000

Those masters who allege the incapacity of tender years, only tacitly reproach their own: those who are incapable of teaching young minds to reason, pretend that it is impossible. The truth is they are fonder of making their pupils talk well than think well; and much the greater number are better qualified to give praise to a ready memory than a sound judgment.

Oliver Goldsmith (1730-1774) Irish poet, playwright, novelist
The History of England; in a Series of Letters from a Nobleman to His Son, Letter 1 (1764)
(Source)

Leonardo da Vinci -- Notebooks (c. 1500) [tr. Richter]

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

Anyone who in discussion relies upon authority uses, not his understanding, but his memory.

Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) Italian artist, engineer, scientist, polymath
Notebooks (c. 1500) [tr. Richter]

Alt. trans.: "The one who relies on authority during a discussion does not use his mind but his memory."

Feather, William -- (Attributed)

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

An education isn’t how much you have committed to memory, or even how much you know. It’s being able to differentiate between what you do know and what you don’t. It’s knowing where to go to find out what you need to know, and it’s knowing how to use the information once you get it.

William Feather (1889-1981) American publisher, author
(Attributed)

The original source for this has not been found. It is quoted (without source) in Carman Fish, "The Safety Valve" column, National Safety News (1960-01). Prior to that, it is also quoted in Telephony Magazine, Vol. 150 (1956), p. 23 (but that article itself notes it is quoting from an issue of Copperweld Magazine).

The first two sentences are often credited to Anatole France, but this seems to be a fairly recent (1990s?) misattribution.

Another variant (attributed to France, uncited; e.g.): "True education is the ability to discern the difference between what you do know and what you don't."