It is more often from pride than from want of intelligence that people oppose with so much obstinacy; the most received opinions. They find the best places taken up in the good party, and do not like to put up with inferior ones.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶380]

It is more often from pride than from ignorance that we are so obstinately opposed to current opinions; we find the first places taken, and we do not want to be the last.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶234]

It is more often our pride than our limited understanding which makes us fly so violently in the face of public opinion. We find the best seats on the correct side already occupied, and we do not care to sit in the rear.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶377]

Pride, rather than a lack of perspicacity, is what usually drives us to oppose with such obstinacy opinions that are generally accepted as correct: though theirs may be the better party, the front benches are already filled, and we certainly do not want to take a back seat.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶234]

It is oftener through pride than through lack of understanding that we so militantly object to prevailing opinions; we find the front seats already in other hands, and we do not want rear ones.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶234]

Those who obstinately oppose the most widely-held opinions more often do so because of pride than lack of intelligence. They find the best places in the right set already taken, and they do not want back seats.
[tr. Tancock (1959), ¶234]

It is more often from pride than from ignorance that we so stubbornly oppose ourselves to the most current opinions: we find the first seats already taken on the better side, and do not wish to sit down there last.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶234]

Nec audiendi qui solent dicere: Vox populi, vox Dei. Cum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniæ proxima sit.

[And those people should not be listened to who keep saying the voice of the people is the voice of God, since the riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness.
[Source]

[We should not listen to those who like to affirm that the voice of the people is the voice of God, for the tumult of the masses is truly close to madness.]
[Source]

Is there anyone, then, except those who rejoiced in his kingly sway, who either was unwilling that the deed should be done or has impugned it since? All therefore share in the fault, for all loyal citizens, so far as rested with them, took part in Cæsar's death. Some wanted the necessary powers of contrivance, some the courage, some the opportunity; but not one the will.
[tr. King (1877)]

Is there then any man, except those that were glad of his reign, who repudiated that deed, or disapproved of it when it was done? All therefore are to blame, for all good men, so far as their own power went, slew Caesar; some lacked a plan, others courage, others opportunity: will no man lacked.
[tr. Ker (Loeb) (1926)]

Is there any one then, except you yourself and these men who wished him to become a king, who was unwilling that that deed should be done, or who disapproved of it after it was done? All men, therefore, are guilty as far as this goes. In truth, all good men, as far as it depended on them, bore a part in the slaying of Caesar. Some did not know how to contrive it, some had not courage for it, some had no opportunity, -- every one had the inclination.
[tr. Yonge (1903)]

Yet, with the exception of the men who wanted to make an autocratic monarch of him, all were happy for this to happen -- or were glad when it had happened. So everyone is guilty! For every decent person, in so far as he had any say in the matter, killed Caesar! Plans, courage, opportunities were in some case lacking; but the desire nobody lacked.
[tr. Grant (1960)]

Is there anyone, with the exception of those who were happy that he was our king, who did not want it done or disapproved that it was done? Everyone is at fault, then. Indeed, all decent men, as far as they could, killed Caesar; some may have lacked a plan, others courage, and still others the opportunity, but no one lacked the desire.
[tr. McElduff (2011)]

To ground the recompence of vertuous actions, upon the approbation of others, is to undertake a most uncertaine or troubled foundation, namely in an age so corrupt and times so ignorant, as this is: the vulgar peoples good opinion is injurious. Whom trust you in seeing what is commendable?
[tr. Florio (1603)]

To ground the Recompence of virtuous Actions upon the Approbation of others, is too uncertain and unsafe a Foundation; especially in so corrupt and ignorant an Age as this, the good Opinion of the Vulgar is injurious. Upon whom do you relie to shew you what is recommendable?
[tr. Cotton (1686)]

To ground the recompense of virtuous actions upon the approbation of others is too uncertain and unsafe a foundation, especially in so corrupt and ignorant an age as this, wherein the good opinion of the vulgar is injurious: upon whom do you rely to show you what is recommendable?
[tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877)]

To base the reward of virtuous actions on the approbation of others is to choose a too uncertain and obscure foundation. Especially in a corrupt and ignorant age like this, the good opinion of the vulgar is offensive; to whom do you trust to perceive what is praiseworthy?
[tr. Ives (1925)]

Basing the recompense of virtuous deeds on another’s approbation is to accept too uncertain and confused a foundation -- especially since in a corrupt and ignorant period like our own to be in good esteem with the masses is an insult: whom would you trust to recognize what was worthy of praise!
[tr. Screech (1987)]

For when something has been demonstrated, the correctness of the matter is not increased and certainty regarding it is not strengthened by the consensus of all men of knowledge with regard to it. Nor could its correctness be diminished and certainty regarding it be weakened even if all the people on earth disagreed with it.
[tr. Pines (1963)]

Not to imitate the folly of others is an effect of rare wisedome; for whatever is introduced by example and custome, is of great force. Some who have guarded against particular ignorance, have not been able to avoid the general.
[Flesher ed. (1685)]

Keep yourself free from common Follies. This is a special stroke of policy. They are of special power because they are general, so that many who would not be led away by any individual folly cannot escape the universal failing.
[tr. Jacobs (1892)]

To keep free from the popular inanities, marks especially good sense. They are highly esteemed because so well introduced, and many a man who could not be trapped by some particular stupidity could not except the general.
[tr. Fischer (1937)]

Alas! there's no man free: for some are slaves
To gold, to fortune others, and the rest,
The multitude or written laws restrain
From acting as their better judgement dictates.
[tr. Wodhull (1809)]

Alas! no mortal is there who is free. For either he is the slave of money or of fortune; or the populace of the city or the dictates of the law constrain him to adopt manners not accordant with his natural inclinations.
[tr. Edwards (1826)]

Vain is the boast of liberty in man;
A slave to fortune, or a slave to wealth,
Or by the people or the laws restrain’d,
He dares not act the dictates of his will
[ed. Ramage (1864)]

Ah, among mortals is there no man free!
To lucre or to fortune is he slave:
The city's rabble or the laws' impeachment
Constrains him into paths his soul abhors.
[tr. Way (Loeb) (1894)]

Ah! there is not in the world a single man free; for he is a slave either to money or to fortune, or else the people in their thousands or the fear of public prosecution prevents him from following the dictates of his heart.
[tr. Coleridge (1938)]

Show me the mortal man who's really free.
He's either a slave to money or to chance.
Or the pressure of the mob or legal code
curbs him from acting as his will dictates.
[tr. Harrison (2005)]

Ah! But there’s no such thing as a free man! All men are slaves, Agamemnon! Slaves to money, to Fate, to the cries of the masses, to the written laws! They all stop him from doing what he wants.
[tr. Theodoridis (2007)]

Then no one is free
in this world. He’s chained to money, or to luck, or to majority
opinion, or to law. Any way you look at it,
he’s still a slave.
[tr. Karden/Street (2011)]

Alas!
there is not in the world a single man who is free;
for he is a slave either to money or to fortune,
or else the mob, or fear of law, prevents him
from following the dictates of his heart.
[ed. Yeroulanos (2016)]

There is no mortal who is free. Either he is a slave to money or fortune, or the city’s mob or its laws make him live otherwise than he would wish.
[tr. @sentantiq (2016)]

Ha!
No one who is mortal is free --
We are either the slave of money or chance;
Or the majority of people or the city’s laws
Keep us from living by our own judgment.
[tr. @sentantiq (2020)]

For man always believes more readily that which he prefers. He, therefore, rejects difficulties for want of patience in investigation; sobriety, because it limits his hope; the depths of nature, from superstition; the light of experiment, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should appear to be occupied with common and varying objects; paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the vulgar; in short, his feelings imbue and corrupt his understanding in innumerable and sometimes imperceptible ways.
[tr. Wood (1831)]

For what a man had rather were true he more readily believes. Therefore he rejects difficult things from impatience of research; sober things, because they narrow hope; the deeper things of nature, from superstition; the light of experience, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should seem to be occupied with things mean and transitory; things not commonly believed, out of deference to the opinion of the vulgar. Numberless in short are the ways, and sometimes imperceptible, in which the affections colour and infect the understanding.
[tr. Spedding (1858)]

For man more readily believes what he wishes to be true. And so it rejects difficult things, from impatience of inquiry; -- sober things, because they narrow hope; -- the deeper thigns of Nature, from superstition; -- the light of experience, from arrogance and disdain, lest the mind should seem to be occupied with worthless and changing matters; -- paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the vulgar: -- in short, the affections enter and corrupt the intellect in innumerable ways, and these sometimes imperceptible.
[tr. Johnson (1859)]

For a man is more likely to believe something if he would like it to be true. Therefore he rejects

• difficult things because he hasn’t the patience to research them,
• sober and prudent things because they narrow hope,
• the deeper things of nature, from superstition,
• the light that experiments can cast, from arrogance and pride (not wanting people to think his mind was occupied with trivial things),
• surprising truths, out of deference to the opinion of the vulgar.

In short, there are countless ways in which, sometimes imperceptibly, a person’s likings colour and infect his intellect.
[tr. Bennett (2017)]