WIST Quotations

Twain, Mark -- Essay (1906), “The Gorky Incident,” Letters from the Earth (c. 1909; pub. 1962) [ed. DeVoto (1939)]

Dave — Fri, 05 Jun 2026 15:40:41 +0000

Customs do not concern themselves with right or wrong or reason. But they have to be obeyed; one may reason all around them until he is tired, but he must not transgress them, it is sternly forbidden.

Mark Twain (1835–1910) American writer [pseud. of Samuel Clemens]
Essay (1906), “The Gorky Incident,” Letters from the Earth (c. 1909; pub. 1962) [ed. DeVoto (1939)]

Commenting on the eviction of Maxim Gorky from multiple hotels in New York City because the woman he was traveling with was not his wife. Twain was a supporter of Gorky's efforts to foment revolution in Tsarist Russia.

The essay was not published in Twain's lifetime. It's original publication was in the Slavonic and East European Review (1944-08), also edited by DeVoto.

Twain, Mark -- Essay (1906), “The Gorky Incident,” Letters from the Earth (c. 1909; pub. 1962) [ed. DeVoto (1939)]

Dave — Fri, 15 May 2026 17:38:27 +0000

Laws are coldly reasoned out and established upon what the lawmakers believe to be a basis of right. But customs are not. Customs are not enacted, they grow gradually up, imperceptibly and unconsciously, like an oak from its seed. In the fullness of their strength they can stand up straight in front of a world of argument and reasoning and yield not an inch.

Doyle, Arthur Conan -- Story (1890-02), “The Sign of the Four,” ch. 1 [Holmes], Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine, Vol. 45 (US) / 1 (UK)

Dave — Thu, 09 Apr 2026 18:57:28 +0000

Detection is, or ought to be, an exact science and should be treated in the same cold and unemotional manner. You have attempted to tinge it with romanticism, which produces much the same effect as if you worked a love-story or an elopement into the fifth proposition of Euclid.

Arthur Conan Doyle (1859–1930) British writer and physician
Story (1890-02), “The Sign of the Four,” ch. 1 [Holmes], Lippincott’s Monthly Magazine, Vol. 45 (US) / 1 (UK)

Critiquing Watson's writing in A Study in Scarlet (1887). More on Euclid's Fifth Proposition here.

The original publication, and Doyle's manuscript (along with many other iterations across media) use "The Sign of the Four" as the title, while others (including the first book publications) use "The Sign of Four." The five-word form is used most commonly in the story, but the four-word form does show up. (More info.)

Published in novel form as The Sign of Four (1890-10).

Russell, Bertrand -- Education and the Good Life, Part 1, ch. 2 “The Aims of Education” (1926)

Dave — Wed, 11 Mar 2026 18:19:02 +0000

Neither acquiescence in skepticism nor acquiescence in dogma is what education should produce. What it should produce is a belief that knowledge is attainable in a measure, though with difficulty; that much of what passes for knowledge at any given time is likely to be more or less mistaken, but that the mistakes can be rectified by care and industry. In acting upon our beliefs, we should be very cautious where a small error would mean disaster; nevertheless it is upon our beliefs that we must act. This state of mind is rather difficult: it requires a high degree of intellectual culture without emotional atrophy. But though difficult it is not impossible; it is in fact the scientific temper. Knowledge, like other good things, is difficult, but not impossible; the dogmatist forgets the difficulty, the skeptic denies the possibility. Both are mistaken, and their errors, when wide-spread, produce social disaster.

Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) English mathematician and philosopher
Education and the Good Life, Part 1, ch. 2 “The Aims of Education” (1926)

Ingersoll, Robert Green -- Lecture (1873-12) “Individuality,” Chicago Free Religious Society

Dave — Fri, 18 Jul 2025 20:31:18 +0000

The Church hates a thinker precisely for the same reason a robber dislikes a sheriff, or a thief despises the prosecuting witness. Tyranny likes courtiers, flatterers, followers, fawners, and superstition wants believers, disciples, zealots, hypocrites, and subscribers.

Robert Green Ingersoll (1833–1899) American lawyer, freethinker, orator
Lecture (1873-12) “Individuality,” Chicago Free Religious Society

Full title "Arraignment of the Church and a Plea for Individuality." Collected in The Gods and Other Lectures (1876).

Fuller, Thomas (1654) -- Introductio ad Prudentiam, Vol. 2, # 2019 (1727)

Dave — Wed, 16 Jul 2025 16:08:28 +0000

Thou art not bound to believe any one positively against thy Reason, which God hath given thee to be thy Guide.

Thomas Fuller (1654–1734) English physician, preacher, aphorist, writer
Introductio ad Prudentiam, Vol. 2, # 2019 (1727)

Bierce, Ambrose -- “Rational,” The Devil’s Dictionary (1911)

Dave — Tue, 10 Jun 2025 15:00:20 +0000

RATIONAL, adj. Devoid of all delusions save those of observation, experience and reflection.

Ambrose Bierce (1842–1914?) American writer and journalist
“Rational,” The Devil’s Dictionary (1911)

Originally published in the "Cynic's Dictionary" column in the San Francisco Examiner.

Orwell, George -- Essay (1946-09), “Politics vs. Literature: An Examination of Gulliver’s Travels,” Polemic, No. 5

Dave — Fri, 25 Apr 2025 15:37:03 +0000

The views that a writer holds must be compatible with sanity, in the medical sense, and with the power of continuous thought: beyond that what we ask of him is talent, which is probably another name for conviction.

George Orwell (1903–1950) English journalist, essayist, writer [pseud. of Eric Arthur Blair]
Essay (1946-09), “Politics vs. Literature: An Examination of Gulliver’s Travels,” Polemic, No. 5

Russell, Bertrand -- Conquest of Happiness, Part 1, ch. 2 “Byronic Unhappiness” (1930)

Dave — Wed, 23 Apr 2025 16:04:04 +0000

We must distinguish between a mood and its intellectual expression. There is no arguing with mood; it can be changed by some fortunate event, or by a change in our bodily condition, but it cannot be changed by argument.

Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) English mathematician and philosopher
Conquest of Happiness, Part 1, ch. 2 “Byronic Unhappiness” (1930)

Russell, Bertrand -- Conquest of Happiness, Part 1, ch. 2 “Byronic Unhappiness” (1930)

Dave — Wed, 09 Apr 2025 15:54:49 +0000

I do not myself think that there is any superior rationality in being unhappy. The wise man will be as happy as circumstances permit, and if he finds the contemplation of the universe painful beyond a point, he will contemplate something else instead.

Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) English mathematician and philosopher
Conquest of Happiness, Part 1, ch. 2 “Byronic Unhappiness” (1930)

Taleb, Nassim Nicholas -- Fooled by Randomness, Prologue (2001)

Dave — Mon, 24 Feb 2025 18:10:26 +0000

Delivering advice assumes that our cognitive apparatus rather than our emotional machinery exerts some meaningful control over our actions.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb (b. 1960) Lebanese-American essayist, statistician, risk analyst, aphorist
Fooled by Randomness, Prologue (2001)

Dante Alighieri -- La Vita Nuova [Vita Nova; New Life], ch. 20, Sonnet 8, ll. 1-4 (c. 1294, pub. 1576) [tr. Norton (1867)]

Dave — Fri, 07 Feb 2025 23:12:19 +0000

Love is but one thing with the gentle heart,
As in the saying of the sage we find;
Thus one from other cannot be apart,
More than the reason from the reasoning mind.

[Amore e ’l cor gentil sono una cosa,
Si come il saggio in suo dittare pone,
E cosi esser I’un sanza altro osa
Com’alma razional sanza ragione.]

Dante Alighieri (1265–1321) Italian poet
La Vita Nuova [Vita Nova; New Life], ch. 20, Sonnet 8, ll. 1-4 (c. 1294, pub. 1576) [tr. Norton (1867)]

The wise man referenced is the poet Guido Guinizzelli (or Guinicelli).

(Source (Italian)). Alternate translations:

Love and the gentle heart are but one thing,
As says the wise man in his apothegm;
And one can by itself no more exist
Than reason can without the reasoning soul.
[tr. Lyell (1845)]

Love and the gentle heart are one same thing,
Even as the wise man in his ditty saith:
Each, of itself, would be such life in death
As rational soul bereft of reasoning.
[tr. Rossetti (c. 1847; 1899 ed.)]

They are the same, Love and the gentle heart!
So runs the saw, which from the sage I stole;
Nor can they more abide, from each apart,
Than reason parted from the reasoning soul.
[tr. Martin (1862)]

Love and the noble heart are but one thing,
Even as the wise man tells us in his rhyme,
The one without the other venturing
As well as reason from a reasoning mind.
[tr. Reynolds (1969)]

Love and the gracious heart are but one thing,
As Guinizelli tells us in his rhyme;
As much can one without the other be
As without reason can the reasoning mind.
[tr. Musa (1971)]

Love and the gracious heart are a single thing, as Guinizelli tells us in his poem: one can no more be without the other than can the reasoning mind without its reason.
[tr. Hollander (1997), sec. 3]

Love and the gentle heart are one thing,
as the wise man puts it in his verse,
and each without the other would be dust,
as a rational soul would be without its reason.
[tr. Kline (2002)]

Love and the noble heart are one and the same thing,
as the sage states in his poem,
and one of them dares as little to exist without the other
as does the rational soul without reasoning.
[tr. Appelbaum (2006)]

Love and the open heart are always one,
the sage has written; neither love nor heart
can be until the other is begun,
as thought confirms a thinking counterpart.
[tr. Frisardi (2012), ch. 11]

Lessing, Gotthold -- Minna von Barnhelm, Act 4, sc. 6 [Minna] (1763) [tr. Holroyd/Bell (1888)]

Dave — Wed, 10 Jan 2024 16:07:41 +0000

What have you to say against laughing? Cannot one be very serious even whilst laughing? Dear Major, laughter keeps us more rational than vexation.

[Was haben Sie denn gegen das Lachen? Kann man denn auch nicht lachend sehr ernsthast sein? Lieber Major, das Lachen erhält uns vernünftiger als der Verdruss.]

Gotthold Lessing (1729–1781) German playwright, philosopher, dramaturg, writer
Minna von Barnhelm, Act 4, sc. 6 [Minna] (1763) [tr. Holroyd/Bell (1888)]

(Source (German)). Another translation:

What have you to say against laughing? Can we not while laughing be very serious? Laughing keeps us more rational than sadness caused by vexation.
[Source (1884)]

Confucius -- The Analects [論語, 论语, Lúnyǔ], Book 13, verse 3 (13.3.2, 5-7) (6th C. BC – AD 3rd C.) [tr. Soothill (1910)]

Dave — Tue, 04 Apr 2023 14:51:30 +0000

The one thing needed is the correction of terms. […] If terms be incorrect, then statements do not accord with facts; and when statements and facts do not accord, then business is not properly executed; when business is not properly executed, order and harmony do not flourish; when order and harmony do not flourish, then justice becomes arbitrary; and when justice becomes arbitrary the people do not know how to move hand or foot. Hence whatever a wise man denominates he can always definitely state, and what he so states he can put into practice, for the wise man will no no account have anything remiss in his definitions.

[擧爾所知、爾所不知、人其舍諸。 … 名不正、則言不順、言不順、則事不成。事不成、則禮樂不興、禮樂不興、則刑罰不中、刑罰不中、則民無所措手足。故君子名之必可言也、言之必可行也、君子於其言、無所茍而已矣。]

Confucius (c. 551- c. 479 BC) Chinese philosopher, sage, politician [孔夫子 (Kǒng Fūzǐ, K'ung Fu-tzu, K'ung Fu Tse), 孔子 (Kǒngzǐ, Chungni), 孔丘 (Kǒng Qiū, K'ung Ch'iu)]
The Analects [論語, 论语, Lúnyǔ], Book 13, verse 3 (13.3.2, 5-7) (6th C. BC – AD 3rd C.) [tr. Soothill (1910)]

On the first thing he would do if given administration of a government. See also Socrates. Brooks identifies this as an interpolation to Book 13 around the time of Book 19.

(Source (Chinese)). Other translations:

What is necessary is to rectify names. [...] If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot. Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires, is just that in his words there may be nothing incorrect.
[tr. Legge (1861)]

One thing of necessity, the rectification of terms. [...] If terms be incorrect, language will be incongruous; and if language be incongruous, deeds will be imperfect. -- So, again, when deeds are imperfect, propriety and harmony cannot prevail, and when this is the case laws relating to crime will fail in their aim; and if these last so fail, the people will not know where to set hand or foot. -- Hence, a man of superior mind, certain first of his terms, is fitted to speak; and being certain of what he says can proceed upon it. In the language of such a person there is nothing heedlessly irregular, -- and that is the sum of the matter.
[tr. Jennings (1895)]

I would begin by defining the names of things. [...] Now, if names of things are not properly defined, words will not correspond to facts. When words do not correspond to facts, it is impossible to perfect anything. Where it is impossible to perfect anything, the arts and institutions of civilisation cannot flourish. When the arts and institutions of civilisation cannot flourish, law and justice cannot attain their ends; and when law and justice do not attain their ends, the people will be at a loss to know what to do. Therefore a wise and good man can always specify whatever he names; whatever he can specify, he can carry out. A wise and good man makes it a point always to be exact in the words he uses.
[tr. Ku Hung-Ming (1898)]

Settle the names (determine a precise terminology). [...] If words (terminology) are not (is not) precise, they cannot be followed out, or completed in action according to specifications. When the services (actions) are not brought to true focus, the ceremonies and music will not prosper; where rites and music do not flourish punishments will be misapplied, not make bullseye, and the people won’t know how to move hand or foot (what to lay hand on, or stand on). Therefore the proper man must have terms that can be spoken, and when uttered be carried into effect; the proper man’s words must cohere to things, correspond to them (exactly) and no more fuss about it.
[tr. Pound (1933)]

It would certainly be to correct language. [...] If language is incorrect, then what is said does not concord with what was meant; and if what is said does not concord with what was meant, what is to be done cannot be effected. If what is to be done cannot be effected, then rites and music will not flourish. If rites and music do not flourish, then mutilations and lesser punishments will go astray. And if mutilations and lesser punishments go astray, then the people have nowhere to put hand or foot. Therefore the gentleman uses only such language as is proper for speech, and only speaks of what it would be proper to carry into effect. The gentleman, in what he says, leaves nothing to mere chance.
[tr. Waley (1938)]

The indispensable is to render designations correct. [...] If the designations are not correct, language will not be clear. If language is not clear, duties will not be carried out. If duties arc not carried out, rites and music will not flourish. If rites and music do not flourish, then punishments will not be specific. If punishments arc not specific, then the people will do nothing without getting into trouble, lienee when the perfect gentleman has given something a name it may with all certainty be expressed in language; when he expresses it, it may with certainty be set in operation. In regard to his language the perfect gentleman is never careless in any respect.
[tr. Ware (1950)]

If something has to be put first, it is, perhaps, the rectification (cheng) of names. [...] When names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not fit the crimes; when punishments do not fit the crimes, the common people will not know where to put hand or foot. Thus when the gentleman names something, the name is sure to be usable in speech, and when he says something this is sure to be practicable. The thing about the gentleman is that his is anything but casual where speech is concerned.
[tr. Lau (1979)]

What is necessary is to rectify names, is it not? [...] If names are not rectified, then words are not appropriate. If words are not appropriate, then deeds are not accomplished. If deeds are not accomplished, then the rites and music do not flourish. If the rites and music do not flourish, then punishments do not hit the mark. If punishments do not hit the mark, then the people have nowhere to put hand or foot. So when a gentleman names something, the name can definitely be used in speech; and when he says something, it can definitely be put into practice. In his utterances the gentleman is definitely not casual about anything.
[tr. Dawson (1993)]

It would certainly be to rectify the names. [...] If the names are not correct, language is without an object. When language is without an object, no affair can be effected. When no affair can be effected, rites and music wither. When rites and music wither, punishments and penalties miss their target. When punishments and penalties miss their target, the people do not know where they stand. Therefore whatever a gentleman conceives of, he must be able to say; and whatever he says, he must be able to do. In the matter of language, a gentleman leaves nothing to chance.
[tr. Leys (1997)]

It must be the rectification of character. [...] For if characters are not correct, speech will not be relevant; if speech is not relevant, affairs will not be accomplished; if affairs are not accomplished, the rituals and music will not prevail; if the rituals and music do not prevail, tortures and penalties will not be just right; if tortures and penalties are not just right, the people will not know where to put their hands and feet. Therefore, when the gentleman adopts a character, he surely can used it to say things; when he says something, it surely can be put into practice. The gentleman, in regard to his speech, is never negligent, that is all.
[tr. Huang (1997)]

I must define the intention of names! [...] If the intention of names is not defined, the word will not be exact; if the word is not exact, the thing will not be done; if the thing is not done, the rituals and music will not be practiced; if the rituals and music are not practiced, the penalty will not be appropriate; if the penalty is not appropriate, people will not know where to go and how to do. So a gentleman must can word out its intention when he names a thing, and must can practice it after he words out the intention. So a gentleman is never unserious to his words.
[tr. Cai/Yu (1998), #313]

Without question it would be to insure that names are used properly (zhengming). [...] When names are not used properly, language will not be used effectively; when language is not used effectively, matters will not be taken care of; when matters are not taken care of, the observance of ritual propriety (li) and the playing of music (yue) will not flourish; when the observance of ritual propriety and the playing of music do not flourish, the application of laws and punishments will not be on the mark. When the application of laws and punishments is not on the mark, the people will not know what to do with themselves. Thus, when the exemplary person puts a name to something, it can certainly be spoken, and when spoken it can certainly be acted upon. There is nothing careless in the attitude of the exemplary person toward what is said.
[tr. Ames/Rosemont (1998)]

It would certainly be to rectify names, would it not? [...] If names are not rectified, speech will not be representative. If speech is not representative, things will not get done. If things do not get done, rites and music will not flourish. If rites and music do not flourish, punishments and penalties will not be just. And if punishments and penalties are not just, the people will have nowhere to put hand or foot. Therefore, as to the gentleman: if he names something, it must be sayable, and if he says something, it must be doable. The gentleman's relation to words is to leave nothing whatever to chance.
[tr. Brooks/Brooks (1998)]

The rectification of names. Without a doubt. [...] Listen. If names aren't rectified, speech doesn't follow from reality. If speech doesn't follow from reality, endeavors never come to fruition. If endeavors never come to fruition, then Ritual and music cannot flourish. If Ritual and music cannot flourish, punishments don't fit the crime. If punishments don't fit the crime, people can't put their hands and feet anywhere without fear of losing them. Naming enables the noble-minded to speak, and speech enables the noble-minded to act. Therefore, the noble-minded are anything but careless in speech.
[tr. Hinton (1998)]

It would, of course, be the rectification of names. [...] If names are not rectified, speech will not accord with reality; when speech does not accord with reality, things will not be successfully accomplished. When things are not successfully accomplished, ritual practice and music will fail to flourish; when ritual and music fail to flourish, punishments and penalties will miss the mark. And when punishments and penalties miss the mark, the common people will be at a loss as to what to do with themselves. This is why the gentleman only applies names that can be properly spoken and assures that what he says can be properly put into action. The gentleman simply guards against arbitrariness in his speech. That is all there is to it.
[tr. Slingerland (2003)]

If I had to name my first action, I would rectify names. [...] If names are not rectified, then speech will not function properly, and if speech does not function properly, then undertakings will not succeed. If undertakings do not succeed, then rites and music will not flourish. If rites and music do not flourish, then punishments and penalties will not be justly administered. And if punishments and penalties are not justly administered, then the common people will not know where to place their hands and feet. Therefore, when the gentleman names a thing, that naming can be conveyed in speech, and if it is conveyed in speech, then it can surely be put into action. When the gentleman speaks, there is nothing arbitrary in the way he does so.
[tr. Watson (2007)]

It would have to be rectifying names. [...] If names are not rectified, what is said will not seem reasonable. When what is said does not seem reasonable, nothing will be accomplished. When nothing gets accomplished, rites and music will not flourish. When rites and music do not flourish, punishment and penalties [will take their place, and they] will fail to be just when put into use. And when punishments and penalties fail to be just in practice, people will not know where to put their hands and feet. Thus when a gentleman names something, the name can surely hold up in speech. When he says something, his words can surely be carried out in action. When a gentleman speaks, there is nothing casual or careless about what he says.
[tr. Chin (2014)]

Commager, Henry Steele -- Speech (1971-04-10), “The University and the Community of Learning,” Kent State University, Ohio

Dave — Wed, 22 Jun 2022 17:55:15 +0000

When a people are confronted with problems that are both incomprehensible and unbearable, they lash out not at those who contrived the problems but at those who expose them. When they are confronted by moral problems that they find insoluble, or perhaps intolerable, they blame the moralists. The anxieties, tensions, revulsions of our day create an atmosphere in which it is almost impossible to think clearly and dispassionately about just those problems which most imperatively require reason and objectivity — problems of adjustment to fundamental change.

Henry Steele Commager (1902–1998) American historian, writer, activist
Speech (1971-04-10), “The University and the Community of Learning,” Kent State University, Ohio

Gessen, Masha -- “The Fundamental Uncertainty of Mueller’s Russia Indictments,” The New Yorker (20 Feb 2018)

Dave — Mon, 07 Jun 2021 20:14:51 +0000

Perhaps the hardest thing for humans to do is to imagine the world as it is imagined by others. We tend to confuse acting in accordance with the goals and values of the society in which we live with rationality; we tend to confuse intelligence with thinking in accordance with those goals and values. And, of course, we are always inclined to see events as predetermined — and we are almost always wrong.

Masha Gessen (b. 1967) Russian-American journalist, author, translator, activist
“The Fundamental Uncertainty of Mueller’s Russia Indictments,” The New Yorker (20 Feb 2018)

Chesterfield (Lord) -- Letter to his son, #209 (19 Dec 1749)

Dave — Thu, 01 Apr 2021 17:25:01 +0000

We must not suppose that, because a man is a rational animal, he will, therefore, always act rationally; or, because he has such or such a predominant passion, that he will act invariably and consequentially in the pursuit of it. No, we are complicated machines; and though we have one main spring that gives motion to the whole, we have an infinity of little wheels, which, in their turns, retard, precipitate, and sometimes stop that motion.

Lord Chesterfield (1694–1773) English statesman, wit [Philip Dormer Stanhope]
Letter to his son, #209 (19 Dec 1749)

Snicket, Lemony -- The Wide Window (2000)

Dave — Wed, 06 Jan 2021 16:40:57 +0000

There are two kinds of fears: rational and irrational — or, in simpler terms, fears that make sense and fears that don’t. For instance, the Baudelaire orphans have a fear of Count Olaf, which makes perfect sense, because he is an evil man who wants to destroy them. But if they were afraid of lemon meringue pie, this would be an irrational fear, because lemon meringue pie is delicious and would never hurt a soul. Being afraid of a monster under the bed is perfectly rational, because there may in fact be a monster under your bed at any time, ready to eat you all up, but fear of realtors is an irrational fear. Realtors, as I’m sure you know, are people who assist in the buying and selling of houses. Besides occasionally wearing an ugly yellow coat, the worst a realtor can do to you is show you a house that you find ugly, so it is completely irrational to be terrified of them.

Lemony Snicket (b. 1970) American author, screenwriter, musician (pseud. for Daniel Handler)
The Wide Window (2000)

~Other -- Anonymous

Dave — Mon, 24 Aug 2020 20:57:00 +0000

The difference between a conviction and a prejudice is that you can explain a conviction without getting angry.

(Other Authors and Sources)
Anonymous

No definitive source is found for this quotation. Frequently attributed to Gregory Benford, Deeper than the Darkness (1970), but it has shown up anonymously at least as early as 1951 as "filler" material in periodicals. Also sometimes attributed to Samuel Butler or Dorothy Sarnoff, but not with any citation.

Straczynski, J. Michael "Joe" -- Babylon 5, 4×02 “Whatever Happened to Mr. Garibaldi?” (11 Nov 1996)

Dave — Thu, 30 Jul 2020 15:18:03 +0000

G’KAR: If you’re going to be worried every time the universe doesn’t make sense, you’re going to be worried every moment of every day for the rest of your natural life.

J. Michael (Joe) Straczynski (b. 1954) American screenwriter, producer, author [a/k/a "JMS"]
Babylon 5, 4×02 “Whatever Happened to Mr. Garibaldi?” (11 Nov 1996)

Wilde, Oscar -- “The Critic as Artist,” Intentions (1891)

Dave — Mon, 27 May 2019 18:57:56 +0000

The security of society lies in custom and unconscious instinct, and the basis of the stability of society, as a healthy organism, is the complete absence of any intelligence amongst its members. The great majority of people being aware of this, rank themselves naturally on the side of that splendid system that elevates them to the dignity of machines, and rage so wildly against the intrusion of the intellectual faculty into any question that concerns life, that one is tempted to define man as a rational animal who always loses his temper when he is called upon to act in accordance with the dictates of reason.

Oscar Wilde (1854–1900) Irish poet, wit, dramatist
“The Critic as Artist,” Intentions (1891)

De Botton, Alain -- The Consolations of Philosophy, ch. 1 “Consolation for Unpopularity” (2000)

Dave — Fri, 01 Mar 2019 02:23:29 +0000

The validity of an idea or action is determined not by whether it is widely believed or widely reviled but by whether it obeys the rules of logic. It is not because an argument is denounced by a majority that it is wrong nor, for those drawn to heroic defiance, that it is right.

Alain de Botton (b. 1969) Swiss-British author
The Consolations of Philosophy, ch. 1 “Consolation for Unpopularity” (2000)

De Botton, Alain -- The Consolations of Philosophy, ch. 1 “Consolations for Unpopularity” (2000)

Dave — Fri, 25 Aug 2017 03:37:23 +0000

Philosophy had supplied Socrates with convictions in which he had been able to have rational, as opposed to hysterical, confidence when faced with disapproval.

Alain de Botton (b. 1969) Swiss-British author
The Consolations of Philosophy, ch. 1 “Consolations for Unpopularity” (2000)

Pratchett, Terry -- Discworld No. 21, Jingo (1997)

Dave — Wed, 26 Aug 2015 14:20:38 +0000

The intelligence of that creature known as a crowd is the square root of the number of people in it.

Terry Pratchett (1948–2015) English author
Discworld No. 21, Jingo (1997)

Scalzi, John -- The Ghost Brigades, ch. 5 (2006)

Dave — Wed, 03 Sep 2014 15:07:48 +0000

Rationality is not one of humanity’s strong points.

John Scalzi (b. 1969) American writer
The Ghost Brigades, ch. 5 (2006)

Harris, Sydney J. -- (Attributed)

Dave — Fri, 14 Aug 2009 12:02:40 +0000

The reason that truth is stranger than fiction is that fiction has to have a rational thread running through it in order to be believable, whereas reality may be totally irrational.

Sydney J. Harris (1917–1986) Anglo-American columnist, journalist, author
(Attributed)

See Twain.

Russell, Bertrand -- “Am I an Atheist or an Agnostic?” sec. “Don’t Be Too Certain!” (1949)

Dave — Tue, 04 Nov 2008 15:35:48 +0000

Not to be absolutely certain is, I think, one of the essential things in rationality.

Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) English mathematician and philosopher
“Am I an Atheist or an Agnostic?” sec. “Don’t Be Too Certain!” (1949)

Originally given as a speech, "Agnosticism v. Atheism," Rationalist Press Assoc. Annual Dinner, London (1949-05-20), then printed as "Agnosticism v. Atheism," The Literary Guide and Rationalist Review (1949-07), then released as an essay under this title later in 1949.

Seuss, Dr. -- “Author Isn’t Just a Cat in the Hat,” interview by Miles Corwin, Los Angeles Times (1983-11-27)

Dave — Thu, 28 Aug 2008 09:34:07 +0000

Nonsense wakes up the brain cells. And it helps develop a sense of humor, which is awfully important in this day and age. Humor has a tremendous place in this sordid world. It’s more than just a matter of laughing. If you can see things out of whack, then you can see how things can be in whack.

Dr. Seuss (1904–1991) American author, illustrator [pseud. of Theodor Geisel]
“Author Isn’t Just a Cat in the Hat,” interview by Miles Corwin, Los Angeles Times (1983-11-27)

Lippmann, Walter -- A Preface to Morals, ch. 7 (1913)

Dave — Tue, 01 Apr 2008 10:57:09 +0000

Once you touch the biographies of human beings, the notion that political beliefs are logically determined collapses like a pricked balloon.

Walter Lippmann (1889–1974) American journalist and author
A Preface to Morals, ch. 7 (1913)

Marcus Aurelius -- Meditations [To Himself; Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν], Book 3, ch. 9 (3.9) (AD 161-180) [tr. Collier (1701)]

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

The happiness of your life depends upon the quality of your thoughts: therefore, guard accordingly, and take care that you entertain no notions unsuitable to virtue and reasonable nature.

[Τὴν ὑποληπτικὴν δύναμιν σέβε. ἐν ταύτῃ τὸ πᾶν, ἵνα ὑπόληψις τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ σου μηκέτι ἐγγένηται ἀνακόλουθος τῇ φύσει καὶ τῇ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κατασκευῇ]

Marcus Aurelius (AD 121–180) Roman emperor (161–180), Stoic philosopher
Meditations [To Himself; Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν], Book 3, ch. 9 (3.9) (AD 161-180) [tr. Collier (1701)]

(Source (Greek)). Other translations:

Use thine opiniative faculty with all honour and respect, for in her indeed is all: that thy opinion do not beget in thy understanding anything contrary to either nature, or the proper constitution of a rational creature.
[tr. Casaubon (1634), 3.10]

Cultivate with all care that power which forms opinions: All depends on this, that no opinion thy soul entertains, be inconsistent with the nature and constitution of the rational animals.
[tr. Hutcheson/Moor (1742)]

Pay a reverential regard to that faculty by which you form your opinions; for every thing depends on this, that no opinion be fostered in your breast that is not consonant to nature and to the condition of a rational being.
[tr. Graves (1792)]

Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this faculty it entirely depends whether there shall exist in thy ruling part any opinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the rational animal.
[tr. Long (1862)]

Hold in honor your opinionative faculty, for this alone is able to prevent any opinion from originating in your guiding principle that is contrary to Nature or the proper constitution of a rational creature.
[tr. Collier/Zimmern (1887)]

Treat reverently your assumptive faculty: by it and it alone is your Inner Self secured against assumptions not in harmony with nature and with the constitution of a rational creature.
[tr. Rendall (1898)]

Hold in honour the faculty which forms opinions. It depends on this faculty alone that no opinion your soul entertains be inconsistent with the nature and constitution of the rational being.
[tr. Hutcheson/Chrystal (1902)]

Hold sacred thy capacity for forming opinions. With that it rests wholly that thy ruling Reason should never admit any opinion out of harmony with Nature, and with the constitution of a rational creature.
[tr. Haines (Loeb) (1916)]

Reverence your faculty of judgement. On this it entirely rests that your governing self no longer has a judgement disobedient to Nature and to the estate of a reasonable being.
[tr. Farquharson (1944)]

Treat with respect the power you have to form an opinion. By it alone can the helmsman within you avoid forming opinions that are at variance with nature and with the constitution of a reasonable being.
[tr. Staniforth (1964)]

Venerate your faculty of judgement. For it depends entirely on this that there should never arise in your governing faculty any judgement that fails to accord with nature or with the constitution of a rational being.
[tr. Hard (1997 ed.)]

Your ability to control your thoughts -- treat it with respect. It’s all that protects your mind from false perceptions -- false to your nature, and that of all rational beings. [tr. Hays (2003)]

Revere your power of judgement. All rests on this to make sure that your directing mind no longer entertains any judgement which fails to agree with the nature or the constitution of a rational being.
[tr. Hammond (2006)]

Revere your capacity for making decisions. Everything depends on this alone, so that your guiding part does not make a decision that is contrary either to Nature or to your makeup as a being endowed with reason.
[tr. Needleman/Piazza (2008)]

Venerate your faculty of judgement. For it depends entirely on this that there should never arise in your ruling centre any judgement that fails to accord with nature or with the constitution of a rational being.
[tr. Hard (2011 ed.)]

Revere your capacity for judgement. Everything depends on this to ensure that there no longer arises in your ruling centre a judgement which fails to follow nature and the constitution of a rational being.
[tr. Gill (2013)]

Doctor Who (1963) -- 14×05 “The Robots of Death,” Part 1 (1977-01-29) [w. Chris Boucher]

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

LEELA: I know, I know, there’s no such thing as magic.

THE DOCTOR: Exactly! To the rational mind, nothing is inexplicable, only unexplained.

Doctor Who (1963–1989) British science fiction television series, original run (BBC)
14×05 “The Robots of Death,” Part 1 (1977-01-29) [w. Chris Boucher]

(Source (Video))

~Other -- Ron Ward

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

One man’s perfectly rational and objective decision making may be another man’s utter insanity.

(Other Authors and Sources)
Ron Ward

Franklin, Benjamin -- Poor Richard (1744 ed.)

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

Hear Reason, or she’ll make you feel her.

Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790) American statesman, scientist, philosopher, aphorist
Poor Richard (1744 ed.)

See also Franklin (1753).

Edlund, Ben -- The Tick (cartoon), 02×09 “Ants in the Pants!” (1995-11-18) [w. Ralph Soll]

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

THE TICK: And isn’t sanity really just a one-trick pony anyway? I mean, all of you get is one trick, rational thinking. But when you’re good and crazy, oohoo-hoo-hoo-hoo, the sky’s the limit!

Ben Edlund (b. 1968) American cartoonist, writer, producer
The Tick (cartoon), 02×09 “Ants in the Pants!” (1995-11-18) [w. Ralph Soll]

Bacon, Francis -- Instauratio Magna [The Great Instauration], Part 2 “Novum Organum [The New Organon],” Book 1, Aphorism # 49 (1620) [tr. Silverthorne (2000)]

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

Man prefers to believe what he wants to be true. He rejects what is difficult because he is too impatient to make the investigation; he rejects sensible ideas, because they limit his hopes; he rejects the deeper truths of nature because of superstition; he rejects the light of experience, because he is arrogant and fastidious, believing that the mind should not be seen to be spending its time on mean, unstable things; and he rejects anything unorthodox because of common opinion. In short, emotion marks and stains the understanding in countless ways which are sometimes impossible to perceive.

[Quod enim mavult homo verum esse, id potius credit. Rejicit itaque difficilia, ob inquirendi impatientiam; sobria, quia coarctant spem; altiora naturae, propter superstitionem; lumen experientiae, propter arrogantiam et fastum, ne videatur mens versari in vilibus et fluxis; paradoxa, propter opinionem vulgi; denique innumeris modis, iisque interdum imperceptibilibus, affectus intellectum imbuit et inficit.]

Francis Bacon (1561–1626) English philosopher, scientist, author, statesman
Instauratio Magna [The Great Instauration], Part 2 “Novum Organum [The New Organon],” Book 1, Aphorism # 49 (1620) [tr. Silverthorne (2000)]

See Demosthenes.

(Source (Latin)). Other translations:

For man always believes more readily that which he prefers. He, therefore, rejects difficulties for want of patience in investigation; sobriety, because it limits his hope; the depths of nature, from superstition; the light of experiment, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should appear to be occupied with common and varying objects; paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the vulgar; in short, his feelings imbue and corrupt his understanding in innumerable and sometimes imperceptible ways.
[tr. Wood (1831)]

For what a man had rather were true he more readily believes. Therefore he rejects difficult things from impatience of research; sober things, because they narrow hope; the deeper things of nature, from superstition; the light of experience, from arrogance and pride, lest his mind should seem to be occupied with things mean and transitory; things not commonly believed, out of deference to the opinion of the vulgar. Numberless in short are the ways, and sometimes imperceptible, in which the affections colour and infect the understanding.
[tr. Spedding (1858)]

For man more readily believes what he wishes to be true. And so it rejects difficult things, from impatience of inquiry; -- sober things, because they narrow hope; -- the deeper thigns of Nature, from superstition; -- the light of experience, from arrogance and disdain, lest the mind should seem to be occupied with worthless and changing matters; -- paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the vulgar: -- in short, the affections enter and corrupt the intellect in innumerable ways, and these sometimes imperceptible.
[tr. Johnson (1859)]

For a man is more likely to believe something if he would like it to be true. Therefore he rejects

difficult things because he hasn’t the patience to research them,

sober and prudent things because they narrow hope,

the deeper things of nature, from superstition,

the light that experiments can cast, from arrogance and pride (not wanting people to think his mind was occupied with trivial things),

surprising truths, out of deference to the opinion of the vulgar.
In short, there are countless ways in which, sometimes imperceptibly, a person’s likings colour and infect his intellect.
[tr. Bennett (2017)]

Marcus Aurelius -- (Spurious)

Dave — Sun, 01 Feb 2004 16:00:00 +0000

The object in life is not to be on the side of the majority, but to escape finding oneself in the ranks of the insane.

Marcus Aurelius (AD 121–180) Roman emperor (161–180), Stoic philosopher
(Spurious)

The earliest identifiable citation appears as an epigraph to Leo Tolstoy, Bethink Yourselves!, ch. 8 (1904), in Recollections & Essays [tr. Aylmer Maud (1937)]. A cleaner copy can be found at the Nonresistance.org site. The classic (and presumably abridged) version of Bethink Yourselves!, as translated by Chertkov (1904), does not include any of the copious epigraphs, including this one.

Regardless, this phrase is not clearly found in Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, though other parts of the lengthy epigraph appear to be. If ordered by position, this would presumably fall somewhere from 10.6 to 10.8 (i.e., the preceding and following sentences are more clearly identifiable), but the language of this sentence does not seem to line up.