We easily know in others, the advantage of courage, of bodily strength, of experience, of disposition and of beautie, but we never yeelde the advantage of judgement to any body: And the reasons, which part from the simple naturall discourse in others, we thinke, that had we but looked that way, we had surely found them.
[tr. Florio (1603)]

We readily enough confess an advantage of courage, strength, experience, geod-nature, and beauty in others; but an advantage in judgment we yield to none, and the reasons that simply proceed from the natural sense of others, we think, if we had but turned our thoughts that way, we should ourselves have found them out.
[tr. Cotton (1686)]

We easily enough confess in others an advantage of courage, strength, experience, activity, and beauty, but an advantage in judgment we yield to none; and the reasons that proceed simply from the natural conclusions of others, we think, if we had but turned our thoughts that way, we should ourselves have found out as well as they.
[tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877)]

We easily recognise in others superiority of courage, of bodily strength, of experience, of activity, of beauty, of rank; but superiority of judgement we concede to no one; and the reasonings that proceed from simple natural intelligence in another, it seems to us that, had we but looked in that direction, we should have found them.
[tr. Ives (1925)]

We readily recognize in others a superiority in courage, physical strength, experience, agility, or beauty. But a superior judgement we concede to nobody. And we think that we could ourselves have discovered the reasons which occur naturally to others, if only we had looked in the same direction.
[tr. Cohen (1958)]

In others we readily acknowledge superior courage, physical strength, experience, agility and beauty: but superior judgement we concede to none. And such arguments in another as derive from pure inborn wit we think that we would have discovered too if only we had looked at things from the same angle.
[tr. Screech (1987)]

There is another kinde of glorie, which is an over-good opinion we conceive of our worth. It is an inconsiderate affection, wherewith wee cherish our selves, which presents-us unto our selves other then wee are. As an amorous passion addeth beauties, and lendeth graces to the subject it embraceth, and maketh such as are therewith possessed, with a troubled conceite, and distracted Judgement, to deeme what they love, and finde what they affect, to bee other, and seeme more perfect, then in trueth it is. [tr. Florio (1603)]

There is another sort of glory, which is the having too good an opinion of our own merit. It is an inconsiderate affection, with which we flatter ourselves, and that represents us to ourselves other than what we truly are: like the passion of love, that lends beauties and graces to the object of it; and makes those who are caught with it, by a depraved and corrupt judgment, consider the thing they love other and more perfect than it is.
[tr. Cotton (1686)]

There is another sort of glory, which is the having too good an opinion of our own worth. ’Tis an inconsiderate affection with which we flatter ourselves, and that represents us to ourselves other than we truly are: like the passion of love, that lends beauties and graces to the object, and makes those who are caught by it, with a depraved and corrupt judgment, consider the thing which they love other and more perfect than it is.
[tr. Cotton/Hazlitt (1877)]

There is another sort of glory, which is a too high opinion that we conceive of our worth. It is an ill-advised affection with which we flatter ourselves, which represents us to ourselves other than we are; as amourous passion lends beauties and charms to that which it embraces, and causes those who are possessed by it, their judgement being disturbed and diverted, to deem what they love different from what it is, and more perfect.
[tr. Ives (1925)]

There is another sort of glory, which is to have too good an opinion of our own worth. It is an unthinking affection with which we flatter ourselves, that represents us to ourselves other than we truly are: like the passion of love, that lends beauties and charms to the object it embraces, and makes those who are possessed by it, with a troubled and corrupt judgment, consider the thing they love other and more perfect than it is.
[tr. Zeitlin (1934)]

There is another kind of vainglory, which is an over-good opinion we form of our own worth. It is an unreasoning affection, by which we cherish ourselves, which represents us to ourselves as other than we are; as the passion of love lends beauties and graces to the object it embraces, and makes its victims, with muddled and unsettled judgment, think that what they love is other and more perfect than it is.
[tr. Frame (1943)]

There is another kind of glory, which is to have too good an opinion of our own worth. It is an unthinking affection with which we flatter ourselves, and which presents us to ourselves as other than we are; just as the passion of love lends beauties and charms to the object it embraces in such a way that the love's judgement is troubled and distracted, and he finds the lady he loves other and more perfect than she is.
[tr. Cohen (1958)]

There is another kind of "glory": the over-high opinion we conceive of our own worth. It is an imprudent affection by which we hold our own self dear, presenting ourself to ourself other than we are, just as passionate love lends grace and beauty to the person it embraces and leads to those who are enraptured by it being disturbed and confused in their judgement, so finding their Beloved other than she is, and more perfect.
[tr. Screech (1987)]

The others you know well enough -- fools who seem to hope that their fish-ponds may be saved, though the country go to rack and ruin.
[tr. Winstedt (1912)]

As for the rest of the Optimates, you know them. They are so stupid as to suppose that their own fishponds can be unharmed even though the constitution go to pot.
[tr. McKinlay (1926), # 13]

The others you know. They seem fools enough to expect to keep their fish-ponds after losing constitutional freedom.
[tr. Shackleton Bailey (1968)]