WIST Quotations

Hoover, Herbert -- The Challenge to Liberty, ch. 7 (1934)

Dave — Mon, 26 Jan 2026 02:42:22 +0000

More particularly does the weakening of the legislative arm lead to encroachments by the executive upon legislative and judicial functions, and inevitably that encroachment is upon individual liberty. If we examine the fate of wrecked republics over the world we shall find first a weakening of the legislative arm.

Herbert Hoover (1874-1964) American engineer, bureaucrat, US President (1929-33)
The Challenge to Liberty, ch. 7 (1934)
(Source)

Montesquieu -- Spirit of Laws [The Spirit of the Laws; De l’esprit des lois], Book 11, ch. 6 (1748) [tr. Cohler/Miller/Stone (1989)]

Dave — Mon, 15 Dec 2025 23:24:00 +0000

When legislative power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will execute them tyrannically.
Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power and from executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator. If it were joined to executive power, the judge could have the force of an oppressor.
All would be lost if the same man or the same body of principal men, either of nobles, or of the people, exercised these three powers: that of making the laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or the disputes of individuals.

[Lorsque, dans la même personne ou dans le même corps de magistrature, la puissance législative est réunie à la puissance exécutrice, il n’y a point de liberté ; parce qu’on peut craindre que le même monarque ou le même sénat ne fasse des loix tyranniques, pour les exécuter tyranniquement.
Il n’y a point encore de liberté, si la puissance de juger n’est pas séparée de la puissance législative, & de l’exécutrice. Si elle étoit jointe à la puissance législative, le pouvoir sur la vie & la liberté des citoyens seroit arbitraire; car le juge seroit législateur. Si elle étoit jointe à la puissance exécutrice, le juge pourroit avoir la force d’un oppresseur.
Tout seroit perdu, si le même homme, ou le même corps des principaux, ou des nobles, ou du peuple, exerçoient ces trois pouvoirs; celui de faire des loix, celui d’exécuter les résolutions publiques, & celui de juger les crimes ou les différends des particuliers.]

Charles-Lewis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755) French political philosopher
Spirit of Laws [The Spirit of the Laws; De l’esprit des lois], Book 11, ch. 6 (1748) [tr. Cohler/Miller/Stone (1989)]
(Source)

(Source (French)). Other translations:

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of every thing, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals.
[tr. Nugent (1750)]

There would be an end of everything, were the same man, or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals.
[ed. Guterman (1963)]

When in the same person or in the same body of magistracy the legislative authority is combined with the executive authority, there is no freedom, because one can fear lest the same monarch or the same senate make tyrannical laws in order to carry them out tyrannically.
Again there is no freedom if the authority to judge is not separated from the legislative and executive authorities. If it were combined with the legislative authority, power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator. If it were combined with the executive authority, the judge could have the strength of an oppressor.
All would be lost if the same man or the same body of principals, or of nobles, or of the people, exercised these three powers: that of making laws, that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging crimes or disputes between individuals.
[tr. Stewart (2018)]

Adams, John -- Letter (1776-04) to George Wythe, “Thoughts on Government”

Dave — Mon, 28 Jul 2025 22:34:55 +0000

The dignity and stability of government in all its branches, the morals of the people and every blessing of society, depends so much upon an upright and skillful administration of justice, that the judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both, as both should be checks upon that.

John Adams (1735–1826) American lawyer, Founding Father, statesman, US President (1797–1801)
Letter (1776-04) to George Wythe, “Thoughts on Government”
(Source)

This is taken from the printed edition of the influential essay, believed to be from the version Adams sent to George Wythe of Virginia.

Berry, Wendell -- Essay (2003-02-09), “A Citizen’s Response,” sec. 3, Citizenship Papers (2003)

Dave — Wed, 11 Apr 2012 13:03:42 +0000

It is impossible to think that constitutional government can be suspended in a time of danger, in deference to the greater “efficiency” of centralized power, and then easily or quickly restored. Efficiency may be a political virtue, but only if strictly limited. Our Constitution, by its separation of powers and its system of checks and balances, acts as a restraint upon efficiency by denying exclusive power to any branch of government. The logic of governmental efficiency, unchecked, runs straight on, not only to dictatorship, but also to torture, assassination, and other abominations.

Wendell Berry (b. 1934) American farmer, educator, poet, conservationist
Essay (2003-02-09), “A Citizen’s Response,” sec. 3, Citizenship Papers (2003)
(Source)

This passage did not appear in the original (abridged) full-page ad in the New York Times (2003-02-06) or the Orion Magazine (2003-03/04) publication of the essay.

Washington, George -- Essay (1796-09-18), “Farewell Address,” Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser, Philadelphia

Dave — Mon, 29 Oct 2007 13:34:23 +0000

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it which predominates in the human heart is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position.

George Washington (1732–1799) American military leader, Founding Father, US President (1789–1797)
Essay (1796-09-18), “Farewell Address,” Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser, Philadelphia
(Source)

The original draft of "The Address of Gen. Washington to the People of America on His Declining the Presidency of the United States" was by James Madison in June 1792. At the end of his second term, Washington, with the help of Alexander Hamilton, revised it for release and publication.