Patience iz a good thing for a man to hav, but when he haz got so mutch of it, that he kan fish all day long, without enny bate on hiz hook, -- Lazyness, is what's the matter ov him.
 
[Patience is a good thing for a man to have, but when he has got so much of it that he can fish all day long, without any bait on his hook -- laziness is what's the matter of him.]

For neither is it fitting that men be so carried away by political freedom as to make no provision for tranquility, nor to accept any tranquility which is inconsistent with freedom.
[tr. Hickie (1888)]

For just as it ill befits men to be so carried away by the dignity of a public career that they are indifferent in peace, so too it is unfitting for them to welcome a peace which is inconsistent with dignity.
[tr. Gardner (Loeb) (1958)]

La promptitude avec laquelle nous croyons le mal, sans l’avoir assez examiné, est un effet de la paresse et de l’orgueil.
 
[The readiness with which we believe evil, without having examined it sufficiently, is an effect of laziness and pride.]

A readiness to believe Ill, before we have duly Examined it, is the Effect of Laziness and Pride. Men are pleased to find Others to Blame and loth to give Themselves the Trouble of Enquiring, how far, and whether they are so, or not.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶268]

A readiness to believe ill without examination is the effect of pride and laziness. We are willing to find people guilty, and unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accusation.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶245; ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶250]

A willingness to believe ill, without examination, is the effect of pride and idleness. We are ready to suppose guilt, but unwilling to be at the trouble of examining into the accusation.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶214]

Readiness; to believe evil without sufficient examination is the result of pride and indolence. We wish to find people guilty, and we do not wish to give ourselves the trouble of examining into the crimes.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶278]

A quickness in believing evil without having sufficiently examined it, is the effect of pride and laziness. We wish to find the guilty, and we do not wish to trouble ourselves in examining the crime.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶267]

A ready belief of evil without examining the facts is a form of pride, or of indolence. We are anxious to ferret out criminals without taking the pains of examining their crimes.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶275]

Readiness to believe evil without adequate inquiry is the result of pride and indolence. We like detecting criminals, but we dislike the labor of investigating crimes.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶267]

The promptitude with which we will believe evil of others, without an adequate examination of the facts, is an effect of pride working with laziness. We wish to find the guilty men, and cannot be be bothered to study the crime.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶267]

Readiness to believe the worst without adequate examination comes from pride and laziness; we want to find culprits but cannot be bothered to investigate the crimes.
[tr. Tancock (1959), ¶267]

A readiness to believe evil without sufficient examination, it is an effect both of pride and of idleness. On the one hand, we desire to find other people guilty; and on the other, we do not wish to take the pains necessary to examine their crimes.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶267]

Nul ne mérite d’être loué de bonté, s’il n’a la force et la hardiesse d’être méchant: toute autre bonté n’est le plus souvent qu’une paresse ou une impuissance de la mauvaise volonté.
 
[... if he lacks the strength and boldness to be wicked ... impotence of ill will.]

... toute autre bonté n’est en effet qu’une privation du vice, ou plutôt la timidité du vice, et son endormissement.
 
[... all other goodness is in fact only a deprivation of vice, or rather the timidity of vice, and its slumber.]

No Man deserves to be commended for his Vertue, who hath it not in his Power to be Wicked; all other Goodness is Generally no better than Sloth, or an Impotence in the Will.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶238]

None deserve the name of good, who have not spirit enough, at least, to be bad: goodness being for the most part but indolence or impotence.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶197; ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶223]

None deserve the character of being good, who have not spirit enough to be bad.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶174]

No man deservers to be praised for his goodness unless he has strength of character to be wicked. All other goodness is generally nothing but indolence or impotence of will.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶248]

No one should be praised for his goodness if he has not strength enough to be wicked. All other goodness is but too often an idleness or powerlessness of will.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶237]

No one should be praised for benevolence if he is too weak to be wicked; most benevolence is but laziness or lack of willpower.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶244]

Goodness deserves credit only in those who are strong enough to do evil. In other cases it is usually laziness or want of character.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶237]

No man should be praised for his goodness if he lacks the strength to be bad: in such cases goodness is usually only the effect of indolence or impotence of will.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶237]

No one deserves praise for being good who lacks the power to do evil. Goodness, for the most part, is merely laziness or absence of will.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶237]

Nobody deserves to be praised for his goodness if he has not the power to be evil. All other goodness is most often but indolence or weakness of will.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶237]

On s’est trompé quand on a cru, après tant de grands exemples, que l’ambition et l’amour triomphent toujours des autres passions; c’est la paresse, toute languissante qu’elle est, qui en est le plus souvent la maîtresse: elle usurpe insensiblement sur tous les desseins et sur toutes les actions de la vie; enfin elle émousse et éteint toutes les passions et toutes les vertus.

'Tis a great mistake, to think that Love and Ambition triumph over all the other Passions: on the contrary, Sloth, notwithstanding all its languishment, hath many times a soveraignty over them; this insensibly usurps an Empire over all the designs, and over all the actions of life; this destroys and compleats all the Passions, and all the Virtues employ'd in the conduct of it.
[tr. Davies (1669), ¶96]

It is a Mighty Error, to suppose, that none but Violent and Strong Passions, such as Love, and Ambition, are able to Vanquish the rest. Even Idleness, as Feeble and Languishing as it is, sometimes reigns over Them; This Usurps the Throne, and sits Paramount over all the Designs and Actions of our Lives; and Insensibly wasts and destroys all our Passions, and all our Vertues.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶247]

It is a mistake to imagine, that the violent passions only, such as ambition and love, can triump over the rest. Idleness, languid as it is, often masters them all; she indeed influences all our designs and actions, and insensibly consumes and destroys both passions and virtues.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶232]

It is a mistake to imagine that the violent passions only, such as ambition and love, can triumph over the rest. Idleness, languid as it is, often governs them all; she influences all our designs and our actions; she insensibly consumes and destroys both the passions and the virtues.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶201]

It is deceiving ourselves to fancy that it is only the violent passions, such as ambition; and love, which can triumph over the others. Indolence, all languid as it is, nevertheless is frequently their master; it spreads its dominions over all the designs and all the actions of life, and thus destroys and insensibly consumes the passions and the virtues.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶277]

We deceive ourselves if we believe that there are violent passions like ambition and love that can triumph over others. Idleness, languishing as she is, does not often fail in being mistress; she usurps authority over all the plans and actions of life; imperceptibly consuming and destroying both passions and virtues.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶266]

It is a great mistake to believe that only violent passions, such as love and ambition, can make us masters of others. Laziness with all its indolence is often the most absolute sovereign; it encroaches upon all the plans and acts of our lives, and, little by little, saps and destroys our passions and our virtues.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶274]

It is a mistake to believe that only the violent passions, such as ambition or love, can dominate their fellows. Indolence, sluggish though she be, is often the queen of them all; she encroaches upon all the intentions and actions of our life; unperceived she crushes and engorges passion and virtue alike.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶266]

We make a mistake if we believe that only the violent passions like ambition and love can subdue the others. Laziness, for all her languor, is nevertheless often mistress: she permeates every aim and action in life and imperceptibly eats away and destroys passions and virtues alike.
[tr. Tancock (1959), ¶266]

We deceive ourselves if we believe that it is the violent passions alone, like ambition and love, that can triumph over the others. Idleness, as languishing as it is, rarely fails to be the master: it usurps all the plans and actions of our lives, destroying and insensibly consuming both passions and virtues.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶266]

While laziness and timidity alone have the merit of keeping us in our duty, our virtue often has all the honour.
 
[Pendant que la paresse et la timidité ont seules le mérite de nous tenir dans notre devoir, notre vertu en a souvent tout l’honneur.]

Shame, laziness and timidity alone retain the merit of holding us back from our duty, while our virtue has all the honor.
 
[La honte, la paresse et la timidité conservent toutes seules le mérite de nous retenir dans notre devoir, pendant que notre vertu en a tout l’honneur.]

It must be admitted that virtue, by which we boast of doing everything good that we do, would not always have the strength to hold us back from the rules of our duty, if laziness, timidity, or shame did not make us see the disadvantages of departing from them.
 
[Il faut avouer que la vertu, par qui nous nous vantons de faire tout ce que nous faisons de bien, n’aurait pas toujours la force de nous retenir dans les règles de notre devoir, si la paresse, la timidité, ou la honte ne nous faisoient voir les inconvénients qu’il y a d’en sortir.]

We are many times kept within the limits of our duty by Shame, Sloth, and Timorousness, while in the mean time our Virtue hath all the credit of it.
[tr. Davies (1669), ¶5]

Many People are kept within their Duty, because they have not the Courage, or will not be at the pains of being wicked; and in such cases oftentimes our Vertue runs away with all the Praise.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶170]

Idleness, timidity, and shame, often keep us within the bounds of duty; whilst virtue seems to run away with the honour.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶233; ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶163]

Idleness, timidity, or shame, often keeps us within the bounds of duty; whilst virtue seems to run away with the honour of it.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶202]

Indolence and timidity often keep us to our duty, while our virtue carries off all the credit of doing so.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶172]

Idleness and fear keeps us in the path of duty, but our virtue often gets the praise.
[tr. Bund / Friswell (1871), ¶169]

Although it is frequently laziness and timidity that keep us within the path of duty, it is virtue that reaps the credit.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶169]

Though indolence and timidity keep us to the path of duty, virtue often gets all the credit.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶169]

When laziness or cowardice keeps us to the path of duty, the credit is often given entirely to our honour.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶169]

When laziness and timidity yokes us to our duties, we often give virtue the credit for it.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶169]

While it is idleness and timidity that retain us in our duty, our virtue takes all the credit.
[tr. Whichello (2016), ¶169]

What is our labour to remember things, our labour to learn, and our ignorance without this labour? our agility got by toil, and our dullness if we neglect it?
[tr. Healey (1610)]

For why is it that we remember with difficulty, and without difficulty forget? learn with difficulty, and without difficulty remain ignorant? are diligent with difficulty, and without difficulty are indolent?
[tr. Dods (1871)]

How difficult it is to remember, how easy to forget; how hard to learn and how easy to be ignorant; how difficult to make an effort and how easy to be lazy.
[tr. Walsh/Honan (1954)]

How is it that what we learn with toil we forget with ease? that it is hard to learn, but easy to be in ignorance? That activity goes against the grain, while indolence is second nature?
[tr. Bettenson (1972)]

Why is it that we remember with such difficulty, but forget so easily? Why is it that we learn with such difficulty, yet so easily remain ignorant? Why is it that we are vigorous with such difficulty, yet so easily inert?
[tr. Dyson (1998)]

A yawner meaneth as much in Latin as a careles and Idle bodie. Let us then flye these condicions, that loathe (as I said) the eyes, the Eares, & the Stomacke. For in using these fashions, we doe not only shewe that we take litle pleasure in the company, but we geve them occasion withall, to judge amis of us : I meane yt we have a drowsye & hevie nowle, which makes us ill wellcom, to all companies we come unto.
[tr. Peterson (1576)]

Many times have I heard learned men say that in Latin the word for yawning is the same as that for lazy and careless. It is therefore advisable to avoid this habit which, as I have said, is unpleasant to the ear, the eyes, and the appetite, because by indulging in it we show that we are not pleased with our companions, and we also give a bad impression of ourselves, that is to say, that we have a drowsy and sleepy spirit which makes us little liked by those with whom we are dealing.
[tr. Einsenbichler/Bartlett (1986)]

• "Then again we criticize and consider wholly deserving of our odium those who are so seduced and corrupted by the blandishments of immediate pleasure that they fail to foresee in their blind passion the pain and harm to come. Equally blameworthy are those who abandon their duties through mental weakness -- that is, through the avoidance of effort and pain. It is quite simple and straightforward to distinguish such cases. In our free time, when our choice is unconstrained and there is nothing to prevent us doing what most pleases us, every pleasure is to be tasted, every pain shunned. But in certain circumstances it will often happen that either the call of duty or some sort of crisis dictates that pleasures are to be repudiated and inconveniences accepted. And so the wise person will uphold the following method of selecting pleasures and pains: pleasures are rejected when this results in other greater pleasures; pains are selected when this avoids worse pains." [On Moral Ends, tr. Woolf (2001)]


• "But in truth we do blame and deem most deserving of righteous hatred the men who, enervated and depraved by the fascination of momentary pleasures, do not foresee the pains and troubles which are sure to befall them, because they are blinded by desire, and in the same error are involved those who prove traitors to their duties through effeminacy of spirit, I mean because they shun exertions and trouble. Now it is easy and and simple to mark the difference between these cases. For at our seasons of ease, when we have untrammelled freedom of choice, and when nothing debars us from the power of following the course that pleases us best, then pleasure is wholly a matter for our selection and pain for our rejection. On certain occasions however either through the inevitable call of duty or through stress of circumstances, it will often come to pass that we must put pleasures from us and must make no protest against annoyance. So in such cases the principle of selection adopted by the wise man is that he should either by refusing cerftain pleasures attain to other and greater pleasures or by enduring pains should ward off pains still more severe." [tr. Reid (1883)]


• "But we do accuse those men, and think them entirely worthy of the greatest hatred, who, being made effeminate and corrupted by the allurements of present pleasure, are so blinded by passion that they do not foresee what pains and annoyances they will hereafter be subject to; and who are equally guilty with those who, through weakness of mind, that is to say, from eagerness to avoid labour and pain, desert their duty. And the distinction between these things is quick and easy. For at a time when we are free, when the option of choice is in our own power, and when there is nothing to prevent our being able to do whatsoever we choose, then every pleasure may be enjoyed, and every pain repelled. But on particular occasions it will often happen, owing whether to the obligations of duty or the necessities of business, that pleasures must be declined and annoyances must not be shirked. Therefore the wise man holds to this principle of choice in those matters, that he rejects some pleasures, so as, by the rejection to obtain others which are greater, and encounters some pains, so as by that means to escape others which are more formidable." [On the Chief Good and Evil, tr. Yongue (1853)]

In a thousand cases to one, the goal of reflection is set at the point where one gets tired of reflection.
(Source)

For the vast majority of men, the object of their reflection lies at the point where they become tired of reflecting.
(Source)

The firefly only shines when on the wing.
So is it with the mind -- when once we rest
We darken.

• "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."
• "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance."