In daily life we are more often liked for our defects than for our qualities.
[Nous plaisons plus souvent dans le commerce de la vie par nos défauts que par nos bonnes qualités.]
François VI, duc de La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680) French epigrammatist, memoirist, noble
Réflexions ou sentences et maximes morales [Reflections; or Sentences and Moral Maxims], ¶90 (1665-1678) [tr. Tancock (1959)]
(Source)
This first appeared in the 5th Ed. (1678). See bottom for parallel maxims.
(Source (French)). Alternate translations:We are often more agreeable through our faults, than through our good qualities.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶130; [ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶97]We often appear to be more agreeable in our faults than in our good qualities.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶114]In the intercourse of life we more often please by our faults than our good qualities.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶232]In the intercourse of life, we please more by our faults than by our good qualities.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶90]In everyday existence we please others more by our faults than by our merits.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶228]In the ordinary intercourse of life our faults give more pleasure than our virtues.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶90]In daily life our faults are frequently more pleasant than our good qualities.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶90]In the business of living our faults are often more attractive than our virtues.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶90]In our dealings with the world, we often please more by our faults than by our good qualities.
[tr. Whichello (2016), ¶90]
The attractiveness of vice or faults versus virtue in human nature was not an uncommon theme in La Rochefoucauld's maxims. Consider the following:There are some who are disgusting in their merits, and others who please with their faults.
[tr. Winchello (2016), ¶155]
[Il y a des gens dégoûtants avec du mérite, et d’autres qui plaisent avec des défauts.]
[1st ed.]There are people whose faults beseem them well, and others whose good qualities disgrace them.
[tr. Winchello (2016), ¶251]
[Il y a des personnes à qui les défauts siéent bien, et d’autres qui sont disgraciées avec leurs bonnes qualités.]
[1st ed.]There are people who enjoy the approval of the world whose sole merit consists in their having vices that are useful in the general affairs of life.
[tr. Winchello (2016), ¶273]
[Il y a des gens, qu’on approuve dans le monde, qui n’ont pour tout mérite que les vices qui servent au commerce de la vie.]
[1st ed.]There are certain faults which, when displayed in a flattering light, shine more brightly than virtue itself.
[tr. Winchello (2016), ¶354]
[Il y a de certains défauts qui, bien mis en œuvre, brillent plus que la vertu même.]
[4th ed.]There are bad qualities which make for great talents.
[tr. Winchello (2016), ¶468]
[Il y a de méchantes qualités qui font de grands talents.]
[5th ed.]
Quotations about:
defect
Note not all quotations have been tagged, so Search may find additional quotes on this topic.
As for Comedy, it is (as has been observed) an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is a species of the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others; the mask, for instance, that excites laughter, is something ugly and distorted without causing pain.
[ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μέν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης.]
Aristotle (384-322 BC) Greek philosopher
Poetics [Περὶ ποιητικῆς, De Poetica], ch. 5 / 1449a (c. 335 BC) [tr. Bywater (1909)]
(Source)
Original Greek. Alternate translations:Comedy is, as we have said, an imitation of characters of a lower type -- not, however, in the full sense of the word bad, the ludicrous being merely a subdivision of the ugly. It consists in some defect or ugliness which is not painful or destructive. To take an obvious example, the comic mask is ugly and distorted, but does not imply pain.
[tr. Butcher (1895)]Comedy is, as we stated, the portrayal of an inferior class, yet not in all their inferiority, being the ludicrous side of ugliness abstracted. Ludicrousness is the painless and non-destructive variety of the species ugliness of the genus failing; thus, e.g., a ludicrous countenance is ugly and distorted, but not painful.
[tr. Margoliouth (1911)]Comedy, as we have said, is a representation of inferior people, not indeed in the full sense of the word bad, but the laughable is a species of the base or ugly. It consists in some blunder or ugliness that does not cause pain or disaster, an obvious example being the comic mask which is ugly and distorted but not painful.
[tr. Fyfe (1932), sec. 3.4]Comedy is, as we said, a representation of people who are rather inferior -- not, however, with respect to every kind of vice, but the laughable is [only] a part of what is ugly. For the laughable is a sort of error and ugliness that is not painful and destructive, just as, evidently, a laughable mask is something ugly and distorted without pain.
[tr. Janko (1987), sec. 2.4]Comedy is, as we said, a mimesis of inferior persons not however that it has to do with the whole range of wickedness but with what is funny -- an aspect of ugliness. A funny thing, to be precise, is a clumsy mistake that is not painful or destructive: or to take an obvious example, the comic mask is ugly and grotesque but not repulsive or painful.
[tr. Whalley (1997)]Comedy, as we said, is an imitation of people of a lower sort, though not in respect to every vice; rather, what is ridiculous is part of what is ugly. For the ridiculous is a certain sort of missing the mark and a deformity that is painless and not destructive; an immediate example is the comic mask, which is something deformed and misshapen without causing pain.
[tr. Sachs (2006)]Comedy is, as we said, representation of people who are inferior but not wholly vicious: the ridiculous is one category of the embarrassing. What is ridiculous is some error embarrassment that is neither painful nor life-threatening; for example, a comic mask is ugly and distorted but does not cause pain.
[tr. Kenny (2013)]
You daub your face and think I shall not see
Your wrinkles. You deceive yourself, not me.
A small defect is nothing when revealed;
But greater seems the blemish ill concealed.[Lomento rugas uteri quod condere temptas,
Polla, tibi ventrem, non mihi labra linis.
Simpliciter pateat vitium fortasse pusillum:
Quod tegitur, magnum creditur esse malum.]Martial (AD c.39-c.103) Spanish Roman poet, satirist, epigrammatist [Marcus Valerius Martialis]
Epigrams [Epigrammata], Book 3, epigram 42 (3.42) (AD 87-88) [tr. Pott & Wright (1921)]
(Source)
"To Polla." (Source (Latin)). Alternate translations:Thou seek'st with lard to smooth thy wrinkled skin,
Bedaub'st thyself, and dost no lover win.
Simple decays men easily pass by,
But, hid, suspect some great deformity.
[tr. Killigrew (1695)]Leave off thy Paint, Perfumes, and youthful Dress,
And Nature's failing honesty confess;
Double we see those Faults which Art wou'd mend,
Plain downright Ugliness would less offend.
[tr. Sedley (1702), "To Cloe"]With lotion some wrinkles you labor to hide.
No policy, Polla, you show; but some pride.
A small fault perhaps might more safely appear:
Whatever is hid, draws construction severe.
[tr. Elphinston (1782), Book 6, Part 3, ep. 20]When you try to conceal your wrinkles, Polla, with paste made from beans, you deceive yourself, not me. Let a defect, which is possibly but small, appear undisguised. A fault concealed is presumed to be great.
[tr. Bohn's Classical (1859)]Seek not to hide a blemish that's but small.
The fault that's hidden ofttimes greater seems.
[ed. Harbottle (1897)]You try to conceal your wrinkles by the use of bean-meal, but you plaster your skin, Polla, not my lips. Let a blemish, which perhaps is small, simply show. The flaw which is hidden is deemed greater than it is.
[tr. Ker (1919)]Applying paste to smooth out the folds in your fat belly only means you are rouging your belly for yourself instead of your lips for me. It wouild be more natural to let that minor flaw stand. The hidden evil is considered worse.
[tr. Bovie (1970)]You try to hide your belly's wrinkles with bean meal, Polla, but you smear your stomach, not my lips. Better that the blemish, perhaps a trifling one, be frankly shown. Trouble concealed is believed to be greater than it is.
[tr. Shackleton Bailey (1993)]You use a cream your wrinkles to disguise,
But you're just pulling wool over our eyes.
The wrinkles, left alone, would draw no mention,
But, covered up, they draw closest attention.
[tr. Wills (2007)]Conceal a flaw, and the world will imagine the worst.
[Source]
Virtue, then, is a state involving rational choice, consisting in a mean relative to us and determined by reason — the reason, that is, by reference to which the practically wise person would determine it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess, the other of deficiency. It is a mean also in that some vices fall short of what is right in feelings and actions, and others exceed it, while virtue both attains and chooses the mean.
[ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ᾧ ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν. μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ᾽ ἔλλειψιν: καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ᾽ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι.]
Aristotle (384-322 BC) Greek philosopher
Nicomachean Ethics [Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια], Book 2, ch. 5 (2.6.15-16) / 1106b.35 (c. 325 BC) [tr. Crisp (2000)]
(Source)
(Source (Greek)). Alternate translations:Virtue then is “a state apt to exercise deliberate choice, being in the relative mean, determined by reason, and as the man of practical wisdom would determine.” It is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed, what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but Virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean.
[tr. Chase (1847)]Moral virtue, then, is a certain formed state, or habit of purpose, which conforms to the relative mean in action, and which is determined to that mean by reason, or as the prudent man would determine it. And it is the mean between two vices, one of which consists in excess, and the other in defect. So that vices sometimes fall short of what is right in our emotions and in our actions, and sometimes exceed it, while virtue fines the mean and chooses it.
[tr. Williams (1869)]Virtue then is a state of deliberate moral purpose consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason, or as a prudent man would determine it. It is a mean state firstly as lying between two vices, the vice of excess on the one hand, and the vice of deficiency on the other, and secondly because, whereas vices either fall short of or go beyond what is proper in the emotions and actions, virtue not only discovers but embraces the mean.
[tr. Welldon (1892)]Virtue, then, is a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of which lies in moderation or observance of the mean relatively to the persons concerned, as determined by reason, i.e. by the reason by which the prudent man would determine it. And it is a moderation, firstly, inasmuch as it comes in the middle or mean between two vices, one on the side of excess, the other on the side of defect; and, secondly, inasmuch as, while these vices fall short of or exceed the due measure in feeling and in action, it finds and chooses the mean, middling, or moderate amount.
[tr. Peters (1893)]Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate.
[tr. Ross (1908)]Virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it. And it is a mean state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect. Furthermore, it is a mean state in that whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right in feelings and in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean.
[tr. Rackham (1934)]Virtue, then, is a deliberately choosing state, which is in a medial condition in relation to us, one defined by a reason and the one by which a practically-wise person would define it. Also, it is a medial condition between two vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency. Further, it is also such a condition because some vices are deficient in relation to what the relevant feelings and actions should be and other are excessive, but virtue both finds the mean and chooses it.
[tr. Reeve (1948)][Ethical] virtue, then, is a habit, disposed toward action by deliberate choice, being at the mean relative to us, and defined by reason and as a prudent man would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one by excess and the other by deficiency; and while some of the vices exceed while the others are deficient in what is right in feelings and actions, virtue finds and chooses the mean.
[tr. Apostle (1975)]So virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it. It is a mean between two kinds of vice, one of excess and the other of deficiency; and also for this reason, that whereas these vices fall short of or exceed the right measure in both feelings and actions, virtue discovers the mean and chooses it.
[tr. Thomson/Tredennick (1976)]Virtue, therefore, is a characteristic marked by choice, residing in the mean relative to us, a characteristic defined by reason and as the prudent person would define it. Virtue is also a mean with respect to two vices, the one vice related to excess, the other to deficiency; and further, it is a mean because some vices fall short of and others exceed what should be the case in both passions and actions, whereas virtue discovers and chooses the middle term.
[tr. Bartlett/Collins (2011)]
Every good human quality is related to a bad one into which it threatens to pass over; and every bad quality is similarly related to a good one. The reason we so often misunderstand people is that when we first make their acquaintance we mistake their bad qualities for the related good ones, or vice versa: thus a prudent man will seem cowardly, a thrifty one avaricious; or a spendthrift will seem liberal, a boor frank and straightforward, an impudent fellow full of noble self-confidence, and so on.
[Jede menschliche Vollkommenheit ist einem Fehler verwandt, in welchen überzugehn sie droht; jedoch auch, umgekehrt, jeder Fehler, einer Vollkommenheit. Daher beruht der Irrthum, in welchen wir, hinsichtlich eines Menschen, gerathen, oft darauf, daß wir, im Anfang der Bekanntschaft, seine Fehler mit den ihnen verwandten Vollkommenheiten verwechseln, oder auch umgekehrt: da scheint uns dann der Vorsichtige feige, der Sparsame geizig; oder auch der Verschwender liberal, der Grobian gerade und aufrichtig, der Dummdreiste als mit edelem Selbstvertrauen auftretend, u. dgl. m]
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) German philosopher
Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2, ch. 8 “On Ethics [Zur Ethik],” § 113 (1851) [tr. Hollingdale (1970)]
(Source)
(Source (German)). Alternate translation:Every human perfection is allied to a defect into which it threatens to pass; but it is also true that every defect is allied to a perfection. Hence it is that if, as often happens, we make a mistake about a man, it is because at the beginning of our acquaintance with him we confound his defects with the kinds of perfection to which the are allied. The cautious man seems to us a coward; the economical man, a miser; the spendthrift seems liberal; the rude fellow, downright and sincere; the foolhardy person looks as if he were going to work with a noble self-confidence, and so on in many other case.
[tr. Saunders (1890), "On Human Nature"]Every human perfection is akin to a fault into which it threatens to pass; conversely, however, every fault is akin to a perfection. And so the error into which we fall in respect of a man is often due to the fact that, at the beginning of our acquaintance, we confuse his faults with the perfections akin to them, or vice versa. The cautious man then seems to us to be cowardly, the thrifty to be avaricious; or again, the spendthrift appears to be liberal, the lout straightforward and sincere, the foolhardy to be endowed with noble self-confidence, and so on.
[tr. Payne (1974)]Every human perfection is linked to an error which it threatens to turn into.
[Source]
Great virtues may draw attention from defects, they cannot sanctify them. A pebble surrounded by diamonds remains a common stone, and a diamond surrounded by pebbles is still a gem. No one should attempt to refute an argument by pronouncing the name of some man, unless he is willing to adopt all the ideas and beliefs of that man. It is better to give reasons and facts than names. An argument should not depend for its force upon the name of its author. Facts need no pedigree, logic has no heraldry, and the living should not awed by the mistakes of the dead.
Robert Green Ingersoll (1833-1899) American lawyer, agnostic, orator
“The Great Infidels” (1881)
(Source)
The most perfidious way of damaging a cause is deliberately to defend it with faulty arguments.
[Die perfideste Art, einer Sache zu schaden ist, sie absichtlich mit fehlerhaften Gründen vertheidigen.]
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) German philosopher and poet
The Gay Science [Die fröhliche Wissenschaft], Book 3, § 191 (1882) [tr. Nauckhoff (2001)]
(Source)
Also known as La Gaya Scienza, The Joyful Wisdom, or The Joyous Science.
(Source (German)). Alternate translations:The most perfidious manner of injuring a cause is to vindicate it intentionally with fallacious arguments.
[tr. Common (1911)]The most perfidious way of harming a cause consists of defending it deliberately with faulty arguments.
[tr. Kaufmann (1974)]One injures a cause in the most perfidious manner by deliberately defending it with erroneous reasons.
[tr. Hill (2018)]
