The senate has a standing rule never to discuss a matter on the same day when it was first introduced; all new business is deferred to the next meeting. They do this so that a man will not blurt out the first thought that occurs to him, and then devote all his energies to defending those foolish impulses, instead of considering impartially the public good. They know that some men would rather jeopardize the welfare of the state than admit to having been heedless and shortsighted — so perverse and preposterous is their sense of pride. They should have had enough foresight at the beginning to speak with prudence rather than haste.
[Quin id quoque moris habet senatus, ut nihil, quo die primum proponitur, eodem disputetur. sed in sequentem senatum differatur, ne quis ubi quod in buccam primum uenerit, temere effutierit, ea potius excogitet postea, quibus decreta tueatur sua, quam quae ex reipublicae usu sint. malitque salutis publicae, quam opinionis de se iacturam facere, peruerso quodam ac praepostero pudore, ne initio parum prospexisse uideatur. Cui prospiciendum initio fuit, ut consulto potius, quam cito loqueretur.]
Thomas More (1478-1535) English lawyer, social philosopher, statesman, humanist, Christian martyr
Utopia, Book 2, ch. 3 “Of Their Magistrates” (1518 ed.) [tr. Adams (1992 ed.)]
(Source)
(Source (Latin)). Other translations:Furthermore this custome also the counsel useth, to dispute or reason of no matter the same daye that it is firste proposed or put furthe, but to defferre it to the nexte syttinge of the counsell. Because that no man when he hath rashely there spoken that commeth to his tonges ende, shall then afterwarde rather studye for reasons wherwith to defende and mainteine his first folish sentence, than for the commoditie of the common welath: as one rather willing the harme or hindraunce of the weale publike then any losse or diminution of his owne existimation. And as one that would be ashamed (which is a verie folishe shame) to be counted anye thing at the first oversene in the matter. Who at the first ought to have spoken rather wyselye, then hastely, or rashlye.
[tr. Robynson (1551)]One Rule observed in their Council, is, never to debate a thing on the same day in which it is first proposed; for that is always referred to the next meeting, that so Men may not rashly, and in the heat of Discourse, engage themselves too soon, which may bias them so much, that instead of considering the Good of the Publick, they will rather study to maintain their own Notions; and by a perverse and preposterous sort of shame, hazard their Country, rather than endanger their own Reputation, or venture the being suspected to have wanted foresight in the Expedients that they proposed at first. and therefore to prevent this, they take care that they may rather be deliberate, than sudden in their motions.
[tr. Burnet (1684)]One rule observed in their council is, never to debate a, subject on the day on which it is proposed. It is ever referred to the next meeting, for fear of rashness and the heat of argument; which might lead them, instead of consulting the public good, to support their first opinions, and hazard their country rather than endanger their own reputation. To prevent this, they are made deliberate rather than expeditious.
[tr. Cayley (1808)]One rule observed in their council is, never to debate a thing on the same day in which it is first proposed; for that is always referred to the next meeting, that so men may not rashly and in the heat of discourse engage themselves too soon, which might bias them so much that, instead of consulting the good of the public, they might rather study to support their first opinions, and by a perverse and preposterous sort of shame hazard their country rather than endanger their own reputation, or venture the being suspected to have wanted foresight in the expedients that they at first proposed; and therefore, to prevent this, they take care that they may rather be deliberate than sudden in their motions.
[tr. Burnet/Morley (1901)]Furthermore this custom also the council useth, to dispute or reason of no matter the same day that it is first proposed or put forth, but to defer it to the next sitting of the council. Because that no man when he hath rashly there spoken that cometh first to his tongue’s end, shall then afterward rather study for reasons wherewith to defend and confirm his first foolish sentence, than for the commodity of the commonwealth: as one rather willing the harm or hindrance of the weal public than any loss or diminution of his own existimation. And as one that would not for shame (which is a very foolish shame) be counted anything overseen in the matter at the first. Who at the first ought to have spoken rather wisely, than hastily, or rashly.
[tr. Robinson (1909 ed)]Moreover the Senate has this custom, that nothing is decided on the same day on which it is first propounded, but that it is put off till the next meeting, and this lest anyone after hastily uttering the idea that first came into his mouth, should afterwards think more of how to defend his opinion than of supporting what is for the good of the commonwealth, and should prefer to jeopardise the public weal rather than risk his reputation through a wrongheaded and misplaced shame, fearing he may be thought to have shown too little foresight at the first, though he should have taken care to speak with wisdom rather than with haste in the first instance.
[tr. Richards (1923)]There's also a rule in the Council that no resolution can be debated on the day that it's first proposed. All discussion is posponed until the next well-attended meeting. Otherwise someone’s liable to say the first thing that comes into his head, -- and then start thinking up arguments to justify what he has said, instead of trying to decide what’s best for the community. That type of person is quite prepared to sacrifice the public to his own prestige, just because, absurd as it may sound, he’s ashamed to admit that his first idea might have been wrong -- when his first idea should have been to think before he spoke.
[tr. Turner (1965 ed.); (2003 ed.)]In addition, the senate has the custom of debating nothing on the same day on which it is first proposed but of putting it off till the next meeting. This is their rule lest anyone, after hastily blurting out the first thought that popped into his head, should afterwards give more thought to defending his opinion than to supporting what is for the good of the commonwealth, and should prefer to jeopardize the public welfare rather than to risk his reputation through a wrongheaded and misplaced shame, fearing he might be thought to have shown too little foresight at the first -- though he should have been enough foresighted at the first to speak with prudence rather than with haste!
[tr. Richards/Surtz (1964)]The Council of Tranibors also follows the practice of never debating a proposition on the day it’s first put forward, but of deferring it to the next meeting. Otherwise someone who has heedlessly blurted out the first idea to come into their mouth may later give more thought to defending their own position than to the country’s interests. Indeed, they may choose to sacrifice the public well-being to their own reputation out of a mistaken and misplaced sense of embarrassment at not having been clear-minded enough at the start — though being clear-minded at the start should have meant speaking thoughtfully rather than in haste.
[tr. Clarke (2017)]
Quotations about:
hastiness
Note not all quotations have been tagged, so Search may find additional quotes on this topic.
And lead weights to your feet may my words be,
that you move slowly, like a weary man,
to the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ of what you do not see.
For he is a fool, and low among his kind,
who answers yea or nay without reflection,
nor does it matter on which road he runs blind.
Opinions too soon formed often deflect
man’s thinking from the truth into gross error,
in which his pride then binds his intellect.
[E questo ti sia sempre piombo a’ piedi,
per farti mover lento com’ uom lasso
e al sì e al no che tu non vedi:
ché quelli è tra li stolti bene a basso,
che sanza distinzione afferma e nega
ne l’un così come ne l’altro passo;
perch’ elli ’ncontra che più volte piega
l’oppinïon corrente in falsa parte,
e poi l’affetto l’intelletto lega.]Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) Italian poet
The Divine Comedy [Divina Commedia], Book 3 “Paradiso,” Canto 13, l. 112ff (13.112-121) [Thomas Aquinas] (1320) [tr. Ciardi (1970)]
(Source)
(Source (Italian)). Alternate translations:Now learn, my Son,
With tardy foot to make your Judgment run,:
And Fancy's wild excursions to repel
Unhappy they, who, by her lure betray'd.
And, like 'lorn travellers, by meteors led.
Their affirmation or denial give
Unweigh'd, for Fancy leans to Falsehood's part,
And soon to Passion's rule betrays the heart.
And her embruted Slaves in bondage live.
[tr. Boyd (1802), st. 19-20]And let this
Henceforth be led unto thy feet, to make
Thee slow in motion, as a weary man,
Both to the ‘yea’ and to the ‘nay’ thou seest not.
For he among the fools is down full low,
Whose affirmation, or denial, is
Without distinction, in each case alike
Since it befalls, that in most instances
Current opinion leads to false: and then
Affection bends the judgment to her ply.
[tr. Cary (1814)]Let this henceforth be lead unto thy feet,
To make thee move slow, like a weary man,
Both to the Yea and Nay, as far 's you can:
For he among the fools is low enough,
Without distinction, who affirms, denies,
Where one and where the other question lies.
It happens, too, that oftentimes incline
Opinions current to the falser side,
And intellect is by affection tied.
[tr. Bannerman (1850)]And lead shall this be always to thy feet,
To make thee, like a weary man, move slowly
Both to the Yes and No thou seest not;
For very low among the fools is he
Who affirms without distinction, or denies,
As well in one as in the other case;
Because it happens that full often bends
Current opinion in the false direction,
And then the feelings bind the intellect.
[tr. Longfellow (1867)]And let this be always as lead to thy feet, to make thee move slow as a weary man both to the yes and to the no that thou seest not; for he is very low down among the fools who affirms or denies without distinction, in the one no less than in the other pass: since it occurs that oftentimes the current opinion swerves in a false direction, and afterwards the desire binds the understanding.
[tr. Butler (1885)]And let this to thy feet a dead weight be,
Like one fatigued to make thee journey slow
Towards the Yes, or No, thou dost not see.
For he amongst the fools is very low,
Who without thought affirmeth, or denies,
Whether to one or other step he go;
Because it happens that too often flies
Public opinion into error's part.
And then its influence the intellect ties.
[tr. Minchin (1885)]And let this be ever as lead to thy feet, to make thee move slow as a weary man, both to the YES and to the NO which thou seest not; for he is very low among the fools who affirms or denies without distinction, alike in the one and in the other case: because it happens, that oftentimes the current opinion bends in false direction, and then the inclination binds the understanding.
[tr. Norton (1892)]And let this ever be lead to thy feet, to make The thee move slow, like a weary man ; both to the yea and nay thou seest not;
for he is right low down amongst the fools who maketh affirmation or negation without distinction between case and case;
wherefore it chanceth many times swift-formed rash opinion leaneth the wrong way, and then con-ceit bindeth the intellect.
[tr. Wicksteed (1899)]And let this always be lead on thy feet to make thee slow, like a weary man, in moving either to the yea or the nay where thou dost not see clearly; for he ranks very low among the fools, in the one case as in the other, who affirms or denies without distinguishing, since it often happens that a hasty opinion inclines to the wrong side and then the feelings bind the intellect.
[tr. Sinclair (1939)]Ever let this, like lead, thy feed down-weigh
To make thee, where thou see'st not clear, move slow,
Like one who is weary, both to Yea and Nay.
For he among the foolish stands right low
Who affirms without distinction or denies
With whichsoever case he hast o do;
Since often it haps that rashness of surmise
Leadeth the judgment on false roads to start;
Then fond desire the understanding ties.
[tr. Binyon (1943)]And to thy feet be this hobble, wrought
Of lead, to make thee move at sluggard pace
Toward Yea and Nay where thou perceivest naught,
For low among the dunces is his place
Who hastes to accept or reject
With no distinction made 'twixt case and case;
Thence come rash judgements, mostly incorrect
And prejudiced, and stubborn all the more
That self-conceit shackles the intellect.
[tr. Sayers/Reynolds (1962)]And let this ever be as lead to your feet, to make you slow, like a weary man, in moving either to the yes or the no which you see not; for he is right low down among the fools, alike in the one asnd in the other case, who affirms or denies without distinguishing; because it happens that oftentimes hasty opinion inclines to the wrong side, and then fondness for it binds the intellect.
[tr. Singleton (1975)]And let this always make your feet like lead
So that you move like a man who is worn out
Towards a Yes or No you cannot actually see:
For a man is right down among the fools
In the case either of affirmation or denial,
If he proceeds without making distinctions;
Because it often happens that a quick opinion
Inclines int he wrong direction, and after that
The intellect is hampered by vanity.
[tr. Sisson (1981)]And let this weigh as lead to slow your steps,
to make you move as would a weary man
to yes or no when you do not see clearly:
whether he would affirm or would deny,
he who decides without distinguishing
must be among the most obtuse of men;
opinion -- hasty -- often can incline
to the wrong side, and then affection for
one’s own opinion binds, confines the mind.
[tr. Mandelbaum (1984)]Let this be leaden weight upon your feet
to make you move slow as a weary man
both to the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ you do not see,
for he ranks low, indeed, among the fools,
who rushes to affirm or to deny,
no matter which, without distinguishing.
Opinions formed in haste will oftentimes
lead in a wrong direction, and man’s pride
then intervenes to bind his intellect.
[tr. Musa (1984)]And let this ever be lead upon your feet, to make you move slowly, like a weary man, to both the yes and the no that you do not see:
for surely he is low among the fools who affirms and denies without distinction in either case,
for it often happens that a hasty opinion turns in a wrong direction, and then affect binds the intellect.
[tr. Durling (2011)]And let this always weight your feet down with lead, and make you go slowly, like a tired man, approaching the yes or no you do not grasp, since he is truly down there among the fools, who affirms or denies without distinguishing between cases, so that it often happens that a quick opinion leans to the wrong side, and then Pride entangles the intellect.
[tr. Kline (2002)]And let this be a lead weight on your feet,
so that you move as slow as if worn out
to any “yes” or “no” unclear to you.
For no fool is as low a fool as one
who taking either of these steps will fail
affirming to denying in distinction.
So often when our judgement rushes on
it happens that we veer in false directions
and then emotions bind tie intellect.
[tr. Kirkpatrick (2007)]And let this always be as lead upon your feet
to make you slow, just like a weary man, in moving,
whether to yes or no, unless you see both clearly.
For he ranks low among the fools
who, without making clear distinctions,
affirms or denies in one case or another,
since it often happens that a hasty opinion
inclines one to the erring side, and then
fondness for it fetters the working of the mind.
[tr. Hollander/Hollander (2007)]And let this forever be like lead on your feet,
Forcing you to go slowly, like someone weary,
Saying 'yes' or 'no' when neither is clear.
A man who either concurs or disagrees
Without some plain distinctions is a fallen fool,
And pretty low even at that level,
For hasty judgment often bends to what's wrong,
And having made a foolish choice the fool
Holds on, letting his foolery tie up his mind.
[tr. Raffel (2010)]
Have a Care of Passion. Anger begins with Folly, and ends with Repentance.
Thou knowest the errors of unripened age,
Weak are its counsels, headlong is its rage.[οἶσθ᾽ οἷαι νέου ἀνδρὸς ὑπερβασίαι τελέθουσι:
κραιπνότερος μὲν γάρ τε νόος, λεπτὴ δέ τε μῆτις.]Homer (fl. 7th-8th C. BC) Greek author
The Iliad [Ἰλιάς], Book 23, l. 589ff (23.589-590) [Antilochus to Menelaus] (c. 750 BC) [tr. Pope (1715-20)]
(Source (Greek)). Alternate translations:You, more in age
And more in excellence, know well, the outrays that engage
All young men’s actions; sharper wits, but duller wisdoms, still
From us flow than from you.
[tr. Chapman (1611), l. 505ff]Thou know’st how rash is youth, and how propense
To pass the bounds by decency prescribed,
Quick, but not wise.
[tr. Cowper (1791), l. 729ff]Thou knowest of what sort are the errors of a youth; for his mind is indeed more volatile, and his counsel weak.
[tr. Buckley (1860)]Thou know’st the o’er-eager vehemence of youth,
How quick in temper, and in judgement weak.
[tr. Derby (1864)]Thou dost know
The faults to which the young are ever prone;
The will is quick to act, the judgment weak.
[tr. Bryant (1870)]Thou knowest how a young man's transgressions come about, for his mind is hastier and his counsel shallow.
[tr. Leaf/Lang/Myers (1891)]You know how easily young men are betrayed into indiscretion; their tempers are more hasty and they have less judgement.
[tr. Butler (1898)]Thou knowest of what sort are the transgressions of a man that he is young, for hasty is he of purpose and but slender is his wit.
[tr. Murray (1924), l. 589-90]It is easy for a youngster to go wrong from hastiness and lack of thought.
[tr. Graves, The Anger of Achilles (1959)]You know a young man may go out of bounds:
his wits are nimble, but his judgment slight.
[tr. Fitzgerald (1974)]Well you know how the whims of youth break all the rules.
Our wits quicker than wind, our judgment just as flighty.
[tr. Fagles (1990)]
Life is made up of constant calls to action, and we seldom have time for more than hastily contrived answers; to follow one’s hunch is usually better than lying doggo, and rough generalizations that have worked well in the past easily easily take on the authority of universals. It does violence to our inner being to be obliged to give a hearing to opinions widely at variance with those we are accustomed to, and to come to a conclusion unweighted by desire.
Learned Hand (1872-1961) American jurist
“At Fourscore,” speech, Harvard Club of New York (1952-01-18)
(Source)
First published in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin (23 Feb 1952).
