I won’t say, the more intellect, the less capacity for loving; for that would do wrong to the understanding and reason; — but, on the other hand, that the brain often runs away with the heart’s best blood, which gives the world a few pages of wisdom or sentiment or poetry, instead of making one other heart happy, I have no question.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr. (1809-1894) American poet, essayist, scholar
Article (1858-04), “Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table,” Atlantic Monthly (Source)
Collected in Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table, ch. 6 (1858).
Illustrious deeds, of dazzling brilliance, are represented by politicians as the outcome of great aims, whereas they are usually the result of caprice or passion. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, though ascribed to their rival ambitions to dominate the world, may have been merely a result of jealousy.
[Ces grandes et éclatantes actions qui éblouissent les yeux sont représentées par les politiques comme les effets des grands desseins, au lieu que ce sont d’ordinaire les effets de l’humeur et des passions. Ainsi la guerre d’Auguste et d’Antoine, qu’on rapporte à l’ambition qu’ils avoient de se rendre maîtres du monde, n’étoit peut-être qu’un effet de jalousie.]
François VI, duc de La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680) French epigrammatist, memoirist, noble Réflexions ou sentences et maximes morales [Reflections; or Sentences and Moral Maxims], ¶7 (1665-1678) [tr. Stevens (1939)]
(Source)
A version of this appeared in the 1st edition (1665). Variants in the 1st edition include starting with Les, not Ces, and speaking of des grands intérêts, not desseins. The 1st edition also was much more assertive that it étoit un effet de jalousie (was a result of jealousy).(Source (French)). Alternate translations:
Great and heroick actions which dazle their eyes who consider them, are represented by Politicians, as if they were the effects of great Interests; whereas they are ordinarily the effects of humour and passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Marc Antony, which some imputed to the Ambition they had of aspiring to the Empire of the World, was an effect of their mutual jealousie.
[tr. Davies (1669), ¶104]
Those great and glorious Actions, that even dazle our Eyes with their Lustre, are represented by Politicians as the result of great Wisdom and excellent design; whereas in truth, they are commonly the effects of Passion and Humour. Thus the War between Augustus and Antony, which is usually thought to proceed from Greatness of Soul, and the Ambition each of them had to become Master of the World, was very probably no more than Envy and Emulation.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶8]
Great actions, the lustre of which dazzles us, are represented by politicians as the effects of deep design; whereas they are commonly the effects of caprice and passion. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, supposed to be owing to their ambition to give a master to the world, arose probably from jealousy.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶10; [ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶7]
Great actions, the lustre of which dazzles us, are by politicians represented as the effects of deep design, whereas they are commonly the effects of caprice and passion. Thus the war between Augustus and Anthony, supposed to be owing to the ambition of giving a master to the world, arose probably from jealousy.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶7]
Those great and brilliant actions which dazzle our eyes, are represented by politicians as the effects of great designs, instead of which they are commonly the effects of caprice and of the passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, which is attributed to the ambition they had of making themselves masters of the world, was, perhaps, nothing but a result of jealousy.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶8]
Great and striking actions which dazzle the eyes are represented by politicians as the effect of great designs, instead of which they are commonly caused by the temper and the passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Anthony, which is set down to the ambition they entertained of making themselves masters of the world, was probably but an effect of jealousy.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶7]
Historians would have us believe that the most dazzling deeds are the results of deep-laid plans; more often they are the reuslts of men's moods and passions. Thus the war that Augustus waged against Antony, caused, we are told, by their ambition to be masters of the world, was, perchance, but the outcome of jealousy.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶7]
Statesmen will often present those great and striking deeds with which they dazzle our eyes as the outcome of some grand design, whereas in fact they are usually the product of mood and of emotion. Thus the struggle between Augustus and Mark Anthony, portrayed as the result of their conflicting ambition each to become sole master of the world, was perhaps caused simply by mutual jealousy.
[tr. FitzGibbon (1957), ¶7]
Politicians explain great and resplendent deeds that dazzle the eye as born of high purpose, where for the most part they derive from whim or passion. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, which we ascribe to their equal ambition to rule the world, was no more, perhaps, than the result of jealousy.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶7]
Great and glorious events which dazzle the beholder are represented by politicians as the outcome of grand designs, whereas they are usually products of temperaments and passions. Thus the war between ‘Augustus and Antony, attributed to their passion to seize the mastery of the world, was probably nothing more than a result of jealousy.
[tr. Tancock (1959), ¶7]
Those great and brilliant actions that dazzle the eyes of men are represented by politicians as being the effects of great designs; but they are usually the results of temper and the passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Antony, which is supposed to be due to the ambition they both had of making themselves the masters of the world, was perhaps nothing more than an effect of jealousy.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶7]
You may choose your word like a connoisseur, And polish it up with art,
But the word that sways, and stirs, and stays, Is the word that comes from the heart.
Ella Wheeler Wilcox (1850-1919) American author, poet, temperance advocate, spiritualist
Poem (1906), “The Word,” st. 2, New Thought Pastels (Source)
There are seasons in human affairs, when qualities fit enough to conduct the common business of life, are feeble and useless; and when men must trust to emotion, for that safety which reason at such times can never give.
Sydney Smith (1771-1845) English clergyman, essayist, wit
Lecture (1804-1806), Moral Philosophy, No. 27 “On Habit, Part 2” Royal Institution, London
(Source)
Collected in Elementary Sketches of Moral Philosophy (1849).
Quoted by Theodore Roosevelt in his speech (1901-09-05), "Brotherhood and the Heroic Virtues," Grand Army of the Republic Veterans Reunion, Burlington, Vermont, collected in Roosevelt's The Strenuous Life (1902).
Thoughts are the shadows of our feelings — always darker, emptier, and simpler.
[Gedanken sind die Schatten unserer Empfindungen, — immer dunkler, leerer, einfacher, als diese.]
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) German philosopher and poet The Gay Science [Die fröhliche Wissenschaft], Book 3, § 179 (1882) [tr. Kaufmann (1974)]
(Source)
Also known as La Gaya Scienza, The Joyful Wisdom, or The Joyous Science.
Dore – Purgatorio, Canto 30 – The Arrival of Beatrice
Not one drop of blood
is left inside my veins that does not throb:
I recognize signs of the ancient flame.
[Men che dramma
di sangue m’è rimaso, che non tremi;
conosco i segni de l’antica fiamma.]
Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) Italian poet The Divine Comedy [Divina Commedia], Book 2 “Purgatorio,” Canto 30, l. 46ff (3.46-68) (1314) [tr. Musa (1981)]
(Source)
Dante, on seeing his long-lost love, Beatrice, repeating to Virgil the lines he had given Dido (Aeneid, 4.23) about how she felt the stirring of long-dead passion upon seeing Aeneas: "Agnosco veteris vestigia flammae" ("I know the traces of the ancient flame" [tr. Kline (2002)]).
(Source (Italian)). Alternate translations:
There is no dram of blood,
That doth not quiver in me. The old flame
Throws out clear tokens of reviving fire.
[tr. Cary (1814)]
There is not one drop
Of blood within me trembling but became:
I know the tokens of the ancient fame.
[tr. Bannerman (1850)]
Not a drachm
Of blood remains in me, that does not tremble;
I know the traces of the ancient flame.
[tr. Longfellow (1867)]
Less than a dram of blood remains to me which trembles not; I recognise the signs of the ancient flame.
[tr. Butler (1885)]
Rests within my frame
No dram of blood that does not tremble now;
I know the symptoms of the olden flame.
[tr. Minchin (1885)]
Less than a drachm of blood remains in me that doth not tremble; I recognize the signals of the ancient flame.
[tr. Norton (1892)]
Less than a drachm of blood
is left in me that trembleth not; I recognise
the tokens of the ancient flame.
[tr. Okey (1901)]
Not a drop of blood is left in me that does not tremble; I know the marks of the ancient flame.
[tr. Sinclair (1939)]
Scarce one drop remains
Of blood in me that trembles not: by this
I recognize the old flame within my veins.
[tr. Binyon (1943)]
There is scarce a dram
That does not hammer and throb in all my blood;
I know the embers of the ancient flame.
[tr. Sayers (1955)]
There is not within me
one drop of blood unstirred. I recognize
the tokens of the ancient flame.
[tr. Ciardi (1961)]
Less than a drop of blood
Is left in me, that is not trembling:
I know the signs of the ancient flame.
[tr. Sisson (1981)]
I am left with less
than one drop of blood that does not tremble:
I recognize the signs of the old flame.
[tr. Mandelbaum (1982)]
There is a barely a drop of blood in me that does not tremble: I know the tokens of the ancient flame.
[tr. Kline (2002)]
Less than a dram of blood is left me that is not trembling: I recognize the signs of the ancient flame!
[tr. Durling (2003)]
There is not one gram
of blood in me that does not tremble now.
I recognize the signs of ancient flame.
[tr. Kirkpatrick (2007)]
Not a single drop of blood
remains in me that does not tremble --
I know the signs of the ancient flame.[tr. Hollander/Hollander (2007)]
There isn't a single drop of whatever blood Still flows in my veins that isn't shaking from fear: I recognize the signs of that ancient fire.
[tr. Raffel (2010)]
It is the head that governs men. A kind heart is of no use in a chess game.
[On gouverne les hommes avec la tête. On ne joue pas aux échecs avec un bon cœur.]
Nicolas Chamfort (1741-1794) French writer, epigrammist (b. Nicolas-Sébastien Roch) Products of Perfected Civilization [Produits de la Civilisation Perfectionée], Part 1 “Maxims and Thoughts [Maximes et Pensées],” ch. 8, ¶ 522 (1795) [tr. Merwin (1969)]
(Source)
But the power of a man’s will is often powerless:
laughter and tears follow so close upon the passions that provoke them that the more sincere the man, the less they obey his will.
[Ma non può tutto la virtù che vuole;
ché riso e pianto son tanto seguaci a la passion di che ciascun si spicca, che men seguon voler ne’ più veraci.]
Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) Italian poet The Divine Comedy [Divina Commedia], Book 2 “Purgatorio,” Canto 21, l. 105ff (21.105-108) (1314) [tr. Musa (1981)]
(Source)
As each alternate Passion leaves a trace
On the still-varying muscles of the face, Fictitious oft; but, by the candid mind,
Conceal'd with pain, the dawn of dubious joy
My features wore.
[tr. Boyd (1802), st. 20]
But the power which wills, Bears not supreme control: laughter and tears
Follow so closely on the passion prompts them, They wait not for the motions of the will In natures most sincere.
[tr. Cary (1814)]
But will is not with power entire endued.
Laughter and tears pursue so much the trace The passion dictates that imprints them there, Nor follow will in natures most sincere.
[tr. Bannerman (1850)]
But yet the power that wills cannot do all things;
For tears and laughter are such pursuivants Unto the passion from which each springs forth, In the most truthful least the will they follow.
[tr. Longfellow (1867)]
But virtue cannot all it would; for laughter and tears follow so much the passion from which each springs, that they least obey will in the most truthful men.
[tr. Butler (1885)]
But all it wishes, will cannot forbear:
For smiles and tears to diverse passion wed, Upon that passion follow so instinct. In open natures, will is quite outsped.
[tr. Minchin (1885)]
But the power that wills cannot do everything; for smiles and tears are such followers on the emotion from which each springs, that in the most truthful they least follow the will.
[tr. Norton (1892)]
But the virtue which wills is not all powerful; for laughter and tears follow so closely the passion from which each springs, that they least obey the will in the most truthful.
[tr. Okey (1901)]
But the power to will cannot do all, for laughter and tears are so close followers on the passions from which they spring that they least follow the will in the most truthful.
[tr. Sinclair (1939)]
But all is not done by the will's decree;
For on the passion wherefrom each is bred Laughter and tears follow so close that least In the most truthful is the will obeyed.
[tr. Binyon (1943)]
But will with us is not made one with power;
Tears, laughter, tread so hard upon the heel Of their evoking passions, that in those Who're most sincere they least obey the will.
[tr. Sayers (1955)]
But man's will
is not supreme in every circumstance:
for tears and laughter come so close behind the passions they arise from, that they least obey the will of the most honest mind.
[tr. Ciardi (1961)]
But the power that wills cannot do everything; for smiles and tears are such close followers on the emotion from which each springs, that in the most truthful they least follow the will.
[tr. Singleton (1973)]
But virtue cannot do everything that it will;
For laughter and tears follow so closely on The passions from which they respectively proceed, That they follow the will least in the most truthful.
[tr. Sisson (1981)]
And yet the power of the will cannot do all,
for tears and smiles are both so faithful to the feelings that have prompted them that true feeling escapes the will that would subdue.
[tr. Mandelbaum (1982)]
But the power of the will cannot do everything, for laughter and weeping follow so closely on the passion from which each springs that they follow the will least in those who are most truthful.
[tr. Durling (2003)]
But the virtue that wills is not all-powerful, since laughter and tears follow the passion, from which they spring, so closely, that, in the most truthful, they obey the will least.
[tr. Kline (2002)]
But will power can't do everything it wills.
For tears and laughter follow on so close to those emotions from which each act springs that these least follow will in those most true.
[tr. Kirkpatrick (2007)]
But the power that wills cannot do all it wills,
for laughter and tears so closely follow feelings from which they spring, they least can be controlled in those who are most truthful.
[tr. Hollander/Hollander (2007)]
But will alone won't stop a human being,
Since laughter and tears are deeply interwoven, Following hard on emotions which spring them forth, And when they're truthful have little to do with the will.
[tr. Raffel (2010)]
Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will always hurt me. Bones mend and become actually stronger in the very place they were broken and where they have knitted up; mental wounds can grind and ooze for decades and be re-opened by the quietest whisper.
Stephen Fry (b. 1957) British actor, writer, comedian Moab Is My Washpot, “Joining In,” ch. 4 (1997)
(Source)
All passions exaggerate; it is only because they exaggerate that they are passions.
[Toutes les passions sont exagératrices, et elles ne sont des passions que parce qu’elles exagèrent.]
Nicolas Chamfort (1741-1794) French writer, epigrammist (b. Nicolas-Sébastien Roch) Products of Perfected Civilization [Produits de la Civilisation Perfectionée], Part 1 “Maxims and Thoughts [Maximes et Pensées],” ch. 1, ¶ 72 (1795) [tr. Mathers (1926)]
(Source)
I’ve always felt sorry for people afraid of feeling, of sentimentality, of emotion, who conceal what they feel and are unable to weep with their whole heart. Because those who do not know how to weep with their whole heart don’t know how to laugh either.
Golda Meir (1898-1978) Russian-American-Israeli politician, teacher; Prime Minister of Israel (1969-1974)
Interview by Oriana Fallaci, Ms. (1973-04)
(Source)
The Ms. article is a portion of an interview held in Jerusalem in November 1972. Answering to the charge that she is hard and inflexible, countering that she is very sensitive and feeling in most matters.
The full interview was reprinted in Fallaci, Interview with History, ch. 4 "Golda Meir" (1974) [tr. Shepley (1976)], but slightly rephrased:
I’ve always felt sorry for people who are afraid of their feelings, of their emotions, and who hide what they feel and can’t cry wholeheartedly. Because anyone who can’t cry wholeheartedly can’t laugh wholeheartedly either.
Was this re-edited (and in which instance?), or is it a matter of different translation? It's unclear in what language the interview was conducted, but the original edition of the book (Intervista con la Storia) was in Italian, Fallaci's native language, which gave the passage as follow:
A me ha sempre fatto pena la gente che ha paura dei sentimenti, delle emozioni, e nasconde quello che prova e non sa piangere con tutto il cuore. Perché chi non sa piangere con tutto il cuore non sa nemmeno ridere a gola spiegata.
I’m struck by how laughter connects you with people. It’s almost impossible to maintain any kind of distance or any sense of social hierarchy when you’re just howling with laughter. Laughter is a force for democracy.
John Cleese (b. 1939) English comedian, actor, screenwriter, producer The Human Face, 01×02 “Here’s Looking at You!” BBC TV (2001-03-14)
Although reason were intended by Providence to govern our passions; yet it seems that in two points of the greatest moment to the being and continuance of the world, God has intended our passions to prevail over reason. The first is, the propagation of our species; since no wise man ever married from the dictates of reason. The other is, the love of life; which, from the dictates of reason, every man would despise, and wish it at an end, or that it never had a beginning.
Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) English writer and churchman
“Thoughts on Religion” (1726)
(Source)
Determination in a single instance is an expression of courage; if it becomes characteristic, a mental habit. But here we are referring not to physical courage but to courage to accept responsibility, courage in the face of a moral danger. This has often been called courage d’esprit, because it is created by the intellect. That, however, does not make it an act of the intellect: it is an act of temperament. Intelligence alone is not courage; we often see that the most intelligent people are irresolute. Since in the rush of events a man is governed by feelings rather than by thought, the intellect needs to arouse the quality of courage, which then supports and sustains it in action.
Looked at in this way, the role of determination is to limit the agonies of doubt and the perils of hesitation when the motives for action are inadequate.
[Die Entschlossenheit ist ein Akt des Muthes in dem einzelnen Fall, und wenn sie zum Charakterzug wird, eine Gewohnheit der Seele. Aber hier ist nicht der Muth gegen körperliche Gefahr, sondern der gegen die Verantwortung, also gewissermassen gegen Seelengefahr gemeint. Man hat diesen oft courage d’esprit genannt, weil er aus dem Verstande entspringt, aber er ist darum kein Akt des Verstandes, sondern des Gemüths. Blosser Verstand ist noch kein Muth, denn wir sehen oft die gescheitesten Leute ohne Entschluss. Der Verstand muss also erst das Gefühl des Muthes erwecken, um von ihm gehalten und getragen zu werden, weil im Drange des Augenblicks Gefühle den Menschen stärker beherrschen als Gedanken.
Wir haben Uer der Entschlossenheit diejenige Stelle angewiesen, wo sie bei nicht hinrechenden Motiven die Qualen der Zweifel, die Gefahren des Zauderns heben soll.]
Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) Prussian soldier, historian, military theorist On War [Vom Kriege], Book 1, ch. 3 “On Military Genius [Der Kriegerische Genius],” (1.3) (1832) [tr. Howard & Paret (1976)]
(Source)
Resolution is an act of courage in single instances, and if it becomes a characteristic trait, it is a habit of the mind. But here we do not mean courage in face of bodily danger, but in face of responsibility, therefore to a certain extent against moral danger. This has been often called courage d'esprit, on the ground that it springs from the understanding; nevertheless, it is no act of the understanding on that account it is an act of feeling. Mere intelligence is still not courage, for we often see the cleverest people devoid of resolution. The mind must, therefore, first awaken the feeling of courage, and then be guided and supported by it, because in momentary emergencies the man is swayed more by his feelings than his thoughts.
We have assigned to resolution the office of removing the torments of doubt, and the dangers of delay, when there are no sufficient motives for guidance
[tr. Graham (1873)]
Resolution is an act of courage in a single instance, and, if it becomes a characteristic trait, a habit of the mind. But here we do not mean courage in facing physical danger, butr courage in facing responsiblity, therefore to a certain extent in facing moral danger. This has often been called courage d'esprit, on the ground that it springs from the intellect, but it is not on that account for an act of the intellect but one of feeling. Mere intellect is not quite courage, for we often see the cleverest people devoid of resolution. The intellect must first, therefore, awaken the feeling of courage to be maintained and supported by it, because in emergencies of the moment man is governed more by his feelings than by his thoughts.
We have assigned to resolution the office of removing the torments of doubt and the dangers of hesitation when there are no sufficient motives for guidance.
[tr. Jolles (1943)]
And the host laughed and wept, and in the midst of their merriment and tears the clear voice of the minstrel rose like silver and gold, and all men were hushed. And he sang to them, now in the Elven-tongue, now in the speech of the West, until their hearts, wounded with sweet words, overflowed, and their joy was like swords, and they passed in thought out to regions where pain and delight flow together and tears are the very wine of blessedness.
J.R.R. Tolkien (1892-1973) English writer, fabulist, philologist, academic [John Ronald Reuel Tolkien] The Lord of the Rings, Vol. 3: The Return of the King, Book 6, ch. 4 “The Field of Cormallen” (1955)
(Source)
Try to remember this: what you project
Is what you will perceive; what you perceive
With any passion, be it love or terror,
May take on whims and powers of its own.
Richard Wilbur (1921-2017) American poet, literary translator
“Walking to Sleep” (1967)
(Source)
There is a road from the eye to the heart that does not go through the intellect. Men do not quarrel about the meaning of sunsets; they never dispute that the hawthorn says the best and wittiest thing about the spring.
Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874-1936) English journalist and writer
“A Defence of Heraldry,” The Defendant (1901)
(Source)
The Intellect engages us in the pursuit of Truth. The Passions impel us to Action.
[Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur, appetitus impellit ad agendum.]
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) Roman orator, statesman, philosopher De Officiis [On Duties; On Moral Duty; The Offices], Book 1, ch. 35 (1.35) / sec. 132 (44 BC) [Barnes (1814)]
The truth is sometimes seen, but rarely heard: on the fewest of occasions does it arrive in its elemental purity, especially if it has travelled far, for then it is always soiled by what has happened on the road: for feeling tinges with her colors all that she touches, sometimes happily, sometimes unhappily: she always leaves some kind of mark.
[La verdad ordinariamente se ve, extravagantemente se oye; raras veces llega en su elemento puro, y menos cuando viene de lejos; siempre trae algo de mixta, de los afectos por donde pasa; tiñe de sus colores la pasión cuanto toca, ya odiosa, ya favorable. Tira siempre a impresionar.]
Baltasar Gracián y Morales (1601-1658) Spanish Jesuit priest, writer, philosopher The Art of Worldly Wisdom [Oráculo Manual y Arte de Prudencia], § 80 (1647) [tr. Fischer (1937)]
(Source)
Commonly truth is seen, but it is extraordinary to hear it. It seldom comes pure to our ears, especially when it come from a far. For then it takes some tincture of the passions that it meets by the way. It pleases or displeases, according to the colours that passion or interest give it, which aim always at prepossessing.
[Flesher ed. (1685)]
The truth is generally seen, rarely heard; seldom she comes in elemental purity, especially from afar; there is always some admixture of the moods of those through whom she has passed. The passions tinge her with their colors wherever they touch her, sometimes favorably, sometimes the reverse.
[tr. Jacobs (1892)]
Truth is more often seen than heard. Seldom does it reach us unalloyed, even less so when it comes from afar. It is always blended with the emotions it has passed through. Emotion taints everything it touches, making it odious or favorable. It tries always to impress us one way or another.
[tr. Maurer (1992)]
Wretchedness is caused by emotional disturbances, and the happy life by calmness, and disturbance takes two forms — anxiety and fear in expecting evils, ecstatic joy and lustful thoughts in misunderstanding good things, all of which are at variance with with wisdom and reason. Accordingly, if a man possesses self-control and consistency, and is without fear, distress, excitability, or lust, is he not happy? But this is the nature of the wise man always, so he is happy always.
[Atque cum perturbationes animi miseriam, sedationes autem vitam efficiant beatam, duplexque ratio perturbationis sit, quod aegritudo et metus in malis opinatis, in bonorum autem errore laetitia gestiens libidoque versetur, quae omnia cum consilio et ratione pugnent, his tu tam gravibus concitationibus tamque ipsis inter se dissentientibus atque distractis quem vacuum solutum liberum videris, hunc dubitabis beatum dicere? atqui sapiens semper ita adfectus est; semper igitur sapiens beatus est.]
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC) Roman orator, statesman, philosopher Tusculan Disputations [Tusculanae Disputationes], Book 5, ch. 15 (5.15) / sec. 43 (45 BC) [tr. Davie (2017)]
(Source)
Now since the Disturbances of the Soul render the Life miserable, but the composure of them happy; and there is a double rank of Passions; in that, Discontent and Fear are terminated on Evils conceiv'd; but excessive Mirth and Lust arise from the misapprehension of good things, since all are inconsistent with Advice and Reason, if you shall see any one clear, emancipated, free from these emotions so vehement, so discordant one with the other, and so distracting, can you make any question of calling him Happy? But the Wise man is always so dispos'd, therefore the Wise man is always Happy.
[tr. Wase (1643)]
But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and tranquility renders it happy: and as these perturbations are of two sorts; grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, immoderate joy and lust, from the mistake of what is good; and all these are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which are so much at variance with one another, can you hesitate to pronounce such a one a happy man? Now the wise man is always in such a disposition: therefore the wise man is always happy.
[tr. Main (1824)]
But when the perturbations render life unhappy, while their repose makes it happy -- and since the mode of perturbation is twofold -- sorrow and fear having birth from reputed evils -- the delirium of joy and desire, from the delusion of good, -- when all these are repugnant to counsel and reason, and you see a man void, exempt, free from these excitements, so vehement, so discordant, so distracted by mutual conflicts, -- will you hesitate to pronounce him happy? But the wise man is always thus, and therefore always happy.
[tr. Otis (1839)]
But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as immoderate joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as all these feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which are so much at variance with one another can you hesitate to pronounce such an one a happy man? Now the wise man is always in such a disposition, therefore the wise man is always happy.
[tr. Yonge (1853)]
Now since perturbations of mind create misery, while quietness of mind makes life happy, and since there are two kinds of perturbations, grief and fear having their scope in imagined evils, inordinate joy and desire in mistaken notions of the good, all being repugnant to wise counsel and reason, will you hesitate to call him happy whom you see relieved, released, free from these excitements so oppressive, and so at variance and divided among themselves? Indeed one thus disposed is always happy. Therefore the wise man is always happy.
[tr. Peabody (1886)]
Emotion doesn’t travel in a straight line. Like water, our feelings trickle down through cracks and crevices, seeking out the little pockets of neediness and neglect, the hairline fractures in our character usually hidden from public view.
Sue Grafton (1940-2017) American novelist, screenwriter “I” is for Innocent (1992)
For one’s emotional state is always determined by the oddest and most accidental things, and it is precisely the most superficial factors that often fortify or diminish our courage.
Stefan Zweig (1881-1942) Austrian novelist, playwright, journalist, biographer Beware of Pity (1939)
(Source)
But feeling is so different from knowing. My common sense tells me all you can say, but there are times when common sense has no power over me. Common nonsense takes possession of my soul.
Lucy Maud Montgomery (1874-1942) Canadian author Anne of the Island, ch. 2 (1915)
(Source)
I must learn to love the fool in me, the one who feels too much, talks too much, takes too many chances, wins sometimes and loses often, lacks self-control, loves and hates, hurts and gets hurt, promises and breaks promises, laughs and cries. It alone protects me against that utterly self-controlled, masterful tyrant whom I also harbor and who would rob me of human aliveness, humility, and dignity, but for my fool.
Theodore Isaac Rubin (1923-2019) American psychiatrist and author Love Me, Love My Fool (1976)
Newton and Descartes started to try and prove that God existed in the same way as they would try and prove something in the laboratory or with their mathematics … And when you try and mix science and religion you get bad science and bad religion. The two are doing two different things. … Science can give you a diagnosis of cancer. It can even cure your disease, but it cannot touch your grief and disappointment, nor can it help you to die well.
Karen Armstrong (b. 1944) British author, comparative religion scholar
“The Reason of Faith,” Interview with Michael Brunton, Ode (Sep-Oct 2009)
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A woman should never take a lover without the consent of her heart; nor a husband without the concurrence of her reason.
Anne "Ninon" de l'Enclos (1620-1705) French author, courtesan, patron of the arts [Ninon de Lenclos, Ninon de Lanclos] The Memoirs of Ninon de L’Enclos, Vol. 1, “Life and Character” (1761)
(Source)
Political campaigns tend to be exercises in progressive degeneration. The steady increase, week after week, in excitement and strain and weariness produces an oversimplification of issues, an over dramatization of alternatives, a growing susceptibility to extreme and catastrophic statements. Candidates find themselves shouting things in the fall that they would never dream of whispering in the summer.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (1917-2007) American historian, author, social critic The Age of Roosevelt, ch. 33, sec. 8 (1960)
(Source)
We have all heard enough to fill a book about Dr. Johnson’s incivilities. I wish they would compile another book consisting of Dr. Johnson’s apologies. There is no better test of a man’s ultimate chivalry and integrity than how he behaves when he is wrong; and Johnson behaved very well. He understood (what so many faultlessly polite people do not understand) that a stiff apology is a second insult. He understood that the injured party does not want to be compensated because he has been wronged; he wants to be healed because he has been hurt.
Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874-1936) English journalist and writer
“The Real Dr. Johnson,” The Common Man (1950)
If the old fairy-tale ending ‘They lived happily ever after’ is taken to mean ‘They felt for the next fifty years exactly as they felt the day before they were married’’, then it says what probably never was nor ever would be true, and would be highly undesirable if it were. Who could bear to live in that excitement for even five years? What would become of your work, your appetite, your sleep, your friendships?
C. S. Lewis (1898-1963) English writer, literary scholar, lay theologian [Clive Staples Lewis]
Mere Christianity, “Christian Marriage” (1952)
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What we call ‘being in love’ is a glorious state, and, in several ways, good for us. It helps to make us generous and courageous, it opens our eyes not only to the beauty of the beloved but to all beauty, and it sub-ordinates (especially at first) our merely animal sexuality; in that sense, love is the great conqueror of lust. No one in his senses would deny that being in love is far better than either common sensuality or cold self-centredness.
But, as I said before, ‘the most dangerous thing you can do is to take any one impulse of our own nature and set it up as the thing you ought to follow at all costs’. Being in love is a good thing, but it is not the best thing. There are many things below it, but there are also things above it. You cannot make it the basis of a whole life. It is a noble feeling, but it is still a feeling. Now no feeling can be relied on to last in its full intensity, or even to last at all. Knowledge can last, principles can last, habits can last; but feelings come and go. And in fact, whatever people say, the state called ‘being in love’ usually does not last.
C. S. Lewis (1898-1963) English writer, literary scholar, lay theologian [Clive Staples Lewis]
Mere Christianity, Book 3, ch. 6 “Christian Marriage” (1952)
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Our Passions, Ambition, Avarice, Love, Resentment &c possess so much metaphysical Subtilty and so much overpowering Eloquence, that they insinuate themselves into the Understanding and the Conscience and convert both to their Party. And I may be deceived as much as any of them, when I Say, that Power must never be trusted without a Check.
John Adams (1735-1826) American lawyer, Founding Father, statesman, US President (1797-1801)
Letter to Thomas Jefferson (2 Feb 1816)
(Source)
Reason! reason! … As much as you like; but beware of thinking that it answers to everything, suffices for everything, satisfies everything. This mother loses her child: will reason comfort her? Does cool reason counsel the inspired poet, the heroic warrior, the lover? Reason guides but a small part of man, and that the least interesting. The rest obeys feeling, true or false, and passion, good or bad.
Joseph Roux (1834-1886) French Catholic priest Meditations of a Parish Priest: Thoughts, ch. 4, #95 (1886)
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I am an atheist, out and out. It took me a long time to say it. I’ve been an atheist for years and years, but somehow I felt it was intellectually unrespectable to say one was an atheist, because it assumed knowledge that one didn’t have. Somehow it was better to say one was a humanist or an agnostic. I finally decided that I’m a creature of emotion as well as of reason. Emotionally I am an atheist. I don’t have the evidence to prove that God doesn’t exist, but I so strongly suspect he doesn’t that I don’t want to waste my time.
Emotion, whether of ridicule, anger, or sorrow, — whether raised at a puppet show, a funeral, or a battle, — is your grandest of levelers. The man who would be always superior should be always apathetic.
Edward George Bulwer-Lytton (1803-1873) English novelist and politician Devereux, Book 2, ch. 1 (1829)
Reasoning will never make a Man correct an ill Opinion, which by Reasoning he never acquired.
Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) English writer and churchman
“Letter to a Young Clergyman” (9 Jan 1720)
(Source)
Earliest version of this general sentiment, which has been attributed to (or at times borrowed by) figures such as Sydney Smith, Fisher Ames, and Lyman Beecher.
In short, we can judge by nothing but Appearances, and they are very apt to deceive us. Some put on a gay chearful Outside, and appear to the World perfectly at Ease, tho’ even then, some inward Sting, some secret Pain imbitters all their Joys, and makes the Balance even: Others appear continually dejected and full of Sorrow; but even Grief itself is sometimes pleasant, and Tears are not always without their Sweetness: Besides, Some take a Satisfaction in being thought unhappy, (as others take a Pride in being thought humble,) these will paint their Misfortunes to others in the strongest Colours, and leave no Means unus’d to make you think them thoroughly miserable; so great a Pleasure it is to them to be pitied; Others retain the Form and outside Shew of Sorrow, long after the Thing itself, with its Cause, is remov’d from the Mind; it is a Habit they have acquir’d and cannot leave.
Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790) American statesman, scientist, philosopher, aphorist
“A Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity” (1725)
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The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason.
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) English mathematician and philosopher The Problems of Philosophy, ch. 15 “The Value of Philosophy” (1912)
Poetry demands a man with special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him; the former can easily assume the required mood, and the latter may be actually beside himself with emotion.
Original Greek. Fyfe (below) notes μανικός to mean "genius to madness near allied," and adds "Plato held that the only excuse for a poet was that he couldn't help it." A possible source of Seneca's "touch of madness" attribution to Aristotle. Alternate translations:
Poetry implies either a happy gift of nature or a strain of madness. In the one case a man can take the mould of any character; in the other, he is lifted out of his proper self.
[tr. Butcher (1895)]
Poetry is the work for the finely constituted or the hysterical; for the hysterical are impressionable, whereas the finely constituted are liable to outbursts.
[tr. Margoliouth (1911); whiles this seems backward, Margoliouth further explains in his footnote.]
Poetry needs either a sympathetic nature or a madman, the former being impressionable and the latter inspired.
[tr. Fyfe (1932)]
Hence the poetic art belongs either to a naturally gifted person or an insane one, since those of the former sort are easily adaptable and the latter are out of their senses.
[tr. Sachs (2006)]
In order to write tragic poetry, you must be either a genius who can adapt himself to anything, or a madman who lets himself get carried away.
[tr. Kenny (2013)]
All this was inspired by the principle — which is quite true in itself — that in the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional nature than consciously or voluntarily; and thus in the primitive simplicity of their minds they more readily fall victims to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves often tell small lies in little matters but would be ashamed to resort to large-scale falsehoods.
Adolph Hitler (1889-1945) German leader Mein Kampf [My Struggle], Vol. 1, ch. 10 (1925)
The more important the emotion is, the fewer words required to express it:
Will you go out with me?
I think I like you.
I care for you.
I love you.
Marry me.
Goodbye.
J. Michael (Joe) Straczynski (b. 1954) American screenwriter, producer, author [a/k/a "JMS"]
rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.moderated, “A Quote by JMS” (31 Jan 2008)
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Straczynski is quoting something he'd previously written on the death of Andreas Katsulas (Feb 2006). A variant of the quote can be found as a sig line at least as far back as Sep 2007:
I had this theory that the more important and intimate the emotion, the fewer words are required to express it.
First it's in dating: "Will you go out with me?" Six words.
"Honey, I care for you." Five words.
"You matter to me." Four words.
"I love you." Three words.
"Marry me." Two words.
But what's left? What's the one most important and intimate word you can ever say to somebody?
A man who does not possess himself enough to hear disagreeable things without visible marks of anger and change of countenance, or agreeable ones without sudden bursts of joy and expansion of countenance, is at the mercy of every artful knave or pert coxcomb.
Lord Chesterfield (1694-1773) English statesman, wit [Philip Dormer Stanhope]
Letter to his son, #183 (22 May 1749)
A strong mind is one which does not lose its balance even under the most violent excitement.
[Ein starkes Gemüt ist ein solches, welches auch bei den heftigsten Regungen nicht aus dem Gleichgewicht kommt.]
Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) Prussian soldier, historian, military theorist On War [Vom Kriege], Book 1, ch. 3 “On Military Genius [Der Kriegerische Genius],” (1.3) (1832) [tr. Graham (1873)]
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If all hearts were open and all desires known — as they would be if people showed their souls — how many gapings, sighings, clenched fists, knotted brows, broad grins, and red eyes should we see in the market-place!
Thomas Hardy (1840-1928) English novelist, poet
Diary (1908-08-18)
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Harriet; I have nothing much in the way of religion, or even morality, but I do recognize a code of behavior of sorts. I do know the worst sin — perhaps the only sin — passion can commit, is to be joyless. It must lie down with laughter or make its bed in hell — there is no middle way.
We are constantly railing against the passions; we ascribe to them all of man’s afflictions, and we forget that they are also the source of all his pleasures.
Alt. trans.: "One declaims endlessly against the passions; one imputes all of man's suffering to them. One forgets that they are also the source of all his pleasures."
Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action.
Hence the young man is not a fit student of Moral Philosophy, for he has no experience in the actions of life, while all that is said presupposes and is concerned with these: and in the next place, since he is apt to follow the impulses of his passions, he will hear as though he heard not, and to no profit, the end in view being practice and not mere knowledge.
[tr. Chase (1847), ch. 1]
And hence it is that a young man is not a fit student of the art political; for he has had no experience in matters of daily life, with which matters our premises are concerned, and of which our conclusions treat. And since, moreover, he is prone to follow his desires, he will listen without purpose, and so without benefit. For the true object of ethical study is not merely the knowledge of what is good, but the application of that knowledge.
[tr. Williams (1869), sec. 3]
Hence the young are not proper students of political science, as they have no experience of the actions of life which form the premises and subjects of the reasonings. Also it may be added that from their tendency to follow their emotions they will not study the subject to any purpose or profit, as its end is not knowledge but action.
[tr. Welldon (1892), ch. 1]
And hence a young man is not qualified to be a student of Politics; for he lacks experience of the affairs of life, which form the data and the subject-matter of Politics. Further, since he is apt to be swayed by his feelings, he will derive no benefit from a study whose aim is not speculative but practical.
[tr. Peters (1893)]
Hence the young are not fit to be students of Political Science. For they have no experience of life and conduct, and it is these that supply the premisses and subject matter of this branch of philosophy. And moreover they are led by their feelings; so that they will study the subject to no purpose or advantage, since the end of this science is not knowledge but action.
[tr. Rackham (1934)]
That is why a young person is not a suitable audience for politics. For he has no experience with the actions of life, and the accounts are in accord with these and concerned with these. Further, since he tends to follow his feelings, it will be pointless and not beneficial to him to be in the audience, since the end is not knowledge but action.
[tr. Reeve (1948)]
In view of this, a young man is not a proper student of [lectures on] politics; for he is inexperienced in actions concerning human life, and discussions proceed from [premisses concerning those actions] and deal with [those actions]. Moreover, being disposed to follow his passions, he will listen in vain and without benefit, since the end of such discussions is not knowledge but actions.
[tr. Apostle (1975), ch. 1]
This is why a young man is not a fit person to attend lectures on political science, because he is not versed in the practical business of life from which politics draws its premisses and subject matter. Besides, he tends to follow his feelings, with the result that he will make no headway and derive no benefit from his course, since the object of it is not knowledge but action.
[tr. Thomson/Tredennick (1976)]
This is why a youth is not a suitable student of political science; for he lacks experience of the actions of life which political science argues from and about. Moreover, since he tends to be guided by his feelings, his study will be futile and useless; for its end is action, not knowledge.
[tr. Irwin/Fine (1995)]
This is why a young person is not fitted to hear lectures on political science, since our discussions begin from and concern the actions of life, and of these he has no experience. Again, because of his tendency to follow his feelings, his studies will be useless and to no purpose, since the end of the study is not knowledge but action.
[tr. Crisp (2000)]
Hence of the political art, a young person is not an appropriate student, for he is inexperienced in the actions pertaining to life, and the arguments are based on these actions and concern them. Further, because he is disposed to follow the passions, he will listen pointlessly and unprofitably, since the end involved is not knowledge but action.
[tr. Bartlett/Collins (2011)]
Note that this passage was the basis for these lines from Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, Act 2, sc. 2, l. 165 (1609):
Young men, whom Aristotle thought
Unfit to hear moral philosophy
I stir in it for the sad reason that no other mortal will move, and if I do not, why, it is left undone. The amount of it, be sure, is merely a Scream; but sometimes a scream is better than a thesis.
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) American essayist, lecturer, poet
Journal (1838)
Referring to his attempts to stop the US Government's forced expulsion of the Cherokee from their land.
The proper use of embarrassment is as a conscience of manners. As your conscience might trouble you if you do anything immoral, your sense of embarrassment should be activated if you do anything unmannerly. As conscience should come from within, so should embarrassment. Hot tingles and flushes are quite proper when they arise from your own sense of having violated your own standards, inadvertently or advertently, but Miss Manners hereby absolves everyone from feeling any embarrassment deliberately imposed by others.
Judith Martin (b. 1938) American author, journalist, etiquette expert [a.k.a. Miss Manners] Miss Manners’ Guide to Excruciatingly Correct Behavior, Introduction (1983)
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We live in deeds, not years:
In thoughts, not breaths;
In feelings, not in figures on a dial.
We should count time by heart-throbs.
He most lives
Who thinks most, feels the noblest, acts the best.
Philip James Bailey (1816-1902) English poet, lawyer Festus, Sc. “A Country Town – Market-place – Noon” [Festus] (1839)
(Source)
I bid you strike at the passions; and if you do, you too will prevail. If you can once engage people’s pride, love, pity, ambition (or whichever is their prevailing passion) on your side, you need not fear what their reason can do against you.
Lord Chesterfield (1694-1773) English statesman, wit [Philip Dormer Stanhope]
Letter to his son, #105 (8 Feb 1746)
(Source)
Those who know their own minds do not always know their own hearts.
[Tous ceux qui connaissent leur esprit ne connaissent pas leur coeur.]
François VI, duc de La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680) French epigrammatist, memoirist, noble Réflexions ou sentences et maximes morales [Reflections; or Sentences and Moral Maxims], ¶103 (1665-1678) [tr. FitzGibbon (1957)]
(Source)
Present in the 1st (1665) edition as "Bien des gens connoissent leur esprit, qui ne connoissent pas leur cœur." In manuscript, given as "On peut connaître son esprit; mais qui peut connoître son cœur?"
Many People are Acquainted with their own Wit, that are not Acquainted with their own Heart.
[tr. Stanhope (1694), ¶104]
Many People are acquainted with their own Abilities, that are not acquainted with their own Hearts.
[tr. Stanhope (1706), ¶104]
Men are sometimes well acquainted with their head, when they are not so with their heart.
[pub. Donaldson (1783), ¶216; ed. Lepoittevin-Lacroix (1797), ¶100]
A man may be well acquainted; with his head, whilst he is far from being so with his heart.
[ed. Carvill (1835), ¶188]
It is not all who know their heads who know their hearts.
[ed. Gowens (1851), ¶106]
Those who know their minds do not necessarily know their hearts.
[tr. Bund/Friswell (1871), ¶103]
Those who know their minds best, know their hearts least.
[tr. Heard (1917), ¶103]
Not every one who knows his own mind knows his own heart also.
[tr. Stevens (1939), ¶103]
Not all those who know their minds know their hearts as well.
[tr. Kronenberger (1959), ¶103]
Not everyone who understands his own mind understands his heart.
[tr. Tancock (1959), ¶103]
All those who know their minds do not necessarily know their hearts.
[tr. Whichello (2016) ¶103]